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The first volume is designed to articulate methodological require-
ments relevant for the investigations of the context(s) that comprise the 
modern Western civilization and the way its diverse factors interrelate, 
leading to a predominance of one over others, their suppression and their 
efforts to reestablish their own mode of supremacy. The methodology es-
tablishes general rules of interpretation of “texts – cultures” and locates 
them in their own contexts. The major contribution of the methodology 
is the way it can show what texts belong together, which ones become 
incompatible and constitute if not contradictory positions, at least are 
deemed dangerous, disruptive of “normal order”, leading to the efforts to 
ban, prohibit and even destroy the texts that contest some predominant 
trend of interpretation of the states of affairs. The method is also designed 
to show in what ways a particular tradition (present in texts) becomes sup-
pressed and how it survives by becoming a required part of the suppress-
ing tradition. This will become obvious in subsequent chapters, where the 
confrontation, accommodation and suppression of Political Enlighten-
ment by Scientific Enlightenment and conversely will become evident. It is 
essential to disclose the principles on which major controversies are based. 
Thus, the modern philosophical debate concerning freedom and equality 
led to the notion that one cannot be had without the other, and yet the 
development of the two enlightenments compelled a separation between 
freedom and equality. The result is two modern histories, each attempt-
ing to favor one or the other aspect of enlightenment, political or scien-
tific, even while the former was in a position to extend the scientific more 
openly and creatively. Without a clear understanding of this philosophical 
debate, there would not be any basic conception as to the “conflict” be-
tween Soviet Union and the West, and by extension, we would fail to grasp 
the revolutions against the Soviet Union and the current states of affairs 
and the emergent paradigms in Lithuania. Obviously, Lithuanian efforts 
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to extricate from the suppression by an interpretation of scientific enlight-
enment of modern tradition, embodied in Marxism, also raises questions 
concerning whether the paradigm of such a tradition has its own internal 
flaws. This will be addressed with the analyses of Marxist-Leninist para-
digm and its unexplored ontological grounds of modern history. 
There, the question will be discussed concerning the ways that scien-
tific enlightenment, in a form modified by the presumed “free market”, 
continues in the present Lithuanian state, and how such a continuation is 
framed by the presence of political enlightenment. Crucial issue arises with 
respect to the ways Lithuanian state embodies political enlightenment and 
what elements are missing. Moreover, the text must confront the issue and 
controversy between “individualism” and “collectivism”, each demanding 
to be the foundation of the other. What is necessary is the exposition of 
the ontological grounds of this debate and the way a new paradigm must 
resolve this confrontation. Indeed, the entire “dialectic” rests on this debate 
and despite all efforts by such a dialectic, it failed: every step of these ef-
forts ran into a wall of ontological inconsistencies. There are no texts that 
deal with this issue at its base, and hence the research, proposed in this vol-
ume, will have to set the tone for any debate about the place of Lithuania in 
post-Soviet Europe. The new paradigm will appear with the limits of Soviet, 
Marxist-Leninist way of thinking and offer a base for political engagement 
of the public. Once the paradigm is established, it will become obvious what 
changes must take place within various institutions, such as judicial, educa-
tional, journalistic, economic, to complete the transition from Soviet ways 
of thinking to a more encompassing European ways. 
The transition or, in terms of our project, the “paradigm shift” is mod-
ern Western conception, and its understanding requires a philosophical 
context. In this sense, the discussion seeks to ground all concepts on the 
analyses of basic issues and their prejudgments. Once disclosed, the latter 
will become part of methodological means to make evident the tensions 
between the suppressed and the suppressing theses and the way that the 
tension is maintained despite the efforts of the suppressing tradition to 
negate or explain away the suppressed. In this text, we shall not repeat the 
close analyses of methodological hermeneutics – the latter was published 
in previous work as part of another project; only the precise rules of inter-
pretation will be offered, while the rest of methodology will be “philosoph-
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ical hermeneutics” supplemented by “transcendental” argumentation that 
is required to have an access both to methodological and philosophical 
hermeneutics. The latter offers the context of a tradition, with its prejudg-
ments and equally the ways that a tradition must confront its own self crit-
ical analysis, and opens the door for such analyses at the transcendental 
level. It must be understood that the “transcendental” awareness includes 
a rational argumentation between diverse positions without becoming 
subject to any of them. It is a unique “in-between” position allowing the 
disclosure of contesting positions, their limits, differences and overlap-
ping characteristics. 
Since the project concerns Lithuania and its transition from one para-
digm, the Soviet interpretation of Scientific Enlightenment to another, West-
ern European efforts to maintain a balance between Political and Scientific 
Enlightenments, the text will use research materials from European scholars, 
appropriate for a given period and region under discussion. While there are 
North and South American discussions of the mentioned issues, they tend to 
follow the lead of European thinkers. In this sense, their texts are secondary 
sources and will not become predominant in this research. The introduction 
of other civilizations in the explication of hermeneutical methodology, such 
as India, is needed to show that the methodology will become relevant for 
further investigations into Lithuanian issues with globalization and its claim 
to universality. Here, we shall address a methodological requirement for 
comparative civilizations that cannot be derived from any civilization since 
such a derivation would become prejudicial in favor of its origin. No doubt, 
the transcendental argumentation accessing the limits, differences and inter-
sections of civilizations will become a necessary requirement. 
It is to be noted that the first volume is unfolding the way that Lithuania 
has joined Europe, but also became a part not only of Europe, but global 
in its own local self-interpretation. This is notable in the ways that Lithu-
ania advertises itself by using not only global means – technologies – but 
by giving itself popular images of Lithuanian citizens as globally significant, 
such as sport stars, writers, artists, and even historical figures. This kind of 
local – global self-assertion will be disclosed at various levels in the second 
volume of this research. Regardless how we would wish to assert our Lithu-
anian uniqueness, premised on the greatness of the past, we are inescapably 
in a global context. While in previous researches it was pointed out how 
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Lithuanian self-identity could be expressed and even thrive in European 
context, in our continuous research the global and inter-civilizational logic 
must be addressed. After all, Lithuania is welcoming not only Europeans, 
but also Japanese, Chinese, Indians, both in commercial and cultural senses. 
This means that to welcome such global world, such diverse civilizations, we 
must understand what they are – apart from the superficial images paraded 





One of the most prevailing methods in the study of history, as consti-
tuted by modern understanding of historical time, to be discussed shortly, 
and the various cultural and civilizational encounters, is offered by herme-
neutics. The term “hermeneutics” was coined in the seventeenth century. 
It is one of the main theses that promises to demonstrate that “language” 
as a tradition is basic to all understanding. The philosophical lexicon by 
Rudolph Gocklenius, Lexicon Philosophicum (1613), contains an article 
on hermeneutics under the Greek term hermeneia. It shows the function 
of this term in medieval theology and jurisprudence and its technical uses. 
Its earlier forms appeared in Greek thought, inclusive of Plato and Aristo-
tle. In Plato’s Laws, there is a discussion of arts, one of which is interpre-
tation; it attempts to illuminate the cryptic sayings of divinities without 
making any claim to truth. In Aristotle, one mode of speaking is interpre-
tive. Subsequently, hermeneutics was developed into an auxiliary disci-
pline of philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence, devising specific rules 
for the explication of texts. This development also included major crises 
of Western thought, specifically during various confrontations of distinct 
texts and traditions. There was a confrontation between Hellenic allegori-
cal thought with the Judeo-Christian historical-prophetic orientation. It 
appeared in the efforts to transmit Greek education to the Latin world in 
order to overcome linguistic barriers. Hermeneutics appeared in the ef-
forts to pass on Roman jurisprudence, Greek philosophy and Biblical texts 
to subsequent generations. Finally, the efforts were made by Schlegel and 
Schleiermacher to free hermeneutics from its auxiliary role and present it 
as a universal theory of understanding. 
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The general view that hermeneutics presents is that all explicit human 
thought, including philosophy, is founded on an implicit understand-
ing. Such an understanding includes all divisions of human thought and 
activity, from philosophy through psychology, arts, sociology, religion, 
economy, to physical sciences to the extent that the latter assume human 
understanding and also the divisions of the world into specific domains 
implicit in this understanding. This means that the understanding con-
tains implicit prejudgments as divisions of various domains that sciences 
and humanities take for granted. Such an understanding is much broader 
than any area of sciences and humanities. Moreover, it must deal with 
other domains, such as architecture, since they too are aspects of human 
world and have an architectural and social meaning. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that architecture is a concrete embodiment of a given social 
“spatial” system. The arrangements of human life into socially assigned 
roles are evident in the places and hierarchies that humans occupy in their 
architectural arrangements. Hence, the understanding of architecture re-
quires the prejudgments of social divisions of a given population. The ex-
position of the various prejudgments is the task of hermeneutics. 
At the level of prejudgments, various writers divide hermeneutics 
into specific philosophical domains. Thomas Seebohm, for example, 
claims that hermeneutics can be divided into four basic concerns: first is 
the methodological concern for interpreting texts. As we shall see, this 
concern is very important because the understanding of a given text is a 
complex process of deciphering layers of meaning. Second is the concep-
tion of a general theory of understanding. Can understanding be universal 
and include all traditions, or is it bound to a specific tradition and its pre-
judgments? Is the meaning of “understanding” as interpretation limited 
to theoretical concerns of the Western philosophy and its various divi-
sions into sciences, humanities, and their subdivisions, or can it cover pre-
judgments of other traditions? The reason for these concerns appears in 
the studies of other traditions. For example, Indian tradition might have 
prejudgments, wherein the division into sciences and humanities is not 
a given; that tradition might divide the world into cosmic eroticism and 
practical action in terms of powers and the search for ultimate dissolution 
of the individual. Hence, the term “understanding” might be “particular 
universal” stemming from the Western tradition. Third is the meaning 
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“philosophical hermeneutics” as fundamental ontology, answering the 
question concerning the meaning of being in distinction to the varieties of 
beings that are in the world, which are the most fundamental. It is claimed 
that the entire Western thought is premised on this distinction between 
being and things. Subsequently, we shall suggest arguments why and how 
such a distinction arose and why it is significant. Fourth addresses the 
question of interpretation of symbols that attempt to “read” the domains 
of the latent and the unconscious. Here, one could have psychoanalysis, 
both Freudian and Jungian, and various types of mythological and mys-
tical pronouncements. As a fifth, we could include historical hermeneu-
tics. This type is concerned with temporal development of some text that 
contains problems and their continuous resolutions. The resolutions may 
open entirely different conceptions that were not available in the original 
text. An example of this type would be the development of a particular 
science, such as geometry from Euclidean to Non-Euclidean. The latter 
opens up the conception of space that is very different from the Euclidean. 
It is claimed, nonetheless, that a full understanding of Non-Euclidean ge-
ometry requires a historical study of Euclidean type and the non-necessity 
of some of its postulates. We shall discuss these hermeneutical types and 
issues in greater detail, since philosophical hermeneutics will be most sig-
nificant as methodology for the understanding of the shift in paradigm in 
Lithuania.
Before entering the philosophical debates that establish contexts for un-
derstanding basic principles and prejudgments, explicated by “philosophical 
hermeneutics”, we need to be reminded of the contributions of methodolog-
ical hermeneutics. In this text, there is no need to offer a detailed exposition 
of such hermeneutics, since this exposition is present in sufficient detail in 
my previous text entitled Civilizations, Cultures, Lifeworlds (Vilnius: Myko-
las Romeris University, 2012), only a brief reminder of the rules of “suppres-
sion” and “renaissances” will be included in this chapter. Methodical her-
meneutics, wherein every text, social system, or political structure must be 
understood from its own context and the part must be understood through 
the whole, while the whole must be understood through the parts, is the well 
accepted procedure. This rule is articulated into four different whole-part 
relationships and can be ordered hierarchically. The first whole, of which 
the text and parts of the text is a part, is the language in which the text is 
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written (deconstructive hermeneutics belongs here). The second whole, to 
which the text and parts of the text belong, is the historical context of the 
text. We have to understand the events, to which the text refers, other texts, 
their terminologies, etc., in the framework of this context. The third whole is 
the totality of the works written by an author, for example, Marx the oeuvre, 
in its temporal and historical unfolding. This whole is represented first by a 
style (the specific use of language, pertaining to an individual or a “school” 
of individuals), and changes in the style in the texts belonging to the same 
author or school, such as Marxism-Leninism. Fourth, is the whole as the text 
itself, and the parts are the parts of the text. The first level is called the “gram-
matical level”, the second is the “historical level”, the third is the “individual 
level” and the fourth is called the “generic level”. 
Yet we know that some texts and traditions end in various ways. Some 
of the ways, relevant for our research, will be offered in terms of methodo-
logical rules. The reason for the question as to the end of a text or a tradi-
tion is the common situation, wherein tribes, nations, or vast movements 
attempt to suppress a tradition that is being either conquered or regarded as 
wrong, immoral, false, and hence to be suppressed. This is most relevant for 
our task: we must show what were the tradition and the texts, which were 
imposed upon Lithuania and the entire Soviet Union, which suppressed the 
traditions of Lithuania (and others), and whether the suppression was in-
adequate on its own grounds. This is the reason why methodological her-
meneutics will require philosophical hermeneutics as a completion for the 
understanding of the paradigmatic shift, initiated by Lithuanian declaration 
of independence. Hence, let us summarize the methodological rules of sup-
pression and liberation. We can state at the outset that in rare occasions, a 
tradition might end of its own neglect.
1.  A tradition ends, in the simplest sense, with the last person who refers 
to the text, or in the present, in which the question is raised. Any other 
position, which in any way refers to the text, such as reading someone 
else’s work about it stands, at the present, in the tradition of the text. 
If this is the case, then there will never be a “true” or final interpreta-
tion, unless all references to the text cease. Speaking more concretely, 
some of the traditional texts tend to fade out, cease to function as 
“significant” in a given context, and thus the only preservation that 
is accorded to them is done by philological method. The latter can 
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be a catalyst for various renaissances of texts – a sort of archaization 
movements that proclaim genuine truths of the past that have been 
forgotten and neglected. New agisms have this tendency, yet such ten-
dencies are always destructive – as one modification of methodologi-
cal hermeneutic – to the extent that the “dead languages”, although 
preserved by philological method in archival depositories, are framed 
in the current living languages and hence are taken out of their own 
contexts. They are a species that have vanished, and reappear only in 
a dramatically reconstructed genetic pool. For example, after the Re-
naissance, Scientific and Political Enlightenments, and Reformation, 
medieval literature virtually vanished. What we have as “Neoscholas-
ticism” is a concoction of parts into a whole that belongs to modern 
reading. This suggests the first rule of methodological hermeneutics: 
a suppressed tradition fades out and its revival means the death of its 
unity, since it will be framed by a context alien to it. In brief, the means 
for its survival will be borrowed. 
2.  There is a death of a tradition by violence: one culture conquers anoth-
er and suppresses it completely, specifically if the conquering culture 
has a monopoly of text production. In the context of our research, au-
tocratic rulers, a variant of which was Soviet Union, had a monopoly 
on the production of all texts and media, extended through an entire 
pedagogical system and its prescribed texts that gave a hermeneutical 
reading from childhood through higher education, is a major mode 
of suppression of all other traditions. Any deviant understanding was 
“underground”, depicted as subversive, immoral and false. Media 
and pedagogy are simple propaganda that changes the history of the 
suppressed tradition in favor of the oppressor. All that was Lithu-
anian history received negative shading and became something to be 
avoided. Here, we find a second rule: a complete and irrevocable sup-
pression, attempting to leave no traces of the suppressed, presupposes 
that the oppressing tradition has a total control of producing and pre-
serving of texts, including the reproducing of selected texts from the past 
as confirmation of the veracity of the suppressing tradition. 
3.  A more complex case, where the other retains power in very fascinat-
ing ways, is present in the confrontation of cultures that possess liter-
ary traditions, or a culture with two powerful literary traditions. One 
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main example, relevant for our topic, is present in modern Western 
world. The Scientific Enlightenment formed a novel interpretation 
of “reality” and relied on eminent texts, such as those of Galileo, 
Newton, Bacon, Hobbes, and their followers, and tended to submit 
all events, including human activities, within its scientific circle. In 
principle, all other texts were at best subjective or at worst, false, to 
be relegated to fiction. Yet, there was another aspect of modern tradi-
tion, the Political Enlightenment with its eminent texts, ranging from 
Rousseau through Locke to Kant, with its dominating terminology 
of equality, rights, autonomy and responsibility. Suppression of this 
literature included Marxism as a social, economic and materialistic 
theory, fascism, as a racial theory, and both demanding the suppres-
sion of the hermeneutical circle of the Political Enlightenment. Both 
mentioned movements followed an older Mid-Eastern tradition of 
autocratic Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and not only banned the 
“false” texts, but burned libraries, books, and the producers of books. 
Thus, in the twentieth century, the Russian Revolution engaged in 
the destruction of texts as well as the writers of them; Nazis did the 
same, and Chinese Cultural Revolution repeated this autocratic tradi-
tion. In this sense, the twentieth century has seen some of the most 
archaic methods to deal with literary traditions that are regarded as 
condemnable. Yet the suppressed tradition had to be incorporated 
as a background, which remained a critical aspect for the excuses of 
the oppressors. In this context, it is possible to decipher a third rule 
of methodological hermeneutics: if a conquering and thus oppressing 
literary tradition suppresses another strong tradition, then it is forced 
to incorporate the conquered tradition and use it against the latter. Yet, 
the very use can turn against the conquering tradition and thus create 
a crisis. The analysis of this crisis will be given in the paradigm of 
Soviet Union and the way it was challenged from its own incomplete-
ness. Such incompleteness will become obvious when we articulate 
the basic methodological morphology with philosophical hermeneu-
tics. It is important to note that the oppressing tradition of the Scien-
tific Enlightenment, exemplified by Marxism, Leninism and Stalin-
ism, is infallible, and cannot tolerate opposition to itself. Meanwhile, 
the tradition of the Political Enlightenment could tolerate contradic-
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tions, and was under no obligation to avoid them; indeed, to produce 
contradictions belongs to the structure of this literature. Thus, any 
authority could be abandoned in favor of open debate concerning 
any subject matter, and it was abandoned. 
Since our researches will include comparative civilizations, it is worth 
noting that there is another tradition, that of India, which adds a variant of 
the third rule of methodological hermeneutics. It offers a clear indication 
of a confrontation between “texts” within one tradition. This confronta-
tion is equivalent to modern West containing a tension between two her-
meneutical “circles” and the way such circles have struggled for suprem-
acy that included Soviet Union and the “unruly Republics” questing for 
“radical” change. No doubt, the tradition of India includes the similarities 
with modern West, but it also contains its own uniqueness. It has two fully 
developed hermeneutical circles in its literatures, and hence two theories. 
We recall that tradition is basically a theory. What is radical about this 
tradition is its demonstration that the presumably oppressed literature is 
found to be an inextricable and integral part of the oppressing tradition. 
For the task facing the shift in paradigms – from the Soviet to the 
Western – requires an in depth researches in the Western and, specifi-
cally, modern Western philosophical thinking that provides a context, 
within which the tensions, the suppressions, the prejudgments that com-
prise principles, ambiguity and aims of which allow for temporary antago-
nisms and even armed confrontations and partial reconciliations. Having 
established the ways that the traditions can oppress one another, and how 
within one tradition there might be two contesting interpretations, we are 
in a position to ask more fundamental questions, leading to philosophical 
hermeneutics in order to understand modern West and its construction 
of texts that formed a basic prejudgment, which also formed two modern 
histories, competing for supremacy. Lithuania was subjected to one of the 
histories that oppressed another and thus the very oppression turned out 
to be pervaded by the oppressed tradition that finally emerged and became 
a predominant force. Here, we shall encounter a question, whether the op-
pressing tradition, which went under the guise of the Scientific Enlighten-
ment, proposing to construct a society deemed to be “scientific socialism” 
is still continuing in Lithuania, and if so, under what interpretation, and if 
the new paradigm that emerged in the philosophical framework as the Po-
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litical Enlightenment is capable of suppressing at least the extremes of the 
Scientific Enlightenment and its variants, such as socialism, communism, 
market supremacy, social engineering and even biological reconstruction 
of human life.
The methodological task for the understanding of the fundamental 
problematic concerning Western tradition and the way it appeared in 
modern era is one of philosophical hermeneutics that asks the most fun-
damental question of being. The reason that this type of hermeneutics be-
comes significant rests on the awareness of the difference between things, 
events, states of affairs, all sorts of objectivities and subjectivities, in short 
beings and being. Being must be explicated in its own right, apart from 
explanations of the totality of things, events, mythological figures, con-
cepts and even social systems. While the difference has been noted since 
the ancient Greek thought, beginning most likely with Parmenides, its 
current hermeneutical interest was influenced by Martin Heidegger. Let 
us look at the way, in which this difference has arisen, and what sorts of 
problems it presents. In Western tradition, it is common to inquire about 
things, objects and events in order to discover “what” they are, their es-
sential nature or structure. It is taken for granted that when we ask “What 
is a human” or “What is matter” or “What is a mind”, we can give defini-
tions that capture some essential characteristics of these beings. The Greek 
philosophers, nevertheless, noticed a specific and significant problem: lan-
guage indicates that whenever we attempt to define any being, we not only 
attempt to discover its basic characteristics, but we also say that such a 
being is. Apart from having some essential features, every being somehow 
participates in being. In turn, the latter is different from any particular be-
ing and its characteristics. 
Given this state of affairs, the ancient Greeks took on the task of de-
vising the ways to understand this being that is different from all other 
beings. Yet, according to Heidegger, they made a fatal mistake: they asked 
the same question that they used to interpret all beings: What is being. The 
point is this: if being is different from all beings, then it is inappropriate 
to ask the same question of being that we ask of beings. And yet, since the 
same question was asked, then being was interpreted in terms of what and 
hence the essential difference between beings and being was lost. Being 
became one of the beings, even if it was designated as the “highest” be-
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ing. Because of the interpretation of everything, including being in terms 
of “what something is”, the difference was forgotten and the question of 
being was neglected. Asking “what something is” is equivalent to asking 
what constitutes the essence of something. This silent and unquestioned 
“essentialism” is a prejudgment that philosophical hermeneutics discloses, 
with a full understanding that a disclosure does not eliminate a prejudg-
ment. Questioning a prejudgment and asking “what it is” assumes that the 
question is in the context of the prejudgment. 
Yet, what are the options to ask the question of being without inter-
preting it in terms of the “what” of beings? First, we can notice one spe-
cific option in human knowledge: either we know the essence of beings 
eternally, or we know such beings temporally. If we accept the first option, 
then our search for knowledge would end as soon as we have propositions 
purporting to give an essential truth of any being once and for all. But 
according to historical hermeneutics, no one, so far, has given us such a 
truth. This is evident from history: many truths were offered and none of 
them survived critical debates. Hence, the second option can be taken as 
more plausible: the essence of any being is temporal and hence our knowl-
edge is open to a range of possibilities. This means that if we speak about 
a specific being and want to know what it is, we are also in a position to 
open the future possibilities of what else can this being be. In this sense, 
we can speak of being as an open horizon of future possibilities. What is 
significant in this conception of the relationship of beings and being is the 
inclusion of ourselves as beings, who are not definable essentially, but are 
open to the possibilities of our future being. We too are temporal and tem-
porary. The implications of this interpretation are important. First, all our 
future possibilities are temporal, and we cannot escape our own temporal 
being. This means that the closest possibility that we must accept is our 
own non-being – death. Second, the possibility of death also implies that 
our knowledge of all the future possibilities of being is also limited. In this 
sense, we cannot claim to have understood all the options of our future 
and the possibilities of all beings. Third, in face of this situation, we cannot 
postpone our current commitments, since tomorrow might not come. The 
possibility of our non-being demands that we live fully at the present. This 
will become an important aspect for understanding one of the catalysts 
that initiated the transformation of the Soviet Union.
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Given the suggested problems, it is necessary to test the cultural pre-
judgment that all awareness is structured by language and its traditions, 
some of which have been called “historical”. This is to say, we must resolve 
a fundamental philosophical issue of awareness and language, of tran-
scendental subjectivity and philosophical hermeneutics with its emphasis 
on a historical tradition and its language, specifically, the prejudgments 
that are at the base of all judgments, including the assumption of “What 
something is”. Since the basic claim of language based theories purports 
that all awareness is linguistically shaped, and all experienced phenom-
ena are linguistically interpreted, then assuming the validity of the priority 
of language, the transcendental problematic seems to be surpassed, since 
there is no need of a subject, awareness of which must correlate to the 
phenomena of the world. We find meaning as a prejudgment imbedded in 
language. Resultantly, what is known as “essence” depends on a given lan-
guage of a tradition, a language that privileges the requirement to define 
all things in the presumed “what something is”. If such a prejudgment is 
made obvious, then there is no ontological basis for “essences”, apart from 
the notion of philosophical hermeneutics that is founded upon a Greek 
classical tradition, lasting through the entire history across all sorts of vari-
ants. After all, in most distinct disciplines, diverse philosophical schools, 
we still ask the same question: what is matter, what is evidence, what is 
mind, what is life, spirit, soul, what is an idea, what is a number. It seems 
then that the matter is settled and that any position that opposes philo-
sophical hermeneutic will be based on the same prejudgment. This is to 
say, there is no longer any requirement for the last vestiges of modern 
metaphysics located within the sphere of transcendental subjectivity that 
supposedly accounts for meaning. Whether this is a solution or a mere 
postponement and a relocating of the question of meaning will be seen in 
the development of the problematic of interpretation: does language or 
culture frame the fundamental interpretation of all events, or does a sub-
ject who can and must transcend the limitations of language and culture 
is the final arbiter of sense? For our research, this issue means that texts 
define us and different texts might disagree, leading to a confrontation of 
two textual traditions, such as modern Western difference between the 
Political and Scientific Enlightenments.
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Reflective Method and History
Counter to the claims that all sense inheres in language or culture 
is the transcendental argument that purports to show that all awareness, 
even the linguistically and culturally laden positions, are premised on a fi-
nal moment of reflection, presence of which cannot be denied without the 
denying thesis becoming nonsensical. The arguments that demonstrate 
the requirement of such subjectivity are offered by an analysis of language 
as it is given purely on empirical grounds. It is noted that a variety of em-
pirical marks or sounds can have one meaning, leading to the notion that 
the meaning is not in the marks or sounds but comes with the meaning 
provided by the subject. In turn, there is no way, by learning a language, 
that one can discover in it a “history” and a tradition. Daily discourses do 
not point to anything else apart from the things that we talk about, i.e. 
intend as our objects of interest. To speak at present and suggest that the 
words we use and the propositions we form depends on the historical tra-
dition is to introduce time awareness that in no wise is implied in the pre-
sent speaking. An access to traditional history or historical tradition is not 
identical with such a tradition. If this holds, then it could be said that any 
thesis, any position is, in the final analysis, transcendental. This appears in 
a tacit introduction of awareness into every position, theory, or method. 
For example, if one states that it is possible to look at mathematics as at 
any other subject matter, one will also recognize that looking at... as in-
tentionality does not look like the subject matter that is being intended, in 
this case – numbers. Yet, how easily the sense of looking or awareness can 
be modified in cases, when one states: let us look at things mathematically. 
This suggests that mathematics becomes a mode of perception that is very 
distinct from the things or subject matters that this mode intends. 
Other modes of such awareness are just as available: we can look at 
things theoretically, practically, theologically, aesthetically and realize that 
such modes are not at all subjective in the sense of mental or psychologi-
cal states. In this way, we can also say let us look at language, whereby the 
looking or awareness of language is not part of language, or we can say let 
us look at the world culturally or linguistically, and hence make a tran-
scendental claim that all awareness is linguistic or cultural. Any discussion 
of language, any comparison of languages will be done either from an-
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other language, and the latter from another one, ad infinitum, or any lan-
guage can be present to awareness that can decipher the meaning of terms, 
phrases, comparisons to other languages, and thus provide an access for 
anyone at the level of awareness. In brief, at this level of awareness, the in-
terpreter of languages is not a language. In this part, we will explicate this 
interpreter both as historical-linguistic and cultural, and to what extent 
it is adequate to deal with the question of the very giveness of a tradition, 
language, or culture. The way to disclose such interpreter is to engage first 
in the problematic of historical-linguistic and cultural phenomena and to 
note whether they can offer a universal account, and second, to disclose 
the transcendental awareness that might provide provisional indications 
of individual identity. For philosophical hermeneutics, it is inescapable 
that the subject is unavoidably present in a tacit, but essential way. If we 
take the basic rule of reading of philosophical texts (and any other texts) 
and claim that they all obey the philosophical rule such that any part of a 
given text – no matter how vast it might be – is determined by the whole 
text, and that the whole text is determined by its parts, then such a claim 
makes the text as a whole into an object of investigation, while the investi-
gator is the subject who does not become part of the text or the whole text.
It has been shown that for modern Western philosophical thought 
there is no direct and demonstrable connection between explanatory struc-
tures and the domain of life world experience of things. The experienced 
phenomena are external to theories and the conjunction between them 
has no necessity. The conjunction requires a conjoiner, understanding of 
which must be broader than the theory and its selected perceptual aspects. 
The conjoiner is a reflecting process that performs the task from a vantage 
point of interest, whether the latter is culturally prejudged, linguistically 
prescribed or part of a historical tradition. In this sense, an application of 
a theory does not yield pure objective perceptual phenomena, but one that 
is interpreted by the theoretical requirements and finally by some con-
textual interest. The latter is usually understood in cultural, historical or 
linguistic terms. Thus, modern sciences, in their “empirical” mode, are 
not concerned with perceptual things, but with quantifiable magnitudes. 
Hence, the mathematically framed theory determines what sort of objec-
tivity is “real.” The scientist, whose awareness is constituted by “let us look 
at everything mathematically,” conjoins this “look” with the things of the 
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world by excluding all perceptual – qualitative – indeed essential aspects 
of any “matter of fact.” The very possibility of conjunction between theory 
and fact is from an interest that is negative – exclusion of all experienced 
phenomena. This is significant for our methodological considerations in 
that the Soviet, Marxist-Leninist paradigm was not engaged with any real-
ity, but with the imposition of this paradigm on a given life world and thus 
defining and remaking the latter in accordance with the requirements of 
such paradigm. What was available in that life world was suppressed, as 
were excluded the “essential” aspects of humanity. The paradigm was not 
just a theory, but also a methodology that was imposed from the vantage 
point of power of the ruling elites. This means that the claim to “objective” 
analysis of a situation was premised on the power interests of a group, 
which excluded itself from the very paradigm that it imposed on an entire 
society. This suggests that the paradigm did not reflect any facts, but was 
conjoined to the facts from a point of interest that was excluded from facts 
and the paradigm.
Let us look at the issue critically and point out that the scientist, or 
the philosophizing subject, or the ruling elite as cultural and historical, are 
also figures in the domain of investigation. By the principles of philosoph-
ical hermeneutics (varied in terms of theoretical theses, such as Marxism-
Leninism), all events are also present in the series of explication of any 
matter of fact. Thus, the philosopher, the theoretician, if he/she is a part of 
culture, or his/her own history, cannot claim to obtain the given phenom-
ena of his/her life world without interpreting them in terms of his cultural, 
linguistic, historical understanding. In addition, the very philosophical or 
theoretical explanation that assumes a novel historical or cultural position 
will itself transform the subject matter of such explanation. While being 
shaped by historical and cultural prejudgments, the explanations offered, 
will also change a given life world. In turn, if a theory is part of language 
and history, with their prejudgments, and is shaped by them, then no the-
ory is sufficiently broad to encompass and offer neither a final nor an im-
partial interpretation – it comprises only one aspect of a historical tradi-
tion. Thus, if positivism were to offer two contesting meta-languages, each 
claiming to account for all the usages of a given language, then the debate 
between them would involve a language that is broader than either meta-
language. Indeed, this can also be said of historical-philosophical herme-
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neutics that posits a historical tradition with its linguistic prejudgments as 
an unsurpassable ground of all understanding of things and being itself: 
it too is a historically contingent position that may belong to a specific 
historical period of a specific tradition and hence cannot offer a universal 
claim. Another context, of the same tradition, might not have a historiciz-
ing language and hence no such understanding, not to speak of entirely 
different traditions. This also holds true for the paradigm constructed by 
Marxism-Leninism, specifically with the claim that all theories depend 
on a given historical context of material conditions of production. In this 
sense, it cannot claim universal validity, since the proposed theory would 
escape the parameters of historical-material conditions. While claiming 
universal validity, Marxism-Leninism is one aspect of one tradition and 
cannot become universal, specifically in areas, such as economy, social life 
world, aesthetics, culture, language, since all of these areas belong to hu-
man creation and not physical world.
Historical reason encounters broader issues. Assuming that there is 
a continuous historical process, having a future aim as its final purpose 
that is posited as a necessary condition for necessary connections between 
temporal events, such assumption results in a positing of historical rules, 
be they dialectics of Hegelian or Marxian brands, or some presumed evo-
lution. In brief, future final purpose is posited as a condition for the in-
vention of necessary rules of historical development. It is significant that 
the final purpose is in and part of history and hence one aspect of history 
and thus defies the very notion of a final purpose. Obviously, one his-
torical event cannot be the aim of the whole. After this “final event” is 
reached, history does not cease and thus abolishes such an event as final. 
This outcome forces the thinkers of historical reason to posit a transcend-
ent historical aim above or beyond history. Such transcendence cannot be 
historical and properly must be designated to be eternal. The results of this 
transcendent view are as follows: first, the best that can be obtained from it 
is a changeless dialectical structure or system and hence in principle static, 
yielding no historical development; second, transcendent, infinite being is 
unknowable by contingent historical actors (well noted by Kierkegaard) 
and thus cannot be a source of claims as to whither of human destiny; 
third, infinity has no temporal orientation and would not be an index of a 
purposive direction of history; fourth, historical consciousness cannot es-
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cape self-destruction in terms of its claim to be universal and all inclusive, 
because, one, if all consciousness is historical (expressed pedagogically 
as an accumulation of knowledge) and must be historically contextual-
ized, then such a conscious claim, in terms of historical hermeneutics, is 
equally historical and must be understood within its historical context; 
and two, the very ontology, which gave rise to the conception of mechani-
cal world, is equally historical. Hence, if the mechanical universe were to 
be reinterpreted as one having open meaning, i.e. signitive, then histori-
cal consciousness would cease to be relevant. These aspects place the cur-
rent historical consciousness at a complete loss and a crisis. No doubt, the 
wrestling with this crisis led numerous philosophical and scientific efforts 
into all sorts of metaphysical postulates of infinity, and cosmic order, all 
attempting to find some permanent component, even an eternal recur-
rence, as a saving grace. Theories are proposed and discarded like spring 
fashions, continuously disclosing our confusion. 
And the confusion is methodological; after a brief critique of philo-
sophical hermeneutics and its attendant historical ground, it is essential 
to offer complex arguments to indicate what must be added methodo-
logically to make certain that an access to the paradigms and their trans-
formations would come into focus. Moreover, it is necessary to discover 
methodological requirements without falling into the predicament of 
separating theory from the world, without the irrational proposal to apply 
theory on the world in order to transform the latter, and without becom-
ing stuck in the philosophical hermeneutical circle. These options are the 
principle hindrances that inhere in the very composition of the paradigm 
of the Soviet experiment and in turn fail to take into account the required 
“non-position” of the researcher. No doubt, it is necessary to understand 
that the initiating ground of modernity, postulating a self as an ego-logical 
point, whose primary activity is reflection upon itself, upon its own think-
ing and upon its own powers, as guarantees of the validity of all claims and 
the possibility of their realization, is inadequate. It was required that all 
events justify themselves in the court of standards and rules established by 
a subject reflecting upon itself. Whatever appears to the subject, whether 
it is a physical thing, a foreign culture, a theory, or even a feeling, cannot 
be taken as it is in its own right, but must first justify itself before this 
subject. Hegel ended the modern tradition by demonstrating its ultimate 
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principle: no longer thinking and being are the same, but reflecting thinking 
and being are the same. It will not do to argue that various philosophical 
trends of the last century posited various explanations, even of the ego-
logical subject, in terms of social, material, economic or biological condi-
tions and numerous other claims. Yet, all of them posit their methods and 
theories derived from and adjudicated by reflection. Despite this inevita-
ble ground, it is possible to disclose some aspects, which do not allow such 
reflection to be the final ground, specifically in the context of the modern 
construct of history and its variants discussed above. This means that a 
“subject”, who is impartial to all positions, will be required as a methodo-
logical “non-position”.
It was noted that the positing of a purposeless, mechanistic nature 
is the catalyst for modern historical consciousness. But this suggests that 
such consciousness does not primarily reflect upon itself, but first from 
the material world to itself as excluded from such a world. The unfolding 
of reflection from something other than oneself comprises an opening to 
an awareness, which traces first requirement to understand history. While 
discussing hermeneutics, it was noted that hermeneutics arose as a basic 
trend of humanities in distinction to the scientific or mechanistic explana-
tion of nature. At the very outset, hermeneutics obtains its own position by 
reflecting from the position of mechanical sciences and claims that such 
sciences are based on a philosophical prejudgment. Yet, when hermeneuti-
cal understanding deals with scientific explanation and contrasts the latter 
with a broader linguistic process, within which explanation is understand-
able, it assumes a comparative position, which belongs neither to herme-
neutics nor to scientific explanation. Although hermeneutics assumed that 
the linguistically transmitted historically effective consciousness is the final 
mediation of all awareness, in showing this final mediation as distinct from 
scientific claims, it must grant an inter-reflective awareness between her-
meneutics and science and be able to see the limits of each, even if one or 
the other claims to encompass everything. Such an “interim” is a condition 
for hermeneutical understanding of itself as historical and for the scientific 
awareness as explanatory. Moreover, hermeneutical understanding with its 
linguistic primacy, in which flux we live, have no signs disclosing that they 
are transmissions of a historical tradition. They become historical when 
they are mediated by inter-reflection, which designates them as historical 
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and, in addition, as temporally contingent. What is also to be noticed is 
the return of both, hermeneutics and explanatory sciences, to the rational 
world: the inter-reflection constitutes them both as something, a what, and 
as essentially different one from the other, and thus return to the same phil-
osophical hermeneutics with its prejudgment. Yet, the appearance of this 
inter-reflexivity is both linguistic and yet transgresses the given parameters 
of language; thus, it is both language and explanation, and also…, or it is 
neither one nor the other, but is aware of both. 
The inter-reflexivity is a methodological requirement and can be dis-
closed in various ways, using for this task what is already understood: thus, 
hermeneutically understood language is the ultimate mediation of all ex-
perience and nature. By itself, this claim cannot be maintained, because (1) 
direct living in language does not reveal language but the world; language 
functions anonymously and exhausts itself in opening the world in specific 
ways. In this sense, to speak of language as the medium for the manifesta-
tion of nature and even history is to implicitly disclose an inter-reflexivity 
between language and nature, to recognize both for their difference, and 
hence to be neither one nor the other; (2) to say that the historically effective 
consciousness has horizons that are more extensive than our individual ho-
rizons and at the same time to show how they are related and converge is to 
live between them in order to show their difference and fusion. Hence, this 
in between domain is a lived awareness that resists being reduced to either/
or mental exclusion and opens neither/nor and yes/but/more. It is the most 
concrete awareness, mediation of which cannot be accomplished by any 
other positional mode. It is significant that it cannot be located as an ego, 
psyche, or even magic, because any structuring would reveal this awareness 
as already in play. It is equally significant to note that its appearance is not 
caused by any historical or explanatory hypotheses; it appears as if it were 
spontaneous, unintentional, and thus having no intentional orientation. 
The next question arises with respect to the composition of this “in-
terim awareness”. Can it be rational, i.e. philosophical and hence capable 
of offering arguments for the selection of methodology, or is it some amor-
phous presence, composition of which might depend on specific historical 
period and its context of interpretation? There is no doubt that for philo-
sophical hermeneutics reason is subordinate to the force of interpretation 
that immerses reason itself in a hermeneutical circle from which no sub-
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ject can escape, and indeed wherein the subject itself is defined. Of course, 
our initial discussion of methodological hermeneutics is viable as an aid to 
overcome the positivistic inertia of the scientific logic and its historically 
unreflected linguistic foundations. In this sense, the significance of me-
thodical hermeneutics is its ability to elevate understanding from its pre-
scientific experience to its reflective articulation. If we are to abolish our 
naive relationship with the historical content of theories, we must devise a 
method of interpreting this content in terms of its categorical frameworks. 
Such a method is hermeneutical in principle, but it will avoid the pitfalls 
of philosophical hermeneutics. It can be said that the latter contains an 
“irrational” moment insofar as it claims that the prejudgments of a tradi-
tion can be disclosed but not avoided. The prejudgments are, accordingly, 
an “authority” precluding any “emancipatory” methodology, leading to 
a problem of understanding the possibility of paradigm transformation 
or shift. Philosophical hermeneutics has a tendency to form a closed her-
meneutical circle, thus contradicting its own thesis of “future horizon” 
that overlaps with the past horizon. This is to say, the future horizon is 
not open, but is limited by the prejudgments of the past horizon and its 
authority, implying that if the paradigm of former Soviet Union had its 
prejudgments, then its future horizon could not transgress them, leading 
to the unavoidable “closed” society. But in this sense, philosophical her-
meneutics, with such variants as Soviet Union, could not be universal. 
There is another issue that is preeminent in philosophical hermeneu-
tics: scientific methodology is not only inadequate, but, above all, mis-
leading concerning the phenomena of its research. For example, social 
phenomena cannot be reduced to empirical data and then treated by sci-
entific methodology as if it were a sum of mathematically posited indi-
vidual atoms. Moreover, scientific methodology assumes an ontological 
base that is derived not from discoveries by scientific methodology, but 
from philosophical debates. In this sense, scientific methodology obeys 
a prejudgment that is not scientific; it must then be part of philosophical 
interpretation that cannot be discarded by some decision of subjects with-
out destroying modern sciences and their methods. Even the “subjects” 
are part of modern interpretation and cannot escape the modern histori-
cal hermeneutical circle. Thus, the “absolutism” of scientific methodol-
ogy belongs in modern context and is valid only within that context and 
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cannot claim universal validity. Yet, there is an irrational background to 
this argument for hermeneutical priority over scientific methodology. The 
latter has been and is constantly being modified in face of the demands 
of phenomena. If the phenomena resist specific methodological composi-
tion, the latter can be modified. Yet, if hermeneutical understanding were 
correct, then by dint of historically given prejudgment, no methodology 
could be escaped, i.e. if methodology is historically bound by a tradition, 
then it cannot be rejected. How can then philosophical hermeneutics, 
within its own historical horizon, claim that the scientific methodology is 
to be rejected – it is an irrational authority that no reason could abolish. 
This state of affairs is posited as a general principle: what is at issue is not 
what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens beyond our doing 
and wanting, i.e. what happens to us can never be objectified and com-
pletely resolved, as it takes place within the process of a tradition, in which 
past and present are mediated. Thus seen, the process of a tradition would 
be a blind, spontaneous “substance”, which develops in accordance with 
its own prejudgments. Even if we continuously test our presuppositions – 
a linguistic process, – the horizon of the present is constantly constituted, 
such that our understanding is always a process of the merging of such 
assumedly independent horizons. This continuous mergence is the condi-
tion for the domination of the subject by the spontaneity of a tradition. 
This “merging of horizons” implies that a tradition continues without in-
terruptions and that it is at the same time more than we can encompass 
reflectively. This “more”, happening “behind our backs”, is the superfluity 
of a tradition, a linguistic process that dominates all our actions. 
Philosophical hermeneutics, as a method, can give us a closed system, 
but not its own problematic that would lead either to its collapse or trans-
formation. The problematic requires a transcendental method of reflec-
tion as an addition to philosophical hermeneutics, specifically since the 
latter gives little credence to the power of reflection and critical thought. 
It is not surprising then, that it is compelled to lend an undue weight to 
authority of pre-judgments. But authority can be abolished by the power 
of reflection, leading to persuasion by rational insight and communica-
tion or by analysis of the contents of a paradigm as either closed or open. 
While philosophical hermeneutics would insist on the “linguistic a priori” 
of all socio-historical understanding, without noticing that this a priori 
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is contingent, constituting at the same time a transcendent power, which 
can neither be grasped, nor demonstrated concerning its necessity – tradi-
tions, after all, are contingent. But contingency cannot preclude reflection 
and, hence, the possibility of emancipation. The latter might appear within 
the horizon of what is currently impossible, but still comprises an aim im-
plicit within philosophical hermeneutical circle, specifically that of mod-
ern philosophy. Such aim is accessible to reflection, but of a very specific 
kind. Philosophical hermeneutics also assumes tacitly a modern prejudg-
ment of what constitutes reflection: an individual entity that, in principle, 
cannot encompass by reflection the entire tradition and escape its pre-
judgments. Indeed, on this interpretation, philosophical hermeneutics is 
safe, but it is not safe to the extent that it accepts a historically constituted 
notion of individual, Cartesian self, reflecting upon itself or the thoughts, 
upon which it reflects. 
The above discussion, in fact, seems to suggest an ambiguity in the no-
tion of authority. On one hand, we can never surpass the “over-abundant” 
flux and the horizons of a tradition; on the other, philosophical hermeneu-
tics supposes the ability to reflect upon the presuppositions of a tradition 
and, therefore, to break from its authority. What appears is a reflection 
not of an individual, but a transcendental awareness that can “look” at any 
authority such that “looking at”, as a mode of awareness, is very distinct 
from the object of this awareness and, thus, as a reflection, is free from 
any authority. It comprises a moment of emancipation that is in a posi-
tion to evaluate the validity and the limits of traditional prejudgments, 
specifically since the latter are contingent. The prejudgments, comprising 
an inescapable and irrational authority for philosophical hermeneutics, 
are disclosed by rational reflection that such an authority is contingent 
and has no force of necessity. In contrast to dogmatic authority of a tradi-
tion, the real authority is rational reflection. Authority based on rational 
supremacy can free consciousness from that authority, which is merely 
legitimated by a tradition. At the same time, it is clear that such a reflec-
tion need not claim to be all-encompassing, since it reflects on prejudg-
ments of a given tradition and becomes emancipated from its authority. In 
this sense, rational reflection is always “particular universality”, showing, 
in our case, that universal philosophical hermeneutics is impossible as a 
methodology. Such conception would require a “universal history”, laws 
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and aim of which could be recognized and consciously appropriated. But, 
although it is possible to show aspects of reason in history, it is impossible 
to reveal the “reason” of history; the sense of history as such. This will be 
seen in our analyses of the Soviet paradigm.
If transcendental reflection is to extend philosophical hermeneutical 
methodology, then it is necessary to show in what ways such a reflection 
appears, with the required provision that it does not leave a tradition, but 
finds within it its own “crises”. The latter reveals a latent presence that 
must make sense of a tradition, and thus treat the latter as containing an 
irrational dimension. Once this dimension is methodologically disclosed, 
as was done in this chapter, then the method of disclosure appears in its 
own right and “complements” the inadequacies of a tradition as a “whole” 
text. Thus, one important rule of philosophical hermeneutics is that a giv-
en text, as a tradition with its prejudgments, can and must be completed 
by the interpreter in a way that even the author(s) were not tacitly aware. 
This means that a given text and its interpretation do not depend on the 
subject doing the interpretation, but in the disclosure of aspects of the 
text that must be introduced if the text is to lose its inadequate intercon-
nections. As we shall see, the question of “essence” in terms of “limits” 
will reveal this requirement. This means that the “truth” of the text has a 
hermeneutical horizon, ground of which is philosophy and thus rational 
transcendental reflection. In this sense, the explication of the text will re-
veal its own inadequacy as a hermeneutical circle and will require a prin-
ciple, an arche, a tacit and yet necessary awareness that might not even 
be a part of the circle, and yet a completing ground for interpreting the 
whole text. This philosophical hermeneutics will be our methodological 
condition for explicating modern Western philosophy, its two paradigms, 
wherein one of them became the hermeneutical text of the Soviet Union, 
and how transcendental reflection constantly comprised a completion of 
the text both breaking out of the closed circle and disclosing what that 
tradition required to make sense. To state the case otherwise, the given 
text, regardless of its significance and magnitude, requires a completion, 
and if the interpreter does all to avoid the task of completing the text, then 
he is not adequate to the requirement of the text and is simply adding his 
subjective affirmation of the truncated text. Simply stated, the affirmation 
reveals such interpreter’s analyses as premised on specific social interest. 
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Temporal Field and Reflection
It is well known that for Europe, since the eighteenth century, reality 
was no longer something present, but the “conditions for the possibility 
of being”. This is precisely what is needed methodologically to understand 
the conditions and, above all, horizons of what is possible. Hence, this 
aspect of methodology will include the reflective consciousness and yet 
will not be “outside” of the modern Western world. This means that other 
kinds of “conditions” must be addressed – including the structure of closed 
social/economic systems and the levels, at which dialogue is possible. To 
decipher such possibilities requires a methodology, which would also ac-
cess common awareness. It is best to begin with the latter as an inevitable 
ground of diverse human actions, their limitations and interpretations. 
There is a given understanding in modern West that life – and in most 
cases – that all events are temporal, including the notion of permanent 
eternity, wherein there is a promise of all sorts of activities in “an eternal 
place” and, thus, human life. As briefly noted above, human life, as tempo-
ral, is a major aspect that opens a question whether a promise of “future” 
paradise, that is constantly postponed and postponed, is beyond reach and 
forces a person to live “today” to the fullest extent. It is noticeable that the 
“eternal place” is present to awareness in the mode of “expectation” and, 
thus, as one aspect of numerous other “expectations” of what is possible – 
an open temporal horizon, which can be narrowed as to what is relevant 
and what is at present irrelevant. In turn, awareness is extended as a “past 
horizon”, which is equally relevant since in some societies the past horizon 
might be restricted to specific eminent texts that become equally relevant 
what shall be selected as significant from the future horizon. In this sense, 
it could be said that past-present-future comprise a field phenomenon of 
human active orientations. This is a way of saying that there is a selectivity 
of activities that are deemed to be proper and exclusion of those that are 
forbidden or irrelevant. As we shall see shortly, this kind of time does not 
mean that humans make history – they are their history directly manifest 
in what they do and build. The field of active time is not connected caus-
ally, but “meaningfully”, such that present events point to past and future 
events, i.e. they “signify” them, forming what contemporary European 
thinkers call a “life-world”. This suggests that to understand people, one 
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must understand their life-world. Even in the most beautiful and unclut-
tered life, events and people interconnect through meaning: this plant is 
medicine, and that animal is domestic, while the one growling at a dis-
tance is wild. One event signifies an entire field of other events, equally 
with overlapping temporal awareness. The horizon of memory does not 
reveal an entire past, but makes leaps connecting only the events, person-
alities, mythical figures, as they are required in the temporal field of today, 
this week, this year, tomorrow, next year. Whatever is the extent of the 
“present”, it dominates the selectivity of what is relevant for it. In case of 
the former Soviet Union, the selectivity was strictly prescribed by ideologi-
cal commitments, and the ways that ideologies were interpreted in accord-
ance with the current proclamations by the authorities. The very structure 
of ideology and its contemporary interpretation comprised the method of 
selectivity of relevant events of the past and required possibilities of the 
future. Even the selectivity of texts from “outside” and from the past was 
decided on the horizon of what is possible and what is not – specifically 
with respect to the text from the world of the Political Enlightenment.
Meaningful connections of events, coupled with the difference be-
tween theoretical and field time, account for the fact that there is no one to 
one correlation between the changes in natural environment and its evalu-
ation in field time. Indeed, while natural events may change, their entering 
a life world as meaningful interconnections may remain the same, and 
conversely. This is one part of the methodology being unfolded here – var-
iation of natural and meaningful aspects. Thus, the so-called material con-
ditions may be similar, yet the temporal field of a life world might signify 
such conditions very differently from life world to life world within their 
horizons of possibilities. Such a horizon is also open selectively, where 
significant possibilities are selected and form a context for interpretation 
of events across future, present and past, forming a historical continuity 
that skips over the theoretical time of causal succession. Even if events are 
past and causally no longer efficient, their significance is present not only 
as past, but also as a factor in the horizon of what is possible.
Our brief delimitation of temporal field awareness, pervading a given 
life world, also disclosed the presence of societies as traditions that while 
devised in the past they are equally dominant in regulating future horizon 
and what is possible in it. It is the next task to articulate the field time of 
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action with its open horizons in terms of social or life world compositions 
and the ways they may limit such horizons – what was already selected 
and what can be selectable. It is equally important that the field time of 
action retains open horizons and options that a given society has not con-
sidered, even if it was not against its requirements. Moreover, an open 
horizon must remain even if what is selected from it as possible comprises 
its limits; the comprehension of the latter is premised on the presence of 
the horizon and all that is possible, but for a given tradition is impos-
sible. Contemporary (and of course many other) clashes and revolutions 
are premised on the tensions of what there is as a life world of a given 
tradition, and what there is not – the open possibilities of a horizon that 
one tradition has closed. One can think of the “Arab Spring” that is still 
“springing” and shifting the selectivities of what is possible – both showing 
the limits of what has been a tradition and its horizons and what limita-
tions are no longer acceptable – the closed circle of Mid-Eastern autocratic 
(in its theocratic interpretation) mode of life, and modern Western reflec-
tive domain that is always present in any attempt to close the horizon in a 
philosophical hermeneutical circle. This was the case of the Soviet Union 
and its paradigm that could not be closed because it had to reflect from its 
own temporal horizon, requiring more than the philosophical hermeneu-
tical circle in its scientific variant would allow.
It ought to be obvious that within a context of a society and its tra-
ditional life world, not all possibilities are equally significant – some are 
more remote than others, and some are not even available. In turn, it is 
the case that some possibilities in a given life world are not realizable even 
if possible. The relationships between socially possible and impossible is 
quite complex. What may be possible politically may be remotely possible 
or even impossible economically, and what is possible economically might 
not be possible technically, morally, ontologically or, in many cases, myth-
ologically. This means that some options might be excluded for time being 
and “sink” into the horizon of the past, and yet they might be reinstated 
as a future possibility given its shift in significance or the changes in moral 
values or economic distributions. Such changes require an introduction of 
awareness as “time reflex”.
As noted above, the limits of what society appears in terms of what is 
possible is reflected from what is impossible. But the latter is what reveals 
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options for a society from another society, leading either to transformation 
or to a clash of societies or two forms within a given tradition. It is the case 
that in contemporary global interaction, such time reflexivity is unavoid-
able, despite the claims of positivistic sociologists that analyses of facts do 
not indicate any transformations. Indeed, such sociology, without an ad-
dition of the notion of life world and its horizontal composition, cannot 
disclose anything as a daily awareness and the way it plays a role in consti-
tuting demands for change, demands for “return” to some eminent text and 
its prescribed narrowing of the horizons and indeed precluding a dialogue. 
During one session at the UNESCO conference in Vilnius (five years ago), 
a question of tolerance was raised; there were Muslim scholars from Egypt 
and Iran, and they stated that as long as West tolerates homosexuality, no 
dialogue will be possible between Islam and the West. Within their horizon 
of what is possible, homosexuality is not possible and, thus, any question of 
its tolerance is to be rejected and with it a society that allows this possibility 
to be part of its life world. Here, we have an autocratic closed hermeneutical 
circle yet inevitably forced to reflect from another society and its horizon 
as to its possibilities and their limits. Within an autocratic life world the 
pronouncements in one text determine the limits of what is possible and no 
forces of nature or evolution can change this temporal field.
It is now possible to sketch briefly the way time reflex is a primary 
method in understanding various research ventures and what the re-
searcher, including his reflective awareness, can offer in disclosing life 
worlds, their traditions and differences. First, the dialogue concerning the 
options and possibilities of a given life world is in flux, and the changing, 
expanding or narrowing of temporal horizons also shifts the selectivity 
and significance of events. Second, this means that temporal horizon of 
the future is a way to locate what is more significant from the past and 
how such significance can be modified in terms of the needs that must be 
fulfilled. Third, the past, as a tradition of a life world with its own future 
horizon, may be opened in terms of current events and yield new pos-
sibilities for the past, such as rereading of some eminent texts or making 
previously some insignificant sections of such texts become significant, or 
even in case of a group that depends on family or tribal stories. The lat-
ter may be enlisted as a way to interpret the novel possibilities and, thus, 
to become part of the fabric of the future. Hence, while moving toward 
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the future, research also establishes an orientation and selectivity of past-
present-future events. Fourth, time reflex accounts for the distinction and 
relationship between the present of the past, present of the present, and 
present of the future. Each present is available with its temporal horizons, 
which intersect and are continuous with those of other presents. This ac-
counts for historical presents as overlapping temporal fields that continue 
a specific tradition of selectivities of the possible, the transformative, and 
how the latter comprises a confrontation, intersection and mutual trans-
formation with other traditions. Any reflexivity presupposes as its condi-
tion the distinction between what is currently real and the temporally pos-
sible, the modalized. Thus, a particular social history does not vary only in 
terms of the presently given and selected facts, but also in terms of consti-
tutive conditions of selectivity based on possibilities, which are temporal. 
The insight into the selectivity of facts in any social process is a key to the 
constitution of the relationship between social facts, their structures and 
the temporal horizons or possibilities. 
Our most limited discussion of the conditions of reflexivity has opened 
the possibility to consider further the shift of the concept of theory to a 
concept of critical theory. The latter must (i) show how its very explana-
tions of events will influence such events, since such an explanation can be 
subsumed under reflexive process and its predictions either enhanced or 
thwarted; (ii) it must evaluate social events from a temporal horizon of pos-
sibilities, showing what is possible and what is impossible within a given 
social system and its subsystems. This means that a critical theory must cor-
relate all factors and show how, in this correlation, some possibilities are 
realizable, others probable and still others made impossible. For example, it 
must show how an economic capacity may be thwarted by a political inca-
pacity, a moral stance or an economic misapplication; or how an economic 
capacity, yielding certain options, may become impossible due to a techno-
logical incapacity. At the same time, the critical theory must show the limits 
of the possibilities of a social system and delimit what changes must be in-
stituted within certain social sub-systems to surpass the limitations. Critical 
theory thus constitutes the most encompassing process of social reflexivity 
in historical and ultimately in the complexity of world time. 
The methodological outline as time reflexivity can now be regarded in 
relationship to any specific life world and the way an intervention by an-
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other life world either from outside or from within can become relevant to 
the extent that it would disclose what else is possible and beneficial. This is 
where time reflexivity begins to appear: but this is a question of value and 
which value is temporally most feasible and which must be postponed, 
reflecting from the future possibility of a paradigmatic transformation or a 
partial extension of an already established life world. To be methodologi-
cally precise, when dealing with a philosophical hermeneutical disclosure 
of prejudgments that form the limits of a hermeneutical circle, it is neces-
sary to assume a tacit reflection that posits such a circle as a whole. This 
means that the whole is defined by its parts and the parts belong to the 
whole, such that there is a mutual implication among parts and among 
parts and the whole and the way the whole implies its parts. Hence, the 
analyses of the whole are usually seen from transcendental-reflecting 
awareness that is emancipatory that does not belong to the circle and is a 
broader consciousness than the philosophical hermeneutical circle could 
contain. But for our task, this kind of methodological reflection surpass-
es our requirements, since the latter is to unfold a given paradigm – its 
philosophical hermeneutics – and disclose within its own horizon to what 
extent its circle contains the very conditions that allow the circle to be 
completed in a very fundamental way. This means that the transcendental 
reflection will have to be found as “passive” awareness providing a broader 
“synthesis” than the one offered “actively” as an all-encompassing philo-
sophical hermeneutical circle.
Now, we can point to the methodological hermeneutical rules con-
cerned with suppression of texts or traditions, and the way the suppressed 
experience a renaissance or at least a partial renaissance in different his-
torical contexts in the sense of modern Western Enlightenment and, as we 
shall see, its initial hermeneutical circle that separated into two distinct 
circles, one oppressing the other in such a way that the oppressing will 
turn out to be – at the level of philosophical hermeneutics – incomplete. 
In this sense, the completion by transcendental reflection might disclose 
that the oppressed is the ground of the oppressing hermeneutics. In meth-
odological hermeneutics, we saw how India exemplifies this situation. In 
philosophical hermeneutics, this would mean that the ontological essence 
is not only a completion of the one sided modern Enlightenment, but also 
the ground of the suppressing hermeneutical circle. It is also important to 
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note that the interpreter, who completes the philosophical hermeneutical 
circle, needs not be “outside” of its horizon, since he too must interpret 
himself as a condition for the completion of a text. To speak socially and 
politically, he is the place, where the “right to speak”, as an aspect of the 
suppressed, is equivalent to the horizons, which he discloses. In this sense, 
we overcome the “individual” subject and appropriate the emancipator 
reflection embodied by the individual.
Given the methodological concerns and the requirement for tran-
scendental reflection, it will become important to explicate how the shift of 
paradigms from the Soviet to European in Lithuania attempt to merge the 
horizons of the Scientific and Political Enlightenments, and what levels of 
transcendental methodology are present to mediate between the two en-
lightenments. In order to reach this level of awareness, we still have to expli-
cate the principles that base modern Western philosophies – principles that 
formed a very unique philosophical hermeneutic circle that faced a “crisis” 
and thus a crisis of the understanding of who we are.
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CHAPTER III
BIRTH OF MODERN WESTERN THOUGHT
Power and Will
The methodological discussion reached a position that in principle 
a particular understanding must respect the context, within which it un-
folds. It is the case that the background of the Soviet Union and its para-
digm, as well as the paradigm of the West, were composed by the pro-
found debates among philosophers, concerning the nature of “reality”, of 
what it is to be human, what sort of society is to be achieved through the 
revolutions against Monarchy and aristocracy, and what does it mean to 
have a government and a political society and state. In this chapter, the 
shape of modern world will be explicated in principle, providing a context 
that shaped the compositions and the tensions of the twentieth century, 
encompassing the European Continent and beyond. It is to be noted that 
the Soviet Union was born, to a great extent, on the basis of “Western-
izers”, who rejected the autocracy of Russian nation. If the Soviet Union 
continued an autocratic tradition, it was in an entirely different context – 
Western-scientific paradigm that was partially a dominant trend across 
Western Europe and the United States. For our research, this state of af-
fairs means that the shift from Soviet paradigm to European paradigm is 
not absolute, and we shall have to be cautious not to think that contempo-
rary West does not have some of the political and social problems found in 
the former Soviet Union. While starting with the entry of Lithuania into a 
“new” life world, it is necessary to explicate the context of this life world, 
called the modern West.
After gaining independence from the Soviet-Byzantine, autocratic 
empire, Lithuania had to face some principal issues that plague the West: 
how to balance freedom and equality. This balance requires a reflective 
consciousness for its explication, fully knowing that the Western civili-
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zation, as political, is not obtained by mere thought, but by action. The 
political praxis, initiated by a selfreflective thought and reason, required a 
mode of action, which positioned the human as an object of human will. 
This praxis proposes that the reality of political revolution is the univer-
sal equality of the human as human. While it has been assumed that for 
modern Western philosophy there cannot be anything such as “human 
essence”, it is nonetheless clear that the more basic background of clas-
sical tradition remains: human as a fallible, yet responsible being even in 
face of mistakes that he must correct. This very fallibility is what allows 
the self-understanding of persons in Western civilization as “open”. Being 
fallible, the individual is posited as equal to any other individual, recogniz-
ing no dominance of one person over others, and no authority, which is 
not affirmed by the individual’s reflection upon himself. Every individual 
is independent from others, and in a free association with others he only 
recognizes a political society and its representatives established and ap-
pointed by him. The representatives must be accountable to the individual 
and the public. This equality also leads to independence and freedom of 
each. Yet, it is not sufficient to make such easy proclamations, since they 
require implementation and a specific kind of society: political society or, 
as Greeks called it, the Polis. 
At the origination of the Polis, Pericles had pointed out that a free 
life requires a strict adherence to the law, and law protects a person from 
injustice. Here, we have an expression of relationship between freedom, 
right and law. This relationship is the main theme of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries thought. Such a thought is pervaded by a dominant 
question: what allows a legitimate application of power if man is essential-
ly free? We must begin by asking: what kind of relationships, which would 
allow the emergence of a political society, must there be between humans? 
This is to say, what distinguishes political communities from other human 
relationships? The answer offers a unique relationship between the human 
as a rational being and as a political being. Most kinds of human relation-
ships are based on common purposes, and indeed the origin of political 
society might have numerous common purposes; yet there must be an 
essential difference, which belongs to the founding of political community 
itself. This is to say the founding and the existence of the political society 
are inextricably related. While we have other purposes, toward which we 
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aim in common, the political community is its own purpose, which we 
ought to have and maintain. The very purpose of human relationship in 
political community is this very relationship, i.e. the purpose of the orig-
ination of this community is the very existence of the community. The 
community is not a means for other purposes or a common purpose, but 
rather the unification of humans into a political community is its own 
purpose. The origination and continuation of political community is, as 
such, a fundamental purpose in itself: it is selffounded. Greeks called ousia 
as something that has its foundation in itself. For Kant, the political com-
munity is what constitutes a common essence or ousia. Thus, the political 
community is not comparable to any other human relationship; the rela-
tionship of humans, as a purpose in itself, and not a relationship for the 
sake of other purposes, is what maintains for the human the source of its 
own essence. This means that the very origin of human as human, as ra-
tional and responsible, can only be maintained and preserved in a political 
community, and in this sense the human as human must be essentially 
political if he is to constitute, preserve and originate human essence. 
This should be regarded closer in terms of various levels, at which the 
relationship between the human and the political community is funda-
mental. What constitutes the human, in one basic sense, is his rationality, 
i.e. the capacity to function in the world in light of humanities own pur-
poses. But in order to manifest his rationality, humanity must establish 
a political community. How so? The human as rational is empowered to 
function in accord with purposes, and purposes are representations of the 
future and at the same selfrepresentations of the human as to what she 
is and what she wants to accomplish. But a purposive being of this kind 
is a free being. Yet, she is constantly working with others for common 
purposes, and hence her freedom is constantly delimited against the oth-
ers; her freedom exists in the context of life with others in such a way that 
this life might lead to one group becoming the “masters”, while another 
becoming the “slaves”. Here, the very essence of the human is completely 
subverted. How is one to avoid such subversion? The freedom of each, in 
the multifarious relations with others, is guaranteed when the free activity 
of an individual is tied to a condition: the consensus of free members with 
one another to the extent that the consensus is guaranteed by universally 
accepted laws. This condition circumscribes and determines the essence 
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of public rights, comprising the totality of laws, which rule the freedom of 
each in relationship to freedoms of others. 
It must be emphasized that the conception of human freedom requires 
political community, in which the freedom of the individual is guaranteed 
not by some ontological rules, present in some determinate being, but by 
a free establishment of laws and a free submission to such laws. The free 
establishment of laws is at the same time an establishment of a political 
community, purpose of which is itself, i.e. the existence of freedom of each 
individual to freely posit and submit to laws, which guarantee the very 
freedom to posit slaw. Thus, once again, the political community is its own 
purpose, within which context other purposes can be agreed upon and 
attained in freedom. The origin of political society is freedom, which, by 
virtue of the founding of political society posited freely, insures each indi-
vidual’s freedom by mutually and freely accepted laws. Other forms of so-
ciety are not political but purposive, i.e. such forms are established for the 
sake of purposes, such as power, economy, psychological security, neither 
of which have any public domain. This is to say, the essence of political so-
ciety is a common and mutual maintenance of the public domain; all other 
forms of social organization are private, even if it claims to be democratic, 
specifically if the public domain begins to be intersected by various private 
or social interests; a public, which does not engage in public affairs and 
hence it is also privatized, i.e. it remains at the level of society but not at 
the level of political society. The establishment of public domain excludes 
private interests, private positions and social status, socially acquired rank 
and hierarchical slot. In political society, each member meets and regards 
others as political members with only one “interest”, the maintenance of 
what each member already is: free. In political society, the public arena is 
where free persons gather for the sake of the maintenance of freely estab-
lished law and, hence, for the maintenance of what each person is. 
The laws, which secure each person’s freedom, are not always fol-
lowed, i.e. not everyone follows the law for the sake or due to respect of the 
law. But what would it mean to say that someone follows the law for the 
sake of the law? First, it would mean that such a person respects freedom 
(he is not submitting to some dictating or necessitating impulses); second, 
the respect of such freedom and, hence, the law is not some natural occur-
rence, but calls for constant maintenance of the law and its free origins; 
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after all, such a law is not simply there, but is a continuous “ought”, not 
in some moral sense, but in a publicpolitical sense. Thirdly, this constant 
“insistence” means that freedom is not a pre-given, inborn, gifted from 
higher authority condition, but a condition that is constantly established 
and maintained. Fourth, any maintenance of the public domain, as the 
political domain of freedom, requires legitimate power, which can compel 
the maintenance of the public against the private, i.e. a person, who fails 
to freely accept the law, which stems from her freedom and the freedom of 
others, acts privately and hence ceases to participate in the political arena; 
hence, she has lost her freedom, has given it up for the sake of an arbitrary 
and compulsive action, some cause or biological, psychological impulse. 
Legitimate power can be used against such a person. In other words, the 
freely agreed upon laws lend each person her freedom and in turn a de-
mand that the law is to be maintained publicly; in this sense, each person, 
as a member of political society, can exercise legitimate power to maintain 
the public sphere free from private incursions and attacks, and, hence, 
attacks on persons as members of political society. One mode of use of 
power is legitimated by political society and its members, who exercise 
it to insure the freedom of each in the public domain by dissuading any 
private act from arbitrary exercise.
It is obviously incorrect to equate morality with law and rights. Moral 
laws require the person’s freedom, but they have causal or compulsory call 
to be followed. As it is well known, moral rules are usually premised on 
punishments and rewards and, hence, are not free. Moral laws are “for the 
sake of” some purpose and, thus, are followed of necessity. Freely estab-
lished laws are for the sake of such laws as a guarantee of freedom and can 
be enforced and consequences delimited in case of the incursions against 
such laws. Thus, those, who are appointed to insure the public domain, 
are not preservers of any morality, but keepers of the law and nothing else. 
Inclusion of morality would turn political society into warring factions of 
fanatics, each offering his “ultimate value”. If the judiciary were to assume 
the role of the preserver of morality, then it would have to apply the meth-
ods of inquisition in order to check the private conscience of every citizen. 
No doubt, there is a specific ethos in relationship to rights in the pub-
lic domain: first, a free recognition and acceptance of the laws, which stem 
from mutual freedom of each individual in relationship to the “ought”, i.e. 
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the maintenance of the rights of each, and second, the continuous engage-
ment of the individuals in the public domain to insure that the laws meet 
the condition of maintaining the public domain of rights and freedoms. 
This means that laws are not eternal, but must be wisely modified in order 
to accommodate the public requirements of currently interrelating indi-
viduals. For example, contrary to numerous commentaries, Kant did not 
posit absolute norms as laws; rather every law, as practical, is to be tested 
in the public arena in order to obtain a universal, i.e. public validity. By the 
latter, Kant means that the law will be acceptable when it guarantees each 
member of political society equal public rights, i.e. when the freedom of any 
member is balanced by the freedoms of all members. This of course permits 
the laws to change in accordance with changing human relationships and 
public needs. What is important to recall that political society or, as some 
would call it, “juridical state”, is not a formal set of laws or imperatives. Each 
individual is a social being, capable of life only in society. This life, nonethe-
less, is insufficient if left solely at the social level, in which all individuals or 
groups are intent on pursuing individual or group aims. This level would 
not be able to account for the “existent freedom” being coextensive with the 
public domain, and, in turn, the “existent” public domain as coextensive 
with freedom. This is to say political society reveals the very essence of the 
selffounding of a public domain that allows for diversity of positions to be 
debated, contested, and resolved; thus, it is not merely an aggregate of indi-
viduals aiming at common purposes. The purpose of the political society is 
the political society, wherein the rights of all individuals as equals are guar-
anteed by the laws and their acceptance and enactment. This conception of 
the public rights of the individual stems directly from the founding of the 
public domain and, thus, of freedom as a basic mode of rational human in-
teraction. In a society, the human “wills” that the society becomes a political 
society; without the latter, the social life remains private and nonpolitical, al-
lowing human rule over humans by illegitimate power. Indeed, it is possible 
that societies might mislead and suppress the political sphere for the sake of 
a quick fix in the domain of private aims and interests, yet such a society, 
on its own basis, cannot account for the continuous appearance of voices 
calling for “rights”, calling for “public participation” in the establishment of 
laws, calling for freedoms; these very voices constitute a reminder that pure 
social life, even under the guise of “politics”, which serves “group” interests, 
is basically a despotic life, devoid of political ethos. 
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The voices calling for the public domain are not a reminder that there 
are some problems with the laws – after all, in pure social life there are no 
public laws, – but a problem with the origin, from which a political society 
emerges, an origin, which is a continuous origination and maintenance of 
the public domain and freedom as an essence of a rational being. This also 
means that a historical investigation into the appearance of various social 
systems is inadequate for the understanding of the origin of the political 
society. The political society, as its own purpose, has the following fun-
damental principles in a sense that their denial would be a performative 
contradiction.
The constitution of a first democratic institution is the public domain 
accessible to all members of a society. This step is coextensive with the 
constitution of freedom of each member of a community as a human be-
ing. Each has a right and a duty to engage in and continuously found the 
political domain and freedom. In turn, each can establish her own way 
of life, to shape her destiny, under the condition that she allows others to 
do the same. A political community must be constantly reminded that in 
order to understand itself as political, it must constantly be aware of this 
principle in order to maintain and guarantee the mutual freedoms of each 
member. At times, this principle is misread, especially in face of the im-
mense difficulties in adjudicating within the public sphere various claims 
and counter claims. Hence, too often the task is left to the “fathers” of a 
political community to handle the affairs of the state. This mode of “gov-
erning” turns out soon to be “paternal”, i.e. the governed are the children, 
who need to be told what to do and who cannot be told everything. The 
benevolent paternalism leads to the notion that all benefits should stem 
from the “new idol”, the state, which, in its omnipotence and omniscience, 
should be left in the hands of the “leaders”. This is one form of despotism, 
which abolishes the rights of the citizen in the sense that the citizen has 
acquired duties but no rights. Such a tendency can appear even in a parlia-
mentary democracy, when, for example, the representatives begin to think 
that political decisions are best left in the hands of the expertise of some 
more “preeminent” leaders or even the representatives themselves. 
The theory of “limited understanding of the subordinates” can emerge 
as the main view of the representatives, even if this view is hidden under 
some other name, such as “popular leadership”. In fact, such a hidden 
44 CHAPTER III 
domination tends to attack any criticism from the “intellectuals” as a criti-
cism that stems from a “pretense” to “know better” than the population, 
all the while maintaining the subordination of the “dumb population” un-
der the unquestioned popularity of the representatives. This “paternalistic 
benevolence” takes its model from a family, with the father at its head. 
The problem is that political community and family are basically distinct. 
The family is not a miniature state and the state is not a magnified family. 
The regard of a political community as a family hides a social despotism, 
in which political freedoms cease to play a role. Subsequently, we shall 
see how such a despotism appears on the basis of reduction of political 
community to pure society. Another danger for the public domain is the 
proclaimed “national unity”, tending to abolish the public participation 
by arguing that all human relationships are power laden, and, hence, the 
leaders must assume power in order to “protect the citizens” from all sorts 
of internal and external enemies. This tends to crush public debate and 
opposition. It is a way of using power by positing “external” and “internal” 
enemies, which must be guarded against and hence by instilling a false 
pride in the national unity and power. Even in the United States, the dem-
ocratic procedures are subverted under the protective jargon of “national 
security”. Subsequently, other threats to political society will be explored, 
specifically those, arising with political technocracy.
From autonomous freedom that is coextensive with the maintenance 
of the public domain flows equality of each member of political commu-
nity. As we saw, freedom based on rationally constituted law allows each 
person to compel other persons, i.e. allows each a right to demand others 
to follow the law. Thus, each through each is submitted to the law. But the 
members are not submitted to each other’s power; rather, each has a right 
to compel others to submit to the law and each must submit to the law 
himself. Of course, the laws are laws stemming from freedom and not im-
posed by an arbitrary power, even if some power has become legitimated 
by longevity. It is to be noted that autonomous freedom, as a source of law 
in the public domain, constitutes each member of the political community 
as equal source of law. It is also to be noted that for modern Western un-
derstanding the notion of “common human nature” is untenable; hence, 
the option of deriving political domain from “natural law” is excluded. 
The reasons for such exclusion are complex, but some of them need to be 
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mentioned as examples. The modern West includes numerous sciences 
concerning the understanding of “nature”. First, there is the basic ontol-
ogy that all things are sum of material parts, no matter how large or small, 
and everything must be explained by their magnitudes, movements and 
locations in space and time. Second, human nature is a complex biologi-
cal and chemical process, ruled by genetic “codes”. Third, human nature 
is a momentary ideological phenomenon, reflecting the economic, mate-
rial interests. Fourth, and equally quite prevalent, is the psychological hu-
man, driven by unconscious impulses expressed in all sorts of sublimated 
achievements. We should mention the current rage of multiculturalism 
pronouncing that each culture defines humans in terms of its own lan-
guage, image, and rituals. Fifth, human nature is invented by some magi-
cian in the sky who pronounced a word, and a thing, such as a human, 
imbued with “heavenly” essence, appears. Thus, the question is which of 
these “natures” shall be proposed as the basis of law? 
The only option that is left is the constitution of the public domain, 
wherein each member of the political community will be regarded as au-
tonomous and equal source of law. The most difficult task for the cur-
rent age is to decipher and promote laws, which would not be a screen 
for power impositions of some group over the population. The reason for 
the difficulties is the industrial society dominating the social relationships 
and in fact hindering the maintenance of political community. This is to 
say, there is a tendency toward social and away from political constitution 
of the state. The principle of equality maintains that no one can compel 
another person except through the public laws, and that each individual 
can reach for the attainment of all her talents, desires, fulfillment of her 
chosen tasks within the framework of public laws. There are no inherent 
birth rights of one group over another, and no privileged line of descent. 
No caste can claim a higher position and exclude others from any public 
participation in any affairs. Fundamentally, no “masterslave” relationship 
is available. The latter still maintains a residuum of “natural” rights, which, 
taken by themselves, may be operative in the social, but are completely 
inadequate as a basis of political community. 
From the conception of public domain, autonomy and equality of 
each member of political community follow each social member’s inde-
pendence as a duty bound law giver. If this were forgotten, then we are 
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exposed to despotism. A law, which is valid for all, stating what is permit-
ted and forbidden, is a matter of a mutual decision. Such a law, stemming 
from a decision of everyone over everyone and herself, guarantees that no 
one is treated unjustly, since no one would decide to treat herself unjustly. 
Injustice can be perpetuated against the other or imposed by the other, 
if one is excluded from participating in the public domain. In this sense, 
no individual’s will – even if an individual were to claim that he is the 
most “qualified” to master the affairs of the whole and hence should be 
acclaimed as a lawgiver – can be a law giver; rather, the law is polycentri-
cally agreed enactment. This is the basic law: mutual consent. The origin of 
such a law consists of three components: (1) freedom of each in the sense 
of a right to shape his life, (2) equality, in the sense that all are subject to 
the law, and (3) a mutual consent, in which each individual makes a de-
cision over others and himself. By the eighteenth century, this basic law 
was called “original contract”. While this might sound like Rousseau, it is 
founded differently from him. This law stems from a rational and hence 
free decision of any human, who, as an individual, lives with other indi-
viduals in a society. Rational beings as free can guarantee their freedom by 
a free and mutual agreement, and the latter is the political act in a society, 
which transforms a society into a political society. 
This thesis of “contract” has been attacked by all sorts of romanticists 
and conservatives, from Hegel through Marx, and up to date in various 
social, historical and evolutionary theories, proclaiming that the current 
laws have emerged historically and are composites of social interests and 
powers, sanctioned by long historical traditions. The problems of “histori-
cal traditions” have been addressed in the previous chapter. In brief, they 
are social laws, and as such, depend on drives, needs, power positions, 
group “dynamics”, resulting in “ideologies”, which sanction the private 
imposition of one person’s rule over another. But precisely, these claims 
make the law depend on “factual” components and relationships, on ir-
rational power struggles and postures, which cannot yield a law, to which 
one must submit by choice, but a law, which is identical with a material 
force. In this sense, we would revert back to the processes depicted by 
Thucydides. “Politics” ceases and becomes a means for a social aggran-
dizement of power positions, possessions, and expansion. Social, political, 
and economic “sciences” share in this conservativism not by dint of their 
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Marxian explanation that even sciences are ideologies, which support 
the given power relationships in a society, but by their very constitution, 
which compels them to regard political society socially and historically as 
a complex interaction of cause and interests. The argument by the “scien-
tists” is pushed further: there is no “historical” evidence, in which a state 
was established on the basis of some original “contract”. 
All these arguments miss the point of the Enlightenment and, specifi-
cally, the principles, which comprise a modern understanding of what it 
means to be human. The contract is a necessary condition of rational and 
free beings living in a society, if such a society is to establish a political 
state, and not a social empire. “Scientific” accusation supposes that phi-
losophers are attempting to derive a political state from an “idea” and not 
from historical reality. After all, ideas reflect reality and not conversely. If 
one were to decipher what is meant by the “idea of contract”, one would 
discover that it is a complex of very concrete factors. To speak phenom-
enologically, the “idea”, or more properly eidos of original contract, relates 
to the individual as a being of interested activity, who, while living with 
others in a society, is related to them in various modes of influence and 
dependence. The contract is in a society and becomes political, when the 
individuals take upon themselves to establish the public domain and cor-
relatively their own autonomy; from this follow mutual laws, presented 
as a constitution, to which all agree to submit. Second, the manifold of 
the eidos allows the law giver to enact laws, which originate with a mu-
tual consent of the members of political society in such a way that such 
members can approve of and submit to the law. Third, the eidos is not 
an arbitrarily invented notion, but rather a necessary insight if the hu-
man is to be preserved as human and not as a creature of irrational forces. 
Thus, the eidos does not propose freedom in its abstract essence, but in its 
concrete affectivity. While essentially a rational being is free, what has to 
be understood is how this freedom relates to other freedoms in a social 
setting. Hence, the concrete reality of this freedom first manifests itself 
in an original contract and not merely in social life. The eidos is what first 
determines objective political reality and practical interactions in public 
arena, and not the privatesubjective and social arena. A theory of political 
society has the task to decipher and to reveal this manifold eidos, as was 
offered above, in various social and historical obfuscations and rhetorical 
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devices. This is to say, the essence of human freedom becomes concretely 
autonomous only in a contractual political society. 
While the three principles enunciated above constitute the basis of 
political society, specific laws do not stem directly from them. A written 
constitution, ratified by citizens, proposes various requirements to be fol-
lowed as a framework for establishing laws. Individual laws depend on the 
changing surroundings and changing human interrelationships. In this 
sense, any law must not only be in accord with the eidos that includes 
rights and responsibilities, but also must be interrogated with respect to 
the range of its necessity. The person appointed to carry out the law, or 
called upon to establish a law, can make mistakes in two directions: first, 
he might not notice that his specific implementation might lead to viola-
tion of rights guaranteed by a constitution, or that the very law leads to an 
unjust conclusion, and second, he might be mistaken as to the justifiable 
necessity of a law in a given context. Given this situation, the constant 
duty of a citizen is to engage in a dual critique. This builds, to speak meta-
phorically, a “podium of public justice”, inclusive of every member’s right 
to offer an open critique without fear of reprisals. Whoever accuses such 
a critique of being against the state, or against the people, harbors appar-
ently despotic tendencies. When the representatives of an open political 
society proclaim that criticism and open debate endanger the state, what 
they are saying in truth is that they are worried about their own misdeeds 
and positions. They actually fear what they do and begin to hate any critic 
and open discourse on public issues. In fact, they begin to intimate that 
the critics are in fact a hateful and disruptive element of the state, counter 
to a “free” and “just order”. They fear their own misdeeds and accuse the 
members of the public, who dare be critical. Such inhabitants of public 
trust should be dismissed with all dispatch. 
The laws, stemming from appointed law givers, are binding to the 
public only to the extent that they represent the agreement of the public. 
What the public cannot decide about itself, neither can the representa-
tives. And this is the very “self-purpose”, which constitutes political socie-
ty: neither the representatives, nor the public can abolish the existent free-
dom of public and mutuality in the public domain. Any such action would 
contradict the very concept of political society. The political community 
does not arise from the necessities of life, but conversely. It is established 
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and maintained because the human can preserve in it his freedom in a 
life of community and a life of needs. Of course, in industrial society the 
law giving function has been submitted to numerous social demands and 
power relationships. In this sense, the social practice of arbitrariness and 
power is being tied to the juridical political society in such a way that the 
state is becoming social juridical state. And this is what creates a tension 
between the social arena of interests, and the political arena of rights and 
public freedoms and duties. There arises a strong tendency to drag into 
the public arena the “interests and necessities” of the social powers and 
irrationalities. Subsequently, we shall address this issue in terms of “legiti-
mation crisis”.
The coupling of the state with society, indeed their mixing, was of-
fered by Hobbes. His, and the like theories, understand the state as a rela-
tionship of humans for the purpose of achieving maximum “happiness”. 
The latter term, at that time, meant the satisfaction of natural needs to a 
maximum degree, duration and intensity. Of course, the individuals think 
of happiness and well-being differently and, indeed, radically differently 
at different times. Thus, it is impossible to give any circumscription of 
what the term “common good” would mean. Moreover, in this conception 
it is impossible to correlate the numerous private wills under a common 
law, and hence the state would have to be a society ruled by power and 
interests. This is to say, the Hobbesian notion of natural selfpreservation, 
dominating human relationships of power, leads to a society, in which the 
only solution to singular confrontation of powers is an invention of one 
power; the latter need not follow any law and thus it is arbitrary, capable 
of maintaining the “happiness” of the sovereign. To escape the notion that 
all relationships in social life are founded on material interest and power, 
Hobbes has no other recourse than to extend society into a power society, 
in which the only adjudication is material, leaving out the possibility of 
rational consent and law. 
These conditions are at the same time at the source of individual anxi-
ety: the social fabric seems to be exposed to chaos and a possibility of anar-
chy. And, thus, the democratic mode of life, in an effort to avoid anarchy, 
calls for a concentration of power. And this concentration is not a sole prod-
uct of the specter of anarchy, but is unique for democracy. If all are equal, 
then all should be submitted to the same laws, chosen by all. Obviously, this 
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general tendency of equality to establish common laws may be specified by 
regional and more specific laws, but the first impetus is “equality under the 
law” of all leading to a central rule. After all, in face of equality, it would be 
most distressing if a law were to apply to one and not another citizen. At 
the same time, a condition for an acceptance and legitimation of a govern-
ment is, in principle, possible in democracy if the governmental legislative 
practice is applicable equally to all. In brief, centralism is legitimated since 
those, who are empowered to legislate, are called upon to do so equally for 
all. Not only for all, but also for all groups, corporations, organizations, and 
interest parties such that they too have no more rights than the individual, 
i.e. they too have the same obligations and requirements before the law, and 
this includes the legislative power, regardless from what origin this power 
might be; it too must submit to the laws as any individual and hence can-
not be above the individual. Yet, the more the will to equality emerges, the 
more the individual seems to disappear into the “crowd”, leading to a con-
sciousness of unity of legal forms stemming from the state. In this sense, the 
individual begins to regard the state as the source of law, power of action 
and favors, and at the same time this individual begins to appear increas-
ingly smaller and insignificant. This is one of the catalysts for citizens in a 
democratic state to cease their participation in the public domain, engage 
in public debates, regard all those, who run for public office with suspicion, 
and public institutions with mistrust. 
Yet, the citizen is to be reminded that it is his/her duty not only to 
appoint a government, but also to hold the government accountable and 
under constant surveillance and critique. This sort of “interaction” is what 
allows for a continuous maintenance of political society and of the knowl-
edge that the public arena is free and open, and that arbitrary powers are 
constantly monitored and thwarted. This knowledge is what should de-
termine the actions of those appointed to public office and entrusted with 
legislative enactment and executive implementation of laws. This knowl-
edge is coextensive with the conception that the entire political society is 
directed by unified laws, comprising both rights and duties of everyone. 
After all, everyone is dominated by a basic conception that the political 
society and the power that is invested in it is freely posited by the citizens 
over themselves, and hence freely accepted by them. Even opposition to 
given laws and procedures, the call for changing of laws, is incorporated 
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in political society and open to all citizens, indeed called for from the pub-
lic and groups. These are the constants of a democratic political society. 
In all the transformations, they maintain coherence and continuity. They 
constitute the indices of a democratic ethos. Once again, it should not be 
understood that it is something “immanent” in the human, such as free-
dom of choice; rather, it is constituted on the basis of an idea of autonomy, 
equality, and willed in praxis. 
Individual
Before explicating the modern, equal individual, it would be benefi-
cial to sketch another mode of life world that could not allow equal in-
dividualism. Such a life world is Medieval (it includes other life worlds 
dominated by autocratic principle, one of which is just mentioned rule by 
a monarch, extolled by Hobbes), in which a society is ruled by one person-
ality, in many cases conflated with created images of a divinity, with which 
a given autocrat is identified as King of Kings, Lord of Lords, at times 
having “divine right of kings”, not to be questioned by anyone. Philoso-
phy demands that every position should be disclosed within its context, 
providing the very principles that such a position must follow. Hence, it is 
essential to explicate an autocratic tradition that the modern West (and, 
indeed, the classical philosophy) escaped, but presence of which still ap-
pears in various guises in Lithuania and the West. It is to be noted that for 
modern West, the crucial question of legitimacy of government has been 
resolved in favor of the autonomous, equal, having rights and responsibili-
ties individual, exposed to the “insecurity” of novel experience of being 
“self-created” and a creator of his political society. 
But modern West had to contest a vast tradition – indeed an entire 
autocratic civilization – wherein the individual was not available or, at 
best, completely suppressed. Thus, what is the legitimacy of the autocratic 
“government”? In case of the latter, the ambiguity of legitimation can be 
dispelled by magical legitimation in mythological imagery. The mytholog-
ical region is peopled by figures that are structurally isomorphic with the 
power holders inhabiting the “solar palaces”. There is the celestial Lord-
King, his Queen, their retinue, their subservient supplicants and worshi-
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pers, each with a sign of appointed and anointed rank, and hierarchical 
position. This is precisely the imperial regality, and in the final analysis the 
celestial mythological region, inhabited by divinities, coincides with this 
ruling composition. This is to say, there is no legitimation here, since the 
mythical does not justify the imperial deeds, but is identical with them. 
The emperor can claim without a fear of contradiction that “we are di-
vine”. Thus, we find that the Persian imperial morphology and the Judeo-
Christian-Islamic composition also coincide. The ruling emperor is the 
law giver and the law, and there should be neither deviations, nor ques-
tions concerning the power of such law. The language here is one of edicts 
and imperatives. All that lives and exists must obey and be subordinate to 
the edicts, indeed must act in ways that would constitute a support and 
enhancement of the edicts. No one can question the imperial force of the 
law, specifically when the law coincides with the mythical imagery that is 
also the magic of “making of the world”. The imperial powers make the 
world by their commands, and their divinities make the world by utter-
ing appropriate words. “Let there be dogs” and dogs appeared by verbal 
magic. Hence, the divine edicts are not some ethical commands of how 
humans must live, but are identical with the way humans are. At this level, 
we are faced with an understanding of verbal power that becomes coex-
tensive with making, and indeed with an in-distinction between word and 
event. The power holder’s every uttered wish becomes coextensive with 
law, deed and reality. While we have indicated this activity to be identical 
with ritualistic and verbal magic, there is also its extension into the lan-
guage of social relationships. At this juncture, we must point out that the 
disclosure of this tradition is premised methodologically on philosophical 
hermeneutics, wherein all events, all our understanding, is mediated by a 
tradition, which horizon is identical with its language. The Philosophical 
hermeneutical circle is closed insofar as everything in the world is deter-
mined by the limits of “divine” edicts coming directly from the emperor, the 
ruler, or the king. Here, no individual, as a reflective consciousness, is pos-
sible, because everything that a human is belongs to the tradition and, in 
the final analysis, on the way a tradition defines everything and everyone.
Up to date, the cult personalities are called “lords, masters, lord of 
lords, king of kings” and the followers of such cults must live on their 
knees, slither on their stomachs, sing “praises to the lord”, go to “places 
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of worship”, be grateful and thankful to the lord, pronounce that every-
thing depends on the “will of the lord”. The lord is an absolute and infinite 
power; he knows and does everything – a sort of panoptical being – and 
demands that the transgressors of his rules confess their misdeeds. He is 
magnificent, perfect, vengeful, and once a while may be merciful. Let us 
be clear on these points at the metaphysical level. The human being, made 
by the power of magical words, must continue to be shaped and ruled by 
additional words. Hence, he may be declared a “sinner” not as some char-
acteristic of his human essence, but as the very essence he acquires due to 
the verbal pronouncement, which he cannot escape. When some high sha-
man of these personality cults pronounces that a person has been “excom-
municated”, it does not mean, as it is usually taken, that he is separated 
from the group, but that he has become by the power of excommunication 
a transformed entity – most likely demonic. This verbal power to make 
and remake is evident from the rituals of “forgiveness.” One can become 
transformed back into a humble follower not by one’s own efforts, but, in 
the final analysis, a declaration of forgiveness by some supreme authority 
or by an appointed servant empowered to forgive the “sinner” and remake 
him into a worthy being. It is important to understand the extent, to which 
the notion of being a “sinner” is pushed. While one is made in the image of 
the lord and master, one is born inadequate, a “fallen angel”, and must be 
made complete by a magical ritual, usually called “baptism”, where mys-
terious words are pronounced to ensure that this being is truly a human 
and, therefore, worthy worshiper and, if need arises, an obedient warrior 
in the service of the lord’s army. Another significant aspect of these cults is 
the ranking of human beings in a hierarchy of social positions: while eve-
ryone is made by the same magic words, in this life each is destined to have 
a specific place in society, which he cannot alter. If he is born a peasant, 
he will not be able to become aristocrat, no matter what he does. It is the 
will of the lord that he is born and must be nothing else, but a peasant. An 
aristocrat is born to be nothing else and regardless of his fortunes or mis-
fortunes, he and his children will be aristocrats. While everyone is equal 
in the eyes of the lord, this equality is postponed for a life in the “other 
world”, but not in the world of flesh and blood. And everyone is watched 
to insure that the established “order” is observed – one cannot escape the 
all-seeing eyes of the lord. Thus, even the body belongs to the “lord”, the 
king, the aristocrat, and not the individual.
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Thus, it is not only the emperor, who has spies everywhere – eyes 
and ears that see and hear everything – but the ultimate authority forever 
knows everything a priori, wherein no one can escape his gaze. Any hope 
of hiding is completely abolished. The servants, the appointed shamans 
of this “panopticon” are empowered to “hear the confessions” of the sin-
ners and to pass judgment as to the status of the very being of those who 
confess. While the shamans act as eyes and ears of the supreme master in 
the sky, the extent of their vision depends on the total vision of the master: 
the sinner may attempt to get away with some omissions in the confes-
sional, but he cannot escape the vision of the ultimate master, the lord of 
lords. This is evident from the rituals of the personality cults, where no 
mediating shaman is required for confessions. The individual must ad-
mit his misdeeds and transgressions directly to the master and proclaim 
that he was forgiven and, therefore, restored to the “ranks of the faithful”. 
One aspect of this ritual shows up with the so-called “evangelicals”, who 
are “reborn” as one with their master. The appropriate shouts and noises, 
words repeated from some fable, empower them to become totally dif-
ferent persons and, in principle, they too become empowered and com-
manded to “spread the word” by any means. 
The current fever in the United States among such groups to “spread 
the word” around the globe that translates into military crusades for the 
conquest of the “unbelievers” or “infidels” is just one outcome of such 
empowerment. Some may object that the members of their group do not 
use weapons to spread the word, but are engaged in good works among 
the poor and the unbelievers, or believers in “false gods”. That may be the 
case, but using weapons to kill may be more kind than destroying people’s 
entire worlds as a way of life that made sense, was meaningful and allowed 
them to live in their simple ways. To make these people live on their knees 
in front of imported personalities is worse than death: it is enslavement 
and destruction of any vestige of human dignity. Of course, among the 
fables of the original texts of personality cults, slavery is sanctioned. That 
is why the slave trade, practiced by the members of these cults, was not 
considered to be evil. In fact, it was regarded as doing a favor to the un-
baptized, heathen savages, including the Lithuanian pagans, who needed 
to be subjected to the true faith and, thus, saved from their own erroneous 
ways. As we know, the conquest of the new world included the destruc-
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tion of total populations in order to make them subservient to the new 
masters and their divinities. In principle, everyone has to be a possession 
of masters, inevitable historical destinies, having not a shred of selfhood 
that is not pervaded by the hermeneutical circle, which no one can escape.
The suggestions so far also delimit an entirely different concept of the 
human than that offered by philosophy. Not the free person empowered 
to question and interrogate all positions in an open forum with others, 
and not even the initial autonomous subject of modern thinking, but the 
one that is “subject to...” is subjected to edicts, to the various strategies 
and techniques of controlling human actions and his very essence. There 
are, obviously, various levels of strategies and techniques, which not only 
address the human, but, as noted, primarily invent it on the basis of ver-
bal power. One might want to argue that the human is pre-given and his 
various characteristics discovered, as would be the case in genuine phi-
losophy, yet one will be hard pressed to offer any evidence of the preexist-
ence of such humans in the autocratic tradition prior to their articulation 
as an “ought”, as permitted and prohibited, normal and deviant modes 
of being. At the very outset, the humans (and all things of the world) are 
defined by what they “ought to be” and not “what they are”. Such notable 
as Emanuel Levinas, while rejecting philosophy, could not escape the pull 
of his tradition, where the “ought” is prior to everything, where everything 
is measured by mysterious infinity, which “freely” creates the other. Here, 
we have a reappearance of the arbitrary will at the highest level of the tra-
dition of personality cults. The latter can be seen as a variant of autocratic 
tradition and apart from the above mentioned lord of lords, god of gods, 
or divine right of kings, may extend into secular dogmas of communism 
and fascism. We shall address them shortly.
The emperor who builds a fortress, a castle, brings with him the le-
gitimating rigidity and absoluteness of monotheistic personality cult. As 
a nomad, he generalizes everything as being under one will and law, lend-
ing the settled nomad a legitimation not only by supreme authority, but 
ruling in the name of its will: thus, his word is the law and before it no 
power can suffice. From his fortress, he sends his mobile forces to enforce 
his will. The eyes of thousand spies see everything, and his long sword 
is everywhere, withheld, yet manifest. This manifestation appears in the 
power spectacle that punishes the offender of the ruling edict, the imperial 
56 CHAPTER III 
proclamation. The withholding of power is an economic way of maintain-
ing it; it is poised everywhere, it pervades all and can become active at a 
moment’s notice. Yet, it has to be guaranteed in an occasional spectacle in 
order to demonstrate to the populace that in face of this power everyone is 
absolutely powerless. Any member, who violates any edict, is seen as a di-
rect attacker on the emperor and the supreme lord. The emperor deems it 
necessary to demonstrate that the power dis-equivalence between him and 
the violator of an edict is infinite. This demonstration constitutes the basis 
for the public scaffold and spectacle. The violator is made to die many 
deaths before the final death in order to reveal the thousand triumphs of 
an edict over the condemned. Since the commands of the emperor and his 
lord are absolute, any deviation from them is equally absolute, where the 
transgressor and the public are to experience the spectacle of public pun-
ishment as a demonstration of the absolute non-being of the transgressor 
in face of the absolute being of the emperor and his counterpart, the heav-
enly lord. There are no degrees of transgression that would warrant differ-
ent degrees of punishment. Every transgression from an absolute position 
is an absolute transgression, to be punished absolutely.
There is, then, invented a verbal anatomy correlative to the body 
technology of degrees of pain and torture. Precise implements have to 
be coded for precise infliction of pain, correlated to precise hierarchy of 
edicts, violation of which is a depiction of an exact degree of assault on the 
imperial and divine persons. Their “justice” pursued the victim beyond 
all possible pain into eternity. Even in the latter, there are verbal rules as 
to the prescribed tortures. But the body, subjected to the coded anatomy 
of torture and pain, must also be seen as the manifestation of the truth of 
the royal and divine judicial system, the interrogation, the confession, and 
documentation; in the proceedings of the imperial court, the accused is a 
priori and of necessity guilty and must be made to confess through degrees 
of torture. Everyone must confess, and those, who do not confess, are the 
ultimate enemies, filled with demonic pride and arrogance and must be 
subjected to extreme punishment, lasting for days, if not weeks. Indeed, 
the subjected body is the law made visible in flesh. The technical imple-
ments are a way of writing the story of the ultimate figure of the personal-
ity cult and its edicts directly into the flesh, the broken bones, and at the 
same time of stating the guilt of the victim, the absolute power of the law 
and lastly the impotence of the transgressor.
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It is impossible to think of the relationship between commands and 
punishment in equivalent terms in this autocratic world, the Byzantine, 
i.e. arbitrary and unlimited parade of power. The commands pronounced 
to be laws are rather designed to demonstrate the direct presence of the 
total superiority of physical power of the emperor on the completely im-
potent body of the victim. This public spectacle of protracted torture is 
not designed as deterrence against crime, but as a way of making present 
the commands and rules of unrestrained power of the ruler on the vic-
tim’s body. The public execution of thousand deaths does not reestablish a 
balance, equivalence through retribution, a justice, but reactivated power. 
The meaning of justice would be, here, a manifestation of force, a justice 
as the physical, technical, overwhelming force of the ruling power. Being a 
ritual of armed law, it manifests the emperor both as a head of law and of 
war. Thus, the public torture has this function: victory of an armed strug-
gle, which is decided in advance by the asymmetry of powers in complete 
favor of the ruler. The body, completely destroyed, torn to bits, broken 
on the wheel, disemboweled, burnt to ashes and thrown to the winds was 
a public spectacle manifesting the infinite power of the emperor and the 
total impotence of the victim. 
This is a legitimation of power by elaborate liturgy of prescribed inscrip-
tions in flesh, each a punishment and an atonement to an absolute source 
of law, standing on the side of the emperor. This kind of absolute atrocity 
cannot be attributed to some concept of retaliation, but has to be coupled to 
a truth and a war. The ruling aristocracy or theocracy or, in a final analysis, 
ideology of a ruling party, exacts truth through torture from the victim and 
reveals itself as an armed power that stands on the side of “truth and jus-
tice”, and resultantly could exalt itself as chivalrous, a chivalrous power that 
declares war against those, who are engaged in civil war, and who must be 
taught in a public spectacle that the power is not only omnipotent, but also 
omniscient. It knows all events at all times and reveals its secret knowledge 
periodically in a public spectacle. The spectacle was a multifaceted represen-
tation of the hidden struggles of an individual against various impositions 
of imperial edicts, a struggle in which the representatives of the empire – the 
police, the magistrate, the priest – were equally small and insignificant; thus, 
the public spectacle was a magnifying device, to make the small deed of the 
“guilty” into an enormity, and the deed doer into a public monster, and the 
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sudden appearance in the public not just of the magistrate, the priest, but 
of the total imperial and divine absolute power. Obviously, the one, who 
was condemned, had another option; instead of repenting and accepting the 
demands, he could defy the terrorism on his body and show that despite the 
absolute thrown against him, he will not bow before the power; he will die 
defiant and unrepentant. Such a person can be a heroic sign to the public of 
resistance and a danger to power.
In the autocratic and, in many cases, anti-philosophical tradition, 
those in power assume that everyone is guilty, a rebel, a suspect if not for 
deviant deeds, at least for unacceptable thoughts. Thinking is silent and 
hidden and, thus, is a greater danger: it must be brought to speech, to ad-
missions of being mistaken, possessed by dangerous and demonic forces, 
by influences of class and social position and even by ignorance of truth. 
Hence, confessions of one’s thinking will reveal falsehoods in face of the 
truth possessed by those in power. Such a truth, as noted, is absolute and, 
as Kierkegaard suggested, is unreachable by humans. In face of it all, our 
thinking is a priori false and all our actions are unethical or criminal. In 
this sense, one must be forced to make a public confession in order for the 
spectators to realize that they too are harboring false thoughts and are en-
gaged in evil activities. There is only one truth, written in cryptic language 
of fables, known only to and understood by the authorities, the priests, the 
shamans, the party heads. Any other writings are false and to be burned 
with the authors of such writings. Above all, philosophical writings are 
the most dangerous and to be avoided lest they infect and mislead those 
with weak minds. Coupled with this syndrome is another claim: what is 
being done to the victims of such a power is done for their good, for their 
salvation, and indeed for the salvation of a fallen, mislead and ignorant 
humanity. It does not matter whether the authorities are theocratic or 
ideological – no one is in a position to know better than they. Hence, the 
modern fever to save the world by those, who have total knowledge and 
understanding of historical destiny of humanity, cannot be questioned. 
The harsh civilization explicated above has variations, claiming to be 
secular, but in fact comprise a continuation of autocratic mode of gov-
erning. It can be said that once an autocratic power takes over, it must 
maintain itself as absolute, must possess all social means of sustenance 
of all members of society and possess such members as property of the 
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autocratic government. The Russian revolution has not changed the social 
position of the population; in principle, one form of autocracy was swept 
away by another – at the top – one head was replaced by another but the 
body remained the property if not of a divine monarch, then of the head 
of the state, who knew the inevitable destiny of history and had to use 
every means to abolish everyone, who would not be a true believer. Not 
only body, but all thinking had to be managed, controlled and always sus-
pect, leading to the rituals of verbal incantations of dogmatic words, which 
sense eluded the lowly population – not the head, but the tail of revolu-
tion. This history need not be recounted here; it is well known autocratic 
control, autocratic decisions to eliminate every suspected person, who 
might have a thought of his own, every child, who might have acquired 
some ideas from his parents, even everyone, who knew how to plant a 
potato without government’s direction. Even Maoist China had public 
confessions of those, who were born into the wrong class or had some 
thoughts of their own. Even wearing glasses was regarded as a sign of an 
educated person and, hence, an enemy of the autocratic state. The follow-
ers of such trends claim that the “people” never do anything on their own; 
all that they do is due to the lord’s will and action, to historical necessity, 
to genetic causes, material and psychological impulses. In other words, 
this is the magic language that is totally isomorphic with monarchic, aris-
tocratic, autocratic and theocratic social orders of power. Those in power, 
the worshipers of their own divinities, truths and ideologies cannot, in 
principle, live in the world of freedom and responsibility; their initial and 
continuous consciousness is still pervaded by slavish attitudes and behav-
ior, their self-esteem is identical with being a servant of the lord master, 
of history, of scientific necessity and their ethos coincides with obedience. 
Of course, the phrase “Scientific Enlightenment” sounds modern, but all 
the premises are autocratic: cause and effect, “natural laws” as edicts, and 
those, who know and manage society, are omniscient.
The human person disappears and is simply a result of “lord’s will,” of 
call to action by universal justice and salvation of humanity. Any thought-
ful questioning of such will and its edicts is forbidden and will be punished 
if not immediately, then certainly in an “after life.” And the emperors, as 
heads of “state and church” with their priestly retinue, place themselves at 
the gate of death and proclaim to possess verbal power to send the “good” 
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for rewards and the “evil” for punishment. In many cases, the “good” are 
the ones, who are required to sacrifice their lives in some holy war and, 
thus, are immediately transported to enjoy heavenly sex with eternal vir-
gins. It is the continuation of verbal magic to transport the submissive fol-
lowers to rewards and those, who dared even to think of questioning the 
“higher or the highest authority”, to punishments. As we shall see, without 
the awareness of our own worldliness and temporality, our finite exist-
ence, the priestly classes, the ideologues would cease to hold such magic 
power. Yet, in a unique extension of this power, the modern scientist is 
also at the gate of life and death. This will appear clearly in our discussion 
of technological ontology and metaphysics and even of the new paradigm 
in the post-Soviet Lithuania.
It is to be noted that the emergence of the imperial powers can be cor-
related to nomadic means, and, according to well-known practices, such 
means were the horse. It is a “technology” that corresponds to other “do-
mesticated” technologies, except for the difference in power and speed. 
The horse is mobile and fast and allows the nomad a wide range of ruler-
ship. This is to say, the horse can be a means by which one is capable of 
wasting one settled community and then going to the next for conquest 
and subsistence until this too is exhausted. The nomad will build his for-
tress, from which it can rule a region and can protect his conquest from 
others like him. Hence, the economy of settled peoples, i.e. agrarian and 
domestic, is an attraction for conquest by the mobile nomadic people, who 
become the robbers yet with a claim to “superiority” in power and “birth”. 
There is the promised land of “milk and honey” and we must claim it since 
our lord, our father in the sky, has promised it to us. Of course, the claim-
ing will require the elimination or enslavement of the local “unbelievers” 
as inferior beings fit to serve the new masters and their lord. The conquer-
ing nomads are the leisure class, i.e. unconcerned with the production of 
the means of subsistence, but very much concerned with the “art of rul-
ing”. This division into “settled” and “nomadic” can be extended into the 
division between warlike and peaceful, power seeking and ruling and the 
ruled. Such ruling by the nomadic power of the horse rider-warrior can 
be equated to the power of modern warfare with powerful and mobile 
machinery of war: tanks, ships, airplanes, rockets, nuclear nirvana, i.e. the 
magic of the word of the rulers of contemporary global-technical empires, 
which can proclaim “let it not be”, press a button and all life will be gone. 
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One characteristic of the imperial divinities is that they have no spe-
cific place or time and hence are positioned as “transcendent” or “beyond” 
space and time and hence can be a means to legitimate the occupation and 
violation of any region: our god rules over everything, and if he is not the 
only one, then at least he is more powerful than any of your gods, and, 
thus, we can rule over everything. Having conquered a given place, the 
nomads will proclaim that it was promised by their divinity and, hence, 
it belongs to them legitimately and beyond the questioning by any mere 
terrestrial being, especially the conquered and, hence, lower beings. This 
claim was and is used by Israelites, by Jesuist conquest of the New World 
and the destruction of the local heathen and infidels, by Islamists, who 
swept across Arabia with the view that truly their victories and harsh rul-
ership by power were legitimated by their ultimate divinity. After all, the 
current pope’s pronouncements about Islam’s spreading the “faith” by 
sword as some sort of immoral action forgets the same actions by Israelite 
and Jesuist brethren. Any means, any action, any dispossession of others’ 
lands are legitimated “in the name of the lord,” all the way to the claims 
that such lands are promised to them by their lord. It is an autocratic no-
tion how the royal ruler allots all the lands to his vassals. 
We need not forget that the conquerors of the New World claimed the 
lands “in the name of the King” and, in the final analysis, “in the name of the 
Lord”. It is equally no wonder that the Islamic personality cult proclaims 
the right to rule over the entire world since in every place there already ap-
peared prophets, who announced the rulership of one master. The univer-
sal Caliphate is a given fact and only its realization is to be accomplished by 
subjugating the people everywhere, who have not heeded the pronounce-
ments of such prophets. There is only one master and a holy war must be 
waged against those, who are still the unbelievers and do not wish to be 
servants to the master. We should not be misled by the “clash” among the 
three Mid-Eastern personality cults: they all have the same power aims and 
the battle is a family affair as to which of the “prophets” is a true follower 
and revealer of the ultimate father’s commands. The current rage concern-
ing “clash of civilizations” is not between West and its claim to be “Judeo-
Christian” and Islam, but between philosophy and Mid-Eastern metaphys-
ics of the will, and ultimately autocracy. Once again, the communist variant 
had a historical destiny that did not belong to a particular place or time, 
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but was proclaimed to be universal with its final victory over entire world. 
While “nowhere and everywhere”, such autocratic position is nomadic: its 
proponents have a duty to invade and conquer anyplace, establish a center, 
from which to rule the local population and indeed be served and supplied 
with sumptuous life style as “elites”, who are “saving” the ignorant popu-
lations from their own ignorance. The Soviet invasions around the globe, 
and specifically the Baltics, set up centers, from which local people could 
be monitored, controlled and “educated” by various means, including con-
centration camps, deportations to labor camps, torture and death. Those, 
who are so treated, are deemed to be deviants from historical destiny of hu-
manity and their presence is a disruptive and negative component, lagging 
behind, a residuum of past and, thus, irrational – they must be eliminated 
as less than human. The nomadic masters must decide what shape the “new 
humanity” must possess. 
It is also interesting to note the current “interfaith debate” among 
Hebrew, Christian and Islamic cult members, where such questions as to 
whether your understanding of the image called a god is too transcend-
ent and, hence, inaccessible to humans, and our image is rational and, 
therefore, superior to yours, are paraded quite seriously, as if the “debate” 
had a subject matter and addressed some “real issues”. After all, how is 
one to adjudicate in the context of such a debate which position is “true” 
apart from appeals to some written stories by self-appointed “prophets”. 
Moreover, such appeals are radically impossible, since such stories are full 
of fables, allegories, metaphors, all sorts of allusions, and all of them open 
to indefinite interpretations. This is to say, in the final “analysis”, the de-
baters can say whatever they will and find “support” in the fables of their 
prophets: in brief, all that the debaters can say is that “it is so because I 
say so”. Yet, more fundamentally, these debates take the texts they cite in 
an autocratic fashion, wherein each appeal to the text is at the same time 
legitimated by the text’s “authority”. This was the case of Soviet autocracy, 
since the autocrats constantly appealed to eminent texts of the “prophets” 
of historical aim and necessity and, thus, could not be questioned with-
out becoming heretics to be eliminated. The autocrats, meanwhile, were 
not bound by any law, since, by virtue of their being the qualified read-
ers of the eminent texts, whatever they say and do is beyond questioning. 
The servants, entire populations, are bound to obey and indeed spread the 
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message of salvation offered by autocrats. Armed with the one universal 
“truth”, the faithful warriors have to wage a holy war against the fallen 
world blind to its own salvation. The most misleading claims of the mod-
ern autocrats are their illegitimate use of and shift to philosophical reason, 
which does not belong in their context. It is the same story of philosophy 
becoming a hand maiden to autocratic closed hermeneutical circle. 
We are articulating the principles of thinking and acting of an auto-
cratic civilization and not some form of atheism, agnosticism anti-clerical-
ism or even some anti-medievalism or communism. Such thinking does 
not accept the world and proclaims that the latter is under the power of 
some supreme personality that demands all sorts of self-sacrifices, servi-
tude, tortures, wars, self-rejection, denial of dignity, honor and responsi-
bility. We are not rejecting the presence of this mode of thinking and life; 
rather, we are suggesting that it cannot be made into philosophy if it is 
taken strictly within its own limits. We are well aware of the claims of this 
civilization that it is “good” and “rational” and, hence, should be treated 
as equal to the philosophical tradition. But such notions as “reason” and 
open discourse, unhindered by the requirement to accept a priori some 
eminent set of stories, does not belong to this tradition. Borrowing from 
others and then intertwining these notions to claim equivalence is simply 
bad faith. As Abelard had demonstrated, the borrowing of classical Greek 
rational thought in the form of logic and using it to evaluate the numerous 
pronouncements of the high priests of one of the Medieval cults showed 
the irrationality of such pronouncements. 
What is interesting in the use of reason and logic in this context con-
sists of the mistaken notion that logic proves the existence of some reality. 
We have known since Kant that this is not the case. To have any validity, 
logic must have perceptual content. The phrases from the fables, inserted 
into logical form, have no perceptual content and resultantly the logic 
frames simple verbal images. To avoid classical and even modern Western 
philosophical thinking, Mid-Eastern autocratic civilization and its Marx-
ian variants simply banned philosophy. After all, philosophy might pro-
mote thinking and questioning and reveal that all the eminent texts are 
full of wondrous figures, images and deeds and, therefore, should properly 
belong to history of aesthetics. From the side of philosophy, we would 
want to agree with this assessment as to the fertility of human imagina-
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tion, as long as it does not lead to terrorist practices against those, who 
have other types of aesthetic histories, specifically those that are classical, 
i.e. satisfied with the forms of life of this world without intertwining them 
with some images of “greater” beings, historical aims and cosmic rules.
This corresponds to civilizational topographies that include Persian, 
Byzantine, Mongolian, Christian, Russian, Holy Roman, Islamic, fascist 
and communist empires; they extend the conception of autocratic-abso-
lutist power, correlating to an autocratic mythological structure, and mag-
ical pronouncements, in opposition to these, the Hellenic demos backed by 
discursive, interrogative and rationally correctable mode of life that cor-
relates to the logos of nature, to which the human belongs. What is natural 
is what contains appropriate strength. Thus, it is natural for humans to use 
fire and it is inappropriate for someone to use power to deprive them of 
fire. There is a possibility to strike bargains, change them and contest them 
in the public arena. Greek mythology, for example, reflects this way of 
natural bargaining. The understanding of power must be adjudicated dis-
cursively and not imposed by edicts. Accordingly, this “freedom” is what 
characterizes the West and at the same time what deflects the imperative 
absolutes of the Middle East and its autocratic civilization: no individual, 
no rights or responsibilities, and not being a master of one’s own thinking 
and body – all of these are property of autocracy. 
Having suggested earlier that the consciousness, constitutive of the 
will to equality, institutes an open public arena accessible to all without 
exceptions, we must now consider how equality, once it has been real-
ized, confirms such a consciousness. Once equality is posited and begins 
to be realized, each individual has neither a master nor a servant; he is 
thrown back upon himself. He tends to assume an attitude of individual-
ism, all the way to proclaim that his body is his own “property” and can-
not be appropriated without his consent. Freed for his own success and 
happiness, the individual could hardly tear himself away from his private 
concerns and tends to leave the public arena to the representatives and to 
state power. The individual is concerned with the public arena solely to 
the extent that his private interests are affected. In this sense, he is inde-
pendent; he can follow his wants and need not be concerned with anyone, 
and need not expect anything from anyone; he becomes detached and, 
in face of the state and society, completely insignificant. His independ-
65BIRTH OF MODERN WESTERN THOUGHT    
ence is the point of his pride, and yet it is also his weakness, because he is 
completely isolated and helpless in face of the overwhelming social events. 
The sole recourse for help, then, is the state; all other help would be simply 
“voluntary”. Thus, the proud individual has only one real neighbor, who 
is duty bound to help: state. As if naturally, his appeals must turn to the 
state power. Thus, the individual feels both independent and completely 
dependent. One could even call this a “natural dialectics” of democratic 
consciousness that generally and in principle denies what in singular cases 
it affirms. The academicians want their autonomy without any interfer-
ence from authorities; but as soon as there is unrest in their own domain, 
they call the authorities. 
This is the general dialectical duality: demands for independence and 
call for the state to constantly intervene and restore peace. Another factor 
of this dialectic reveals that the will to independence contains its own call 
for state support in a democratic society. Being independent, the singular 
cannot withstand the impositions that social groups or organizations might 
exercise over him; hence, he needs the state to guarantee his independence. 
Indeed, the state is called upon to guarantee not only independence, but 
the right of the singular to be different, to be a peace disturber in the sense 
of a right to demand changes in the law, to express his opinion, to protest, 
and in general to exercise his freedom. All these demands by the individual 
result in an increment of state’s power, since the latter, while legitimated to 
protect the individual, is also legitimated to protect the counterdemands of 
other individuals against the “disturber” of peace, the exerciser of freedom. 
This may be the background of universal conformity.
It has been noted above how the will to equality tends to create a cen-
tralized, unified and uniformly functioning powerful state. The increasing 
realization of equality has a tendency to increase the role and power of the 
state to such an extent, that it appears as a kind of natural presence and not 
as a result of decision. This is, of course, a troublesome, but not the final note 
in a democratic revolution; after all, the will to equality is also a will to free-
dom, and the latter is capable of guarding against infringements, especially 
when freedom subsumes equality under its own demands and makes it its 
own deliberate base. Yet, we should point to a difference between democ-
racies: some have emerged among the people, who had an understanding 
of independence and freedom prior to calling for equality. Once they have 
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gained equality, they retained a strong sense of individual freedom and a 
sense of opposition to any governmental decrees that would limit freedom. 
Others have begun with equality, e.g. the European monarchic absolutism, 
which had established equality without offering freedom. In this case, the 
European development tended toward equality and the call for state guaran-
tees of equality even if freedom is to be either limited or suppressed. This is 
the difference between the AngloAmerican and the Continental trends. The 
English, who settled in the new world to found a democracy, were accus-
tomed to deal with public matters. They had customs that allowed freedom 
of thought, of expression, personal freedom and local selfgovernment. They 
took these freedoms as self-evident and built their new world democracy. 
Equality was founded on freedom. For the Americans, thus, freedom is the 
older over equality. For the Europeans the case is reversed. Thus, in France, 
when the democratic revolution was established and equality achieved, all 
power went to the state. The lacuna could not be filled by any other means. 
Equality requires that there should not be any rank distinctions and indeed 
not even singular differences in freedom. 
In complex democratic political society, there is a “natural centraliza-
tion”, while local independent administrations play a lesser role. Given 
this centralization, the public’s ability to insure the proper function of the 
government requires knowledge, participation and education. Lacking 
these, the dangers of power usurpation become obvious. If the public is 
ignorant of the principles, paths and efforts required in order of maintain-
ing democracy, then democratic despotism looms imminent. Centralized 
government is then in a position to either attract the few, who are edu-
cated, and hence form a ruling elite, or incorporate the uneducated, yet 
“committed”, to rule by blind power. In this case, the possessors of pow-
er tend to perpetuate themselves by various tricks. One of the common 
ploys, which we have seen with the Athenians, was a constant pressure 
on the public through a threat of war, through an invention of “enemies” 
everywhere, calling for increasing power of the central government, and 
promising fame abroad and security at home. This ploy gives the holders 
of power not only means to diminish the power of the population, but of 
any member or a group of a population that might question the “authori-
ties”. The latter is in a position to extend the dangers of the state to include 
“internal” enemies and “collaborators” against the people. The “external” 
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enemies are “internalized”. Fearing its own defeat, the population is called 
upon and is ready to surrender more freedoms in order to “protect” free-
dom. The power holders of the state can begin to dispense with the public 
arena and transform the Polis into a social system of powers, favors, se-
crets and manipulations. While Europe had made numerous revolutions 
and counterrevolutions since the French experiment, all such revolutions 
had one constant point: centralization. Fascism and communism are the 
most extreme examples, although each attempts to back itself by appeals 
to the sciences. These threats must be seen in light of the democratic “for-
mula”, although subsequently they will have to be seen in terms of a more 
pervasive power of modern scientific ontology.
The eidos of the democratic revolution is equality through freedom. 
Yet, the equalities established by freedom pose dangers for freedom. One 
wants to be free in order to be equal, yet once equality takes root, freedoms 
begin to shrink. As the French Revolution has shown, with one act the 
people acquired freedom, and having established equality, again abolished 
freedom. But what is more troublesome and unintended is the tendency of 
equality toward the median, the average and a distrust of any outstanding 
or at least publicly glorified personalities. This does not lead to a blatant 
tyranny, does not abolish public institutions, but has a peaceful pressure 
against freedom. Freedom of course can never vanish in political society 
that maintains the hard won equality. Equality could not long survive 
without the former. Thus, democracy is crisscrossed by two trends: on the 
one hand, the trend calling for the centralization of political power and 
the direction from such a power, and a tendency to demand freedom. One 
usually thinks that these different trends could be mediated by the elec-
tion of the occupants of political power positions, leading to a seeming 
combination between central power and freedom. But what does it mean 
for a citizen to enter the public arena for one moment to elect the officials 
and then to disappear back into social life and its numerous interests. The 
periodic elections do not at all guarantee that the central power will act 
democratically, and indeed lends the citizen the pretense of “participa-
tion”, while at the same time weakening his political will. The latter is al-
ways exposed to dissolution with a simple “refusal” to vote. 
This is to say, the citizen enters into the public arena because of the 
pressure from mass opinion propagandized by mass media: vote. But 
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these momentary excursions do not demand of the citizen to be an aware 
participant in the public domain, to exercise his political thinking and ac-
tivities. Lacking this, the citizen begins to mix the political with the social, 
leading to the results of regarding the political as a solution to social issues 
or as something that is controlled by the “others”, who have “higher” so-
cial positions and controlling power in the public domain. The latter view 
leads the citizen to believe that he cannot “win” against the socially pow-
erful and it is best that he leave the political alone. Moreover, the citizen 
is told that the issues are so vast and complex – almost cosmic in scope – 
and, hence, accessible only to experts and not to persons, whose political 
concerns should be focused on “local budget”. At the same time, “the man 
on the street” is asked his opinion on every subject matter and this opinion 
becomes the standard of truth for the day. 
Having asked the central government to exclude the citizen from par-
ticipation, except on the election day, we are in turn asking the nonpar-
ticipating citizen to offer an opinion on all public matters. Moreover, the 
centralized powers would find it difficult to deal with a public that is both 
politically and judgmentally incapacitated or both politically and judgmen-
tally sophisticated. In the former case, the appointed officials would have to 
attempt to guess constantly what the momentary public whims are and at 
the same time reduce the operations of the public arena in order to make 
them appear as if they were responses to the tandem “this is what the people 
want now”. In the second instance, the centralized power would be on a 
constant notice concerning its operations; the appointed officials would be 
compelled to adhere to the public duties, for which they were appointed. 
Are these states of affairs in a democratic political society a permanent con-
dition, or can they be so constituted as to avoid the pitfalls suggested above? 
The democratic revolution takes for granted that there is no rigid or fixed 
form that democracy should assume; it remains open and variable. Usually, 
there is a concern with the well-being of the public, but not an overly great 
concern with grand purposes. The individual is “independent”, although the 
social enterprises tend to subsume him and exercise power over him. 
While customs are established and maintained, they do not have the 
force of law or inevitability. Even the laws have become “humane” guar-
anteeing not only rights, but many other amenities, such as protections 
against social powers and their incursion into private lives, possibilities 
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of public education without ideological impositions and manipulations. 
Of course, life lacks the magnificence that was once the province of the 
rulers, at the expense of the ruled. Whatever remains of ceremonial differ-
ences is simply a residuum of previous undemocratic times. Equality, in 
short, is abolishing such differentiations. The abolishment is no longer a 
task of some dedicated individuals, but is an effort of civic duty performed 
by many, i.e. educators; the latter is to be regarded as a way of increasing 
equalization through educational advances. Indeed, while social classes 
still exist, politically one should note an increasing necessity for crossso-
cial work and cooperation. The call for increasing knowledge, in order to 
be able to participate more fully in political society, is universal; what re-
mains is its full implementation. This can no longer be avoided. Of course, 
in this situation neither an individual nor a group can make any claims as 
to “whither” we are tending or what is our “destiny”. These notions are de-
cided provisionally with constant shifts in aims and means. Novelty itself 
seems to be the main outline of the democratic life. 
If there are drawbacks in democracy, there is one basic means of check-
ing them: political freedom. The formula is shown in political ethos. If 
freedom, which owes its realization to equality, is not to disappear behind 
equality, then these two determinations shaping democratic consciousness 
must be reversed. The democratic consciousness has assumed equality to be 
preeminent. In this sense, freedom is used for the establishment of equal-
ity. But if this is not to lead to the despotism of equality, freedom must be 
backed by equality of freedom. This is not a surrender of equality, but rather 
recognition of the main factor, which made equality possible. This reversal 
allows the establishment of the initial equation of freedom and equality: the 
will to equality becomes the basis for the will to freedom, while freedom 
becomes the determining viewpoint for the will to equality. But the trans-
formed consciousness is not adequate for the realization of the eidos of po-
litical society. We suggest the fulfillment of three conditions:
1.  The thought of freedom cannot be forced upon a person external-
ly. No placards and proclamations can make one free; one must 
recognize one’s own task and responsibility. Indeed, one in a way 
“knows” this freedom and responsibility, yet one must insist upon 
exercising it. This “knowledge” is equality and the latter is a prop 
for the reversal of equality and freedom in order for freedom to be 
regarded as a basis of equality.
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2.  The establishment of this transformation in reality is called for when 
one recognizes its necessity, i.e. when it is endangered. If freedom is 
not seen as threatened, then one will continue to maintain equality, 
but not allow, or at least will not call for, the founding of equality on 
freedom. It could be well argued that freedom currently is endan-
gered and precisely by equality. The more equality becomes preemi-
nent, insisted upon, the more is freedom restricted. Thus, what has 
to be limited is the all-pervasive power stemming from equality, ap-
pearing in the above discussion of the phenomena of mass opinion, 
political nonparticipation, privatization, technocratization, and sub-
jection of the person under heterogeneous power of interests. This 
power is what necessitates and demands retransformation of demo-
cratic consciousness toward the priority of freedom as its own pur-
pose and not as means for various interested material equalities.
3.  This necessity is not something “natural”. Rather, it is a task to 
be taken up; if the citizen does not take up the task, then freedom 
ceases to be a factor. Freedom is not a state of being but a deed, an 
insistence and persistence. No doubt, this kind of transformation 
of democratic consciousness elicits in the social arena numerous 
tensions and conflicts. The will to freedom reentering the domain 
of political society turns against all the tendencies in democracy to 
limit or even abolish freedom in favor of equality. Yet, such a will 
is in a position to dissolve the contradiction, into which democ-
racy sinks. This is the mentioned contradiction between the will to 
independence and the tendency toward conformity, between the 
sense of freedom and the careless surrendering of freedom to the 
“officials” or to social groups in a position of “authority and leader-
ship”. It is precisely this logic, which makes for the danger and the 
possibility of freedom in democracy. The citizen is in a position 
to exclude the social and even public powers from his life, but at 
the same time, in case of “trouble”, the same citizen calls for im-
mediate social and state interference in his life. In this sense, the 
democratic consciousness swings between independence and sub-
mission. While this discussion has suggested a distinction between 
freedom and equality, it did not imply that a democratic polis could 
exist solely on the basis only of one or the other. Ultimately, both 
are a condition and must be treated as mutual.
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Since Thucydides, we have known that every political decision also 
raises a question of power. Yet, we also know that power is not the sole 
problem; it becomes a problem, when it is not submitted to political ethos. 
We also know that an appeal to morality is completely inadequate to 
deflect the abuses of power. Only political society with its arena, where 
freedomequality comprise a unity that the political ethos can maintain, 
power claims in check. If such an ethos is abolished or has not yet been 
achieved, the human is constantly exposed to power abuses. The aim of 
the democratic revolution is the establishment of this ethos. This revolu-
tion of modern democracy takes for granted an underlying conception of 
reflection.
In our discussion of methodology, we claimed that the philosophical 
hermeneutics, with its closed circle, is necessary for the understanding of 
modern West, but not sufficient to explicate the open horizon that is tac-
itly present in this hermeneutics. The tacitly present aspect is twofold: one, 
Western philosophical recognition of human essence as fallible and, hence, 
open for self-correction and, thus, correction of laws and institutions, and 
two, the correction and extension of such essence by way of methodologi-
cal reflection. In this sense, methodical reflection and its relationship to 
freedom is most crucial for our understanding of equality. Indeed, we are 
called to reflect upon consciousness structures, social structures, methods, 
aims of sciences, freedom and equality, interrelationships between sci-
ence, society, economy and politics. How is such a reflection founded and 
legitimated? In fact, there appears another problem. The political progres-
sives call for a change of social relationships through concentrated effort 
and at the same time insist upon protracted reflection. But reflection is a 
theoretical-rational attitude that is at the core of autonomy. How do we 
relate reflection that turns to theoretical positions with activity? The usual 
notion of reflection is borrowed from the medieval philosophies of “inten-
tion recta” and “intention oblique”, where the first means a direct seeing 
of something, while the latter means a glance toward the seeing. This does 
not explain how the second could become preeminent when the first is 
the founding one; would this not mean a perversion of a natural priority. 
Indeed, the common conception of reflection would not lead us to the 
priority of the second mode, which is constantly demanded in our world. 
This mode could be called “objectivating”. We know well that Descartes 
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has posited a mode of thinking that starts with the very essence of thought 
and the certitude of the I am. But this also means that everything that ap-
pears to consciousness does so in light of the certitude of consciousness. 
The modern experience of reflection is not a mere act of cognition, but of 
being, of an ego, and with others, of inter-subjective world. The essence of 
the subject consists of an activity that is determined by selfconsciousness. 
Said in other way, subject consists of a self-conscious and willed activity. 
Obviously, the will, determined in its activity by selfconscious reflection, 
is a selfwilling. A being that thinks itself as selfwilled can offer numerous 
possibilities of selfwilling and determination: as a spirit, reason, ego, life, 
and the latter as a instinctual process, as in Schopenhauer, or as a higher 
conscious affirmation of life, as in Nietzsche, or an existence that is singu-
larized, socialized, nationalized.
It is obvious from our discussion of methodology that a being found-
ed in reflection allows various metaphysical positions. This is to say mod-
ern metaphysics is at the outset pluralistic, and modern pluralism has its 
source in this metaphysics. Today we experience consciousness primarily 
as social and political and, thus, our will as political self-determination. 
If we conceive consciousness in this social- political sense, then the two 
questions raised at the outset can now be answered in the following ways: 
(1) the basic character of consciousness is reflection. If this is achieved, 
then we take an objectifying position not only to this or that, but attain 
freedom toward our own consciousness. If this consciousness is primarily 
social and political, then this consciousness lends us freedom in relation 
to social and political domain, in which we reside. The enactment of con-
scious reflection constitutes a freedom of ourselves toward ourselves in 
such a way, that the social and political relations become objects of free 
knowledge, willing and affectivity of the subject. The call for reflection is 
founded in freedom, which allows reflection, and reflection is elicited for 
the sake of freedom. (2) Reflection and activity have usually been related 
in an order of priority, with the former preceding the latter. Thus, the view 
is that reflection considers the aims and the means for the achievement of 
the aims. Such a reflection belongs to every type of praxis. Yet, what the 
modern reflection adds to the activity is the inclusion of the process of the 
reflective consciousness itself. 
If we remind ourselves that reflective activity is liberating insofar as 
the social and political domain can become an object of concern and prax-
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is, then it should be noted that such a reflection precedes both theoretical 
and practical reason and makes both possible. It makes the theoretical at-
titude possible insofar, as it posits consciousness as an object of scientific 
analyses and at the same time transcends such an analysis. Reflection also 
enables the practical attitude by showing how consciousness relates to the 
object of want and act. As a source of theoretical relationship of conscious-
ness to itself, reflection is more theoretical than all theoretical knowledge, 
and as a source of praxis, it is more practical than any wanting and activ-
ity. In their source of liberating reflection, theory and praxis refer to their 
initial unity, from which they originate. If we recognize this source, we are 
also called upon to decipher what constitutes this reflection. 
In the ruminations about reflection, we note that it allows us to reach 
a freedom, through which consciousness becomes an object of knowledge 
and activity. What then is this free region that is opened by reflection? 
Within it, everything appears as an object of knowledge, planning and 
activity. The free domain, which is opened by reflection, remains related 
to the objects of cognition and want. It is a basic condition for objecti-
fication. But this does not yet tell us what comprises the experience of 
this free region. Indeed, reflection surpasses and transforms all objective 
knowledge and volition by making them possible, yet as this enablement it 
remains tied to cognition and volition and their objects. Reflection, thus, 
is in no position to decipher the essence of the free region, which it opens. 
Here, we encounter the limits of reflection, limits, which are not some 
inadequacy of reflection, but rather something, that belongs essentially to 
it. The region taken up by reflection, in which consciousness and want can 
appear as objects of theory and praxis, is itself not something objective. 
The free region cannot be represented in any objective form; does it mean 
that it is something irrational and, therefore, subjective? 
This would lead us to traditional blind prejudgments. After all, reflec-
tion takes place, and in a certain sense it is thought and, thus, it is not irra-
tional. It is thought by us as a condition of free access to ourselves, i.e. to a 
consciousness, which determines us. But it is not thought in its own right. 
This means that we can decipher this free region in a mode of thought, 
which is not itself a reflection. This leads to a peculiar shift. Reflection 
occupies a region of free turning to ourselves. It occupies this region, but 
does not establish it; it takes this region for granted. What reflection posits 
74 CHAPTER III 
are objects of cognition and want. In this sense, freedom is not a conse-
quence of reflection, but rather reflection owes its freedom to the region, 
which reflection takes up although is incapable to decipher. The decipher-
ing requires an entirely different mode of thought, which we do not pos-
sess, but which is the sole access to the essence of freedom. To open such 
thinking would be the main task of current philosophy. This should not 
mean that this thinking can become something that we want. All wanting 
is objectifying. Thus, the access to it is in not wanting and not objectify-
ing. And this is our dilemma: in order to trace out this region, we seem to 
require objectification, and at the same time we take for granted this very 
region. What we seek is perhaps a playspace, in which all that are appear 
in their open options without impositions such that we too are drawn into 
this open play space. In the political arena, this would suggest an opening 
of play region, in which each and everyone could participate without the 
objectified social aims and means, without the power presumptions stem-
ming from such objectification. Here, reflection itself would find itself in 
a domain, in which it too would be decentered from its own objective 
and indeed subjective postures. It would be the free reflection upon and 
tolerance of every individual as the source both of will and rationality. 
This is also an inter-subjective domain: it opens every individual to every 
other individual in tolerant and free relationships. It is then the source 
and equally the ground of democratic political society. But, in turn, the 
constant establishment of political society as a free domain is a condition 
of free reflection. One cannot be given without the other. In brief, we con-
tend that the freedom of reflection and the establishment of political soci-
ety are one and the same event. In the second part of this volume, the very 
ground of such a reflection will be disclosed.
IntentionWillPower
Given the free region of reflection, there appears a shift toward the 
priority of the “subject” as the decisive factor with respect to what the 
world is and what the subject decides itself to be. As already mentioned, 
the subject wants equality of everyone; yet, obviously, there are notable 
inequalities in abilities, desires, exertion of effort in the political arena to 
maintain one’s voice and participation, and in the environmental condi-
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tions. It seems then that equality, and indeed freedom, is something 
to be achieved. The effort to achieve freedom and equality dominates 
the modern age and its understanding of power into the contemporary 
Lithuania and Europe. To get to the roots of this understanding, it is es-
sential to decipher the two major intentionalities unfolding through the 
modern age. While both take for granted the above deciphered modern 
Western revolution, they also require investigation into the ways that 
the mentioned revolution could be implemented. In his work Power and 
Humanity, Schabert, in fact, suggests that modern West moves along 
two lines of development in an effort to reach a historical accord be-
tween equality and freedom. And in his work Tractatus Concerning Hu-
man Power, Fink traces the development of modernity only to discover 
that modernity is created by a very specific conception of power, created 
as if out of nothing. The following discussion will include the works of 
the two thinkers. Other authors, such as Volkmann Schluck, Luhmann, 
and Husserl, will appear in appropriate places of our discussion. While 
the question of power might not appear directly, it will be implied in 
their works.
Although there is a continuity between the classical and modern 
traditions with respect to the basic conception of the equality of the hu-
man, the modern thought redefines this equality in terms of freedom 
without any inherent essence that would determine the human to be a 
specific being. The indetermination initially separates the human from 
nature. The modern “experiment” is an attempt to replace the rule of 
nature and its theological support by some transcendent being. In such 
a setting, human becomes an image, an Imago Dei, and the surrounding 
environment reflects the limits imposed by the transcendent creator – 
the just discussed autocratic ruler. It is important to note that while the 
medieval claim insists that the natural world and its divinely imposed 
laws cannot be transgressed, this theological understanding includes an 
ambiguity between the creator as a law giver, and as a will. First, the 
creative act is the act of will, and second, the creator can change the 
course of nature by all sorts of “willful miracles”. This lends priority to 
will. Such a view will be accepted by modernity at the human level, giv-
ing priority to the metaphysics of will over the ontology of reason. This 
is a unique conception in human history, leading, according to Richter, 
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to a selfevaluation of the human as omniscient and omnipotent. We shall 
analyze the ground for this claim in time. Meanwhile, it is obvious that 
with writers such as Bacon and his conception of knowledge not as some-
thing that is interested in the understanding of nature, but in the effort to 
change it, to control it, to submit it to human power, there appear both 
the theological and the human primacy of the metaphysics of will. His De 
Regno Hominem promises human domination over nature. Indeed, Ba-
con already names the modern conception of man’s power to change the 
world at the price of disregard for others and for nature. His moral dictum 
becomes the following: happiness is either the stupidity or death of others; 
he is even fond of an old saying: no serpent can become a dragon until it 
devours other serpents. This is, of course, already the Hobbes’ notion of a 
struggle of all against all, and the emergent social morality bolstered, sub-
sequently, by scientific technology. This morality holds a view that what is 
unpleasant or unacceptable in the environment can be changed or abol-
ished – but only on the basis of autocratic science. 
The process of transformation from the “old” to the “modern” lived 
world stretches from late medieval through the Renaissance. Yet, the issue is 
basically one: the emancipation from all traditions, from the environment, 
and building the future without hindrances either from the past or from di-
vinities. Each generation should be free to repeat the break with the past and 
to create its own world and itself in accordance with its own willed designs. 
While initially there were still debates concerning man’s fragility, contin-
gency, subsequently, such views were pushed aside. In 1350, Johannes von 
Tepel in his work Der Ackerman aus Boehmen depicted a debate between 
Ackermann and death, in which death reprimanded him for his selfeleva-
tion. Hundred years later, Pico della Mirandola in his work Oratio de Digni-
tate Hominis completely rejected the “arguments of death”. For him, man is 
magnum miraculum and extends this notion to theos anthropos. Pico devel-
oped the divinization of man from three assumptions: (1) there is no specific 
nature of the human, (2) the human can make of himself what he wills, and 
(3) the great wonder in this world is the human who, in his selfdetermina-
tion, can become divine. Indeed, as an unconditional source of reason and 
will, he is identical with the traditional definition of the divine.
The way Pico depicted the creation of the human reveals the modern 
assumption of complete human freedom and his destiny to control the 
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world. According to Pico’s depiction, the creator told his “new son”: “I 
have not assigned to you any fixed place nor have I given you a specific 
form. I have not given you any talent that would be appropriate to you 
alone. You will have to determine your place, your form and your talents 
in accordance with your wishes and your measure. I have created you nei-
ther as heavenly nor as earthly, neither mortal nor immortal, so that you 
could create yourself freely from your own power, shaping and transform-
ing yourself to a form which you wish to acquire. You can reduce yourself 
to an animal or elevate yourself to a divinity”. In principle, the human 
has no natural form – once seen as the mainstay of human belonging to 
nature – and resultantly he can be a maker of himself and, indeed, of his 
world. This indefinable human is, of course, the above discussed region 
of reflection, allowing the constitution of numerous views of the human 
about himself and his world.
Pico’s view places the human in a light that favors the human even over 
gods. The latter are fixed by their nature, while the human can become any-
thing. Pico stresses persistently that the human can become what he wills. 
This is the “wonder man” of modernity, constituting a philosophical anthro-
pology to fit the modern age. Without this anthropology, it would be diffi-
cult to understand the development of the autonomous, free being who is a 
maker of himself and his world. This is the modern revolution. By the eight-
eenth century, one had an enlightened view and an enlightened anthropol-
ogy. Condillac has no longer any question but that the human creates and 
exists from himself. One of the initial interpretations of this selfelevation 
was “naturalistic” in the sense, that the human follows his rational selfinter-
est. The world was reinterpreted as a geometric machine to be arbitrary ma-
nipulated by human interests. Condorcet designates the Philosophie Nou-
velle, with the terms “true, rational, scientific”, and the old with mistaken, 
nonsensical and illusory. The rejection of the old is not a loss, but a gain 
over errors and illusions. Fontenelle goes so far as to claim that we ought to 
be thankful to the old philosophies for having exhausted most of the false 
opinions and for having set us free from their nonsense. The previous hu-
manity was a youthful stage, while the modern man has reached maturity 
and need no longer be in error. Thus, it is no longer a question whether cur-
rent human activities are good or bad, have good or bad consequences, have 
value or disvalue; rather, each activity is justifiable if it replaces something 
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old by something new, something “progressive”. This is one of the sources 
not only of progress, but of the view of truth as historical. Whoever lives 
today is superior to those in the past because he is more modern and novel, 
has acquired a greater mastery over the environment and resultantly more 
truth. Not only is the novel more true, but also it is better – improvement of 
humanity through science and technology.
The method for achieving the truth is mathematics. By the time of 
Descartes, the final theoretical formulation of nature had to be mathemati-
calquantitative. There is nothing in the world, including divinities, which 
are not submitted to the laws of quantification. With the latter, the motive 
for mastery and conquest of nature reaches almost lyrical stage, a stage that 
allows the human to equate himself with divinity. The world is material, 
atomistic, and mechanical; it functions in accordance with mathematical-
ly precise laws; hence, if humans can decipher such laws, their knowledge 
becomes equal to divine knowledge. With Galileo, there is no qualitative 
difference between human and divine knowledge. With this equation, we 
acquire another elevation of the human over nature subtended by an inten-
tion to master and have power over all. If human knowledge is absolute, 
then he is in a position of a creator of the world. As Galileo ruminates, the 
human is so great that he should envy himself. The literature of the Scientific 
Enlightenment is replete with this narcistic view of the human. Not only 
Galileo, but Bacon and even Newton repeatedly emphasize their conviction 
that the new Filosofia Naturale will place man in such a superior position 
oven nature, that the human will have power even over himself.
The only writer of note who objected to the over inflated exuberance 
was Montaigne. Although his voice was not heeded, his analyses reveal 
a particular psychological composition. The self-elevation does not stem 
from philosophicaltheoretical reflection, but from arrogance. The arro-
gance overheats the imagination and propels it with pictures of extreme 
self-importance and superiority of being a measure and standard of all 
things. The overheated imagination might be even a protection against 
what Richter calls the real condition of modernity: complete human in-
significance. As the modern human emerges from the security of an all-
encompassing, protective, and alive cosmos of medieval period into the 
materialistic, mechanical and indifferent world, the human needs com-
pensation – perhaps overcompensation – a self-constructed imagery of 
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absolute significance and power of man. The overcompensation might be 
seen in two respects: (1) being a child of some divinity, the medieval per-
son feels worthy, yet his worth depends on another being, a being that 
makes everything worthy, but, as we saw above, also subservient to a mas-
ter. Such subservience guarantees that no one leaves his assigned social 
position. A peasant is born to be property of his master and could not 
even imagine being an aristocrat; after all, this is an order established from 
the “beginning of the world”. A revolt against this conception requires the 
human to become the source of worth of himself and of the world; (2) the 
materialization and mechanization of the world requires a certain vivifica-
tion of the cosmos, a source of value and worth for the world; all this must 
come from the human, who, in order to become the source of all value and 
worth, must become supreme, a ruler, an omnipotent master. 
Of course, the omnipotence requires that humans acquire a complete 
knowledge of the mechanisms of the material world. Without such knowl-
edge of the “hidden secrets”, human dominance could not be complete; 
without the equivalence of his power with nature, the human could not 
dominate the world effectively. As long as something escapes human con-
trol, man is still “inferior” to nature; hence, the task is to uncover all the 
secrets in order to subsume them under human technical designs. The new 
cosmic center is the sole source of value and beauty. As Buffon proclaims, 
the human is capable of transforming the Nature Brute into Nature No-
velle. As he ponders the world, he suggests that if we look at the world, 
where no human has yet settled, the brute nature, we find it to be ugly and 
dead. It is I, solely I, who makes nature attractive and living. Everything 
changes only through me, and a new nature comes from the hand of man. 
Man, the master over the regions, has changed and renewed everything 
in this world, and his right is founded on nothing else than his right as a 
conqueror. Nature is the “raw material stuff” and the human can shape it 
in accordance with his wishes.
Given this direction, there is an admixture of scientism and free-
dom. One is free to use science in order to master and control nature; 
yet, in turn, the human too can become part of the natural environment 
and, hence, must submit to the controls of sciences. And this is one of the 
major attitudes emerging with the view of mastering everything through 
science. Having made an absolutist claim, i.e. that science with its math-
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ematical method can acquire divine knowledge, this knowledge then can 
be applied to the human. Hence, Bacon has no question but that even 
politics could be reduced to physics. It is instructive that Bacon, one of the 
fathers of modern scientism, has persistently opposed the then emerging 
Political Enlightenment and its rejection of all political absolutisms. In 
the well-known case of Bacon and Coke, Bacon supported the absolutism 
of monarchy and its power against Coke and the “superstitious popula-
tion”. It is up to the new science to control all human affairs without any 
need to respect the views of the population. It is obvious that once again 
we encounter the split in modern consciousness between the Political En-
lightenment and the Scientific Enlightenment, such that the latter, with its 
absolutization of science and those who are in charge of science, form an 
autocratic movement, specifically Marxism and its variants, and disregard 
humans as a labor force to be subjected to the material needs and mate-
rial production. In this sense, freedom and equality, human dignity and 
respect, have no place in scientific socialism. As we shall see subsequently, 
this trend constitutes some of the political technocracies of our age. While 
humans are in charge of scientific reconstruction of the world, and the hu-
man, only some of the humans, the ones in the “know”, i.e. the scientists, 
the ones in charge of scientific progress and the aim of history, should be 
the rulers over the masses, of course, for the benefit of the masses.
The concentration of power in the hands of the human calls for a 
specific attitude: distance from nature, i.e. making nature into an “object”. 
One cannot rule over something if one remains a part of what is being 
ruled. One has to be a nonparticipating observer. This distance allows the 
human to survey all nature indifferently, from no particular vantage point 
and, thus, from no particular place. In this sense, the human has no spe-
cific place in the world and must establish the place in accordance with 
his methods. Pascal, in fact, suggests that the modern man has lost his ap-
propriate place in the order of the cosmos. He becomes the Archimedean 
point, from which the world can be mastered. According to Descartes, Ar-
chimedes still conceived of a point, from which he could move the earth, 
yet, the only certain point we have is the thinking and acting ego. Only 
from the ego that one can develop Philosophie Practique as a means of 
domination and power over nature. The ego is the Archimedean point 
outside of nature which, in its self-certainty, can think, will and remake 
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the world. The shift from the power of nature to the power of the human 
is almost complete. From this external point, nature is determined as a 
copy of a primordial archetype designed by the human. By the nineteenth 
century, there is no longer any question concerning the superiority of the 
human and, specifically, the will. As Fichte announced, nature is the serv-
ant of the ego. Everything must correspond to my thought and will, and 
I will in accordance with a freely projected aim. This will is ultimate and 
is not determined by anything higher; it rules the body by virtue of which 
the ego constructs the surrounding world. I will to have influence in the 
world in accordance with my powers, while the surroundings cannot have 
any influence over me. I am the Archimedian point, from which the world 
is moved – I am the sole power – omnipotent. As Schelling announces, if 
you are a being in itself, then no opposing power can change your con-
dition and limit your freedom. Thus, strive to become a being in itself, 
absolutely free, to subordinate every heteronomous power under your 
autonomy, and through your freedom strive to extend your freedom to 
absolute, unlimited power. 
While this being in itself might be limited by the resistance of the en-
vironment, nonetheless the extent to which the resistance is experienced 
depends on human expansion of power and, thus, is a manifestation of 
this power. This is to say, the very resistance is determined by human 
striving for power. It is the human power, which defines the conditions, 
which will be seen as resistance. Thus, the human is the Ens Realisimum, 
while nature becomes an appearance in the actualization process of man. 
This is the principle of the human as totally self-determining. To be self-
determining is to be autonomous. This is the result of the conception that 
the human has no pre-given nature, no essence, and that by discovering 
the appropriate method he can be a master over nature.
Obviously, this background comprises two factors: first, the human is 
in principle self-determined, autonomous being, and second, in this self-
determination he must determine the world by remaking it in his own im-
age. As Marxism would have it, the material nature, and the material man, 
must be humanized. And this is also the background of the emergence 
of the previously mentioned two intentionalities: Political Enlightenment 
calling for the free autonomy of each individual and Scientific Enlighten-
ment calling for the mastery of the environment and the human – remak-
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ing the human in accordance with an improved material design. These 
two intentionalities lead to two divergent, although inseparable modern 
histories. One wants to guarantee human freedom through institutions, 
the other wants to postpone freedom until the environment and the hu-
man will become completely determined by human power. This is to say, 
one history considers the human as autonomous, omnipotent, even totally 
narcistic and self-regarding, whereas the other is the reality, which lags be-
hind the concrete establishment of this freedom due to the still inadequate 
controls of the material world. Despite all the varieties of Marxisms and 
their efforts to establish the “new man”, in principle Marxism is premised 
on the notion that freedom and equality of everyone will be realized by 
reshaping the material conditions to be totally under the will of the hu-
man. We shall depict the “logic” of scientific socialism and its continuous 
“delay” of the final solution of the riddle of history.
At this juncture it should be pointed out that one of the “motives” to 
master nature is inherent in the democratic revolution. Each person, in this 
revolution, has to be a maker of his own life, his own destiny; he must be 
independent from others and secure his own means of well-being. He owes 
nothing to anyone, and he cannot expect anything from others. Thus, the 
basic striving is to accumulate means of survival, to guarantee one’s own 
well-being and security. But this direction begins the long road of privatiza-
tion of all the public domain, and finally the privatization of political society. 
The setting up of the Political Enlightenment also set up the institutional 
conditions for the adjudication of what is public and what is private; the 
stress on the individual’s selfreliance, nonetheless, compromises the confla-
tion of the political with the private and begins to force the private into the 
public, and conversely. This is a hidden side of the danger for democracy, 
since the latter can easily be mistaken for the sum of private interests and 
not an open arena of maintenance of freedom and equality. In this mixture, 
the individual “participates” in the public only to the extent that his specific 
interests require. Everything else is left to the officials and other interests. 
Thus, he ceases to be a continuous founding of political society.
Here, we have reached a multifaceted tension: first, there is the ten-
sion between freedom and equality – even if they are initially and in prin-
ciple mutually founding. This tension becomes apparent in the demo-
cratic political society, when in the public domain freedom and equality 
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are maintained as inseparable, but in the social and private arena, there 
appear noted material inequities. Second, there is a tension between an 
effort to establish human mastery over nature and over traditional views 
of human essence. Third, there emerges a tension between the human as 
a source of power and mastery, and the human, who becomes subject to 
the very power means created by the human. Fourth, the tension between 
the social and private demands to secure material means of well-being, 
and the requirements of maintaining the democratic public domain as a 
guarantee of autonomy and equality. Fifth, there is appears a tension be-
tween the constant requirement of maintaining the freedom of the public 
domain both as the result and the source of reflective consciousness, and 
its restriction to specific and reflectively established, i.e. free projects of 
will. Indeed, the very projects as free are founded on this very publicreflec-
tive domain. All in all, these tensions are not a given; they depend on the 
requisite activities that constitute them as given. 
Given this context of modern Western world, it is now necessary to 
extend its ground into what comprises the basic hermeneutical tension and 
confrontation between two modern trends, although both seemingly found-
ed on the same prejudgment – autonomy and equality. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, there is a struggle between two powerful interpretations of 
the world, both claiming to be the best and most beneficial ways of life for 
humanity. As already mentioned, Lithuania was in the middle of this ten-
sion and it still faces the issues unresolved by its liberation from the Soviet 
Union, specifically, as we shall see, the modern West is at the basis of both, 
Scientific and Political Enlightenments, such that both are unavoidable and, 
in many cases, incompatible. Now, it is necessary to expound on the phi-
losophies of the two Enlightenments and how they provide context both, for 
the paradigm of the former Soviet Union and for efforts to establish a new 
paradigm. In this text, we shall have to decide whether the interpretation of 
the new paradigm is adequate, and if not, what is lacking. 
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Methodological hermeneutics has disclosed a complex way that a tra-
dition or one aspect of a tradition can oppress another tradition and how 
the oppressed might become relevant to the oppressor and, thus, regain 
its position if not of superiority, at least as an unavoidable presence with 
which one has to contend. Following the methodological requirements, it 
is now possible to explicate the background philosophical principles of the 
Scientific Enlightenment and the ways that it led to its opposition to the 
Political Enlightenment, an opposition that is clearly established by Marx-
ism as a paradigm of the society of the Soviet Union. It is significant that 
the Marxian paradigm, interpreted in the Soviet Union as scientific social-
ism and as an extension of the Scientific Enlightenment, suppressed the 
Political Enlightenment. It is important for Lithuania, as part of the for-
mer Soviet Union, to understand in principle what comprised the tension 
between the two enlightenments and how such a tension is playing out in 
contemporary Lithuania. While the analyses in the last chapter indicated 
a tension between the two enlightenments that included a broad sweep 
of the principles of any autocracy and its opposition to freedom, human 
individual, dignity, self-respect and respect for others, it is now essential to 
suggest the efforts of each enlightenment to maintain itself.
The development of modern philosophies toward the Political and 
Scientific enlightenments has resulted in two contemporary political di-
rections: one stressing the defense of democratic institutions and all that 
these institutions guarantee – equal rights, freedom of speech and press, 
belief, opinion, and occupation, with a requirement for responsibility to 
the law and its maintenance. The other direction consists of “liberation” 
movements, up till the recently occupying Soviet Union and its satellites – 
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including various regions in Africa, Latin America and China. Since both 
directions originated in modern Western consciousness, the task of this 
chapter is to develop one ontological layer that constitutes the framework 
of contemporary tensions still prevalent in Lithuania and even across Eu-
rope in the form of freedom counter equality and conversely, between 
those emphasizing market economy and those emphasizing the role of 
government in planning and maintaining some areas of social life, includ-
ing education, public transportation and in part health care. The contro-
versies, in fact, include the supporters of the views that democratic institu-
tions are ideological expressions of private interests, leading to inequalities 
and oppressions, and the views that factual and historical developments of 
private interests have no necessary connection with the developments of 
democratic institutions and all that they guarantee and sanction. 
Interesting and important as these controversies are, the discussion 
in this chapter is directed toward “ontological consciousness and its inten-
tionalities” providing a context, from which unfold the liberal Political En-
lightenment with democratic institutions and the Scientific Enlightenment 
calling for “liberation” from such institutions in favor of reconstructing 
society in accordance with scientific establishment of material conditions 
in order to achieve scientifically projected results. No doubt, there are vari-
ous affinities and differences between those two Enlightenments. They are 
a base for numerous orientations in sociology, economy and politics and 
controversies among them, but we shall treat them all as expressions, sec-
ond level phenomena, founded upon more basic development of ontologi-
cal consciousness for understanding the “crisis” of modern consciousness. 
Our quest is not arbitrary but, as Bernhard Waldenfels points out in his 
edited work Phaenomenologie und Marxismus, the roots of our current pre-
dicament has been opened up by thinkers, such as K.H. Volkmann-Schluck, 
L. Landgrebe, and E. Fink. Although without numerous references to their 
works, we shall follow their spirit in digging to the roots.
As we saw in the last chapter, the Political Enlightenment consists 
of consciousness, which rejects any claim that humans belong to nature 
or to divinities, which rule over nature. The result is a dramatic effort by 
Modern Western person to achieve an omniscient and omnipotent posi-
tion. The understanding of the basis of this effort comprises modern re-
flective consciousness, suggested in the last chapter. Given this rejection, 
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there is only one solution to social/political domain: the governing must 
be based on laws agreed upon by the public and institutionalized. Institu-
tions would have to guarantee every person’s autonomy, rights, value, re-
spect and responsibility. Freely created by autonomous persons, the insti-
tutions negate the possibility of one person’s rule over another person, the 
taking away of freedom of another person, the abolition of equal rights, 
the rejection of toleration of other’s opinion and its free expression, and 
the negation of free decision concerning one’s own life. Intent on further 
securing human autonomy, the thinkers of the Political Enlightenment 
institutionalized governmental division of powers in order to prevent the 
possibility of government to rise above the institutions and establish dom-
ination of person over person. In this sense, institutions could not become 
instruments of individuals or groups seeking their private interests and 
elevation of power. As the jurist Martin Kriele claims, without the division 
of governmental tasks, democracy is not guaranteed, since there would 
not be checks and balances between administrative, legislative and judicial 
domains. Laws are equal for all, including for the elected officials. But he 
argues quite convincingly that institutions cannot be founded either on 
natural interests or on a power of a group. Interests and power abolish 
the modern principle of human autonomy and subject human actions to 
causes, leading to abolition of rights, responsibility and equality. It should 
be noted that the modern consciousness of human ontological autonomy 
is found not only in the Political Enlightenment, but also in other areas of 
understanding. The awareness that humans are creators of laws, that they 
are “divine beginning”, extends from early Renaissance and goes through 
the Romantic claim that man is “original creator”, a “divine genius”, all 
the way through the Narcistic and ego-centric self-glorification and Ni-
etzsche’s reach toward the “overman”, who, in his free exercise of power, 
creates and destroys divinities. Even for Marxism, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, this ontology is in the background – although in an interpre-
tation as “free activity”, such that by creating the conditions of his material 
existence, man creates himself. The historical human aim is to establish 
material conditions, which will not only consist of humanization of na-
ture and man, but also the liberation of man from material necessities to 
allow man to live as free self-creator. Of course, Marx failed to grasp this 
ontological stance fully and reverted to “causal explanations” of human 
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history and life, and in doing so abandoned philosophy and the Political 
Enlightenment, turning the latter into a social arena for power confronta-
tions and struggles. 
The Ontology of Nature in Scientific Enlightenment
While we disclosed the will to control the natural environment and 
pointed out that the Scientific Enlightenment requires a devaluation of na-
ture, we shall have to add a more basic dimension – the ontological and 
metaphysical, allowing such a devaluation to become “practical”. But this 
devaluation differs from that offered by the Political Enlightenment. For 
the latter, devaluation of nature was designed to elevate man above nature, 
while for the Scientific Enlightenment devaluation meant the stripping away 
all essential characteristics of the great variety of beings and a reduction of 
such beings, including humans, to homogeneous matter. This also means 
that for sciences man is to be reduced to material being, such that all his 
actions could be subjected to and explained by causes. Material world has 
no value or meaning. Prior to modern revolution, nature had beauty, good-
ness and value. For example, if a person desired something, it is because the 
desired thing had an intrinsic goodness and value. After the modern revolu-
tion, something has goodness, value, beauty and meaning because a person 
desires it. In brief, all the perceived qualities no longer belong to nature, 
but to human subject. Thus, nature is “unmasked” and appears in its plain, 
material reality. As Buffon in his work La Nature announces, brute nature 
has no beauty. Only I make nature attractive and alive. Everything changes 
through me, and a new nature flows from the hand of man. 
Although this elevation of man and devaluation of nature is based on 
the ontological consciousness of autonomy, this consciousness is insuf-
ficient to guarantee human autonomy in nature. Humans are in nature, 
which far surpasses human powers and, thus, is a hindrance to autonomy. 
In order to achieve complete autonomy, man must become a master over 
nature. In other words, he must become a law giver not only to himself 
and in agreement with others to society, but also a law giver to nature. 
Galileo claims that nature is material and functions in accordance with 
mathematical laws. Since man is in a position to understand such laws 
completely, his understanding cannot be distinguished from divine wis-
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dom. If material events are known from divine vantage point, then man’s 
knowledge encompasses all totality. This, according to Schabert, means 
that human knowledge, respect and value are equal to divinity. Indeed, 
Galileo is so overwhelmed that he proclaims that man is so grand that he 
should be envious of himself. 
Modern political confrontations between those, who support demo-
cratic institutions, and those, who want to discard them in the name of 
liberation and even equality, must be understood within the context of op-
position, which flows from general liberalism of Enlightenment. Holding 
strictly to the principles of the Scientific Enlightenment, everything must 
be reduced to matter, which is transformable into material conditions and 
predictable results flowing from them. In this technocratic logic, the hu-
man must also be reduced to material process. Based on the ontology that 
humans have no specific nature, unique human form, it follows that hu-
mans can be made into anything and, given specific conditions, they will 
have to be regarded as results of such conditions. In turn, humans can be 
treated as material conditions – labor power – to yield projected results. 
As we shall see, this is the ground for the Marxian claim that given new 
material conditions, there will be a “new man”. Yet, in this sense, humans 
are results of material causes, and just as everything else are predictable 
products of scientific calculations. This is the principle, which formed the 
“grand experiment” of Marxism in the form “scientific socialism” pre-
sumably established in the Soviet Union – with a promise of a future au-
tonomous new man. What distinguishes this autonomy from that of the 
Political Enlightenment is the ruling of society by “scientific technocracy” 
directed by social autocratic elites, using technology and humans to main-
tain state power. To better understand this ruling and its relationship to 
the Political Enlightenment it is necessary to distinguish between three 
types of modern liberalism. First liberalism is founded on the ontology of 
autonomy and equality, and the liberties, rights, value and responsibility 
implied by this liberalism. The latter guarantees autonomy, etc., by insti-
tutions allowing for pluralism, tolerance of opinions, political directions, 
religions, moralities and diverse ways of attaining them. These guarantees 
are further enhanced by the division of powers into legislative, judicial 
and administrative. Within the context of this liberalism, man lacks one 
right: the abolition of institutions, which guarantee human autonomy and 
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equality in the public domain. Such abolition would contradict human 
autonomy and the equal autonomy of others. The abolition of institutions 
would lead to abolition of equality of all under laws agreed by convention 
and an establishment of man’s rule by other men, resulting in a society of 
power confrontations by different groups.
This scientific wisdom is not for the sake of itself, but as an instrument 
to construct material events in accordance with human designs. Schabert 
points out that this constructionism is one of the most fundamental mo-
tives in the modern consciousness of human ontological autonomy. For 
example, Bacon is not interested in understanding material events for sci-
entific curiosity, but primarily for the acquisition of power to rule over 
nature. After all, his main work contains a subtitle De Regno Hominis (hu-
man rule). Human rule, this intentionality to dominate requires complete 
knowledge of possible material combinations, since otherwise humans 
would not be in a position to subordinate them under human standards. 
If there is something in nature that still escapes human power to control, 
then humans are still in an inferior position with respect to nature. When 
all the secrets have been “tortured out” of nature and ruled by humans, 
then humans will be masters; all the surroundings and human intrinsic 
nature will be transformed by new standards. According to Schabert, not 
only the modern “scientists”, but also modern philosophers had the same 
intention. For example, Descartes reveals this intention by claiming that 
the purpose of the new sciences is to become instruments for the subordi-
nation of nature under human domination. When human knowledge be-
comes an instrument of domination, then knowledge is already regarded 
technically – means for power, and above all, means of power over hu-
mans reduced to mechanisms. 
The subordination of nature under human control correlatively ele-
vates human power. Its incrementation is based on technological concep-
tion of science and reification of nature. Such reification allows everything 
to be treated as “stuff” or “resources”, which can be shaped and changed in 
terms of human projects and technical capacity. In this sense, “liberation” 
proposed by the Scientific Enlightenment has the following morphology. 
Every material state of affairs can be calculated mathematically; from such 
states of affairs it is possible to calculate and predict the results caused by 
such affairs. But the material states of affairs can be changed by human 
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hand in accordance with human calculations and from such reworked 
matter humans can calculate what results will be caused. The calculated 
processes then become “conditions”, which yield predictable results. Such 
shaping requires human activity, called labor power, that at base is “free 
activity” constituting a specific human ability and a specifically construct-
ed environment, but for modern West, also increasing technical sophisti-
cation and power. The outcome is an increasing reversed process: humans 
can calculate material results to be obtained and establish material condi-
tions for attainment of the calculated results. The more results humans 
project, the more technological conditions must be established to achieve 
the results. This is called “progress”. Thus, nature is not discovered as it 
functions from itself, but as it must function in terms of human wants. 
This consciousness yields an “if-then” logic of action and nature: if we 
wish for certain material results, then we must establish required condi-
tions for such results. As Hans Jonas points out, the shaping of matter into 
new technologies opens, in turn, demands for newer technologies and dis-
coveries. If scientific technical means leads to new discoveries, then such 
discoveries lead to new technologies. While this is progress, it also means 
that it has no end. After all, no achieved end is final or perfect, and eve-
ry invention suggests new and “better” inventions. Thus, every achieved 
aim and purpose becomes means for other purposes and aims. The Sci-
entific Enlightenment elevates human power and is presumed to lead to 
increased liberation from surroundings, including from human nature. 
This, according to Robert Spaemann, comprises human modern aim at 
ontological autonomy in the material domain. 
Two essential points must be added: first, the increase in technical 
means and aims leads to “instrumental reason”, such that everything in 
human environment, once established as achieved aim, becomes means 
for other aims, such that when the latter are achieved, they too become 
means – to no end. Second, instrumental reason ties in with “progress”, 
which also seems to point to means for an achievement of aims, and aims 
becoming better or more sophisticated means for other aims – without 
end. If we were to ask an ontological question as to what is the purpose of 
progress, the answer of the Scientific Enlightenment would be “more pro-
gress”. To speak in plain terms, the ontology of progress is self-referred to 
the extent that its purpose is itself – a self-generating process for the sake 
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of self-generation. But it is also clear that to progress humans must also 
become “stuff” for use and transformation, for remaking and constantly 
“improved” technologization, increasing division into capacities called 
“expertise”. The expert is unique since it is from his narrow perspective 
that he acquires an “ego” and a position, a center in the geometric coor-
dinates of material space to create “new nature”. We arrive at Descarte’s 
“ego” and a Philosophie Practique. Above all, the technical expert has a 
social value required by the state; in this sense, the expert does not ques-
tion his position, since he has no latitude to demand of the state any other 
position apart from the one valued by the state. The latter need not justify 
to the individual why his position is valuable, since such a justification 
would recognize the person as having some sort of responsibility, rights, 
dignity and even honor.
The second type of liberalism, dominating much of social and politi-
cal thought, is “relativistic liberalism”. The following are its major theses: 
(i) human values, rights, equalities and freedom are relative historical-cul-
tural expressions of a specific civilization, in contemporary world, mod-
ern Western civilization. During other times and in different civilizations, 
there was no consciousness of autonomy and equality. Resultantly, the 
modern consciousness of autonomy has no universal necessity. (ii) The 
modern ontological understanding of man as self-created, as someone, 
following his own interests, can make of himself what he will, leads to 
the view that institutions emerge as expressions of temporary interests. 
This implies that changing interests might require not only different insti-
tutions, but their irrelevance. One party rule or one dictator’s power are 
cases to demonstrate such irrelevance. (iii) Speaking most fundamentally, 
institutions may be reduced to advance material or psychological needs 
or interests of a specific group. This usually applies to capitalism, where 
institutions are means to advance economic interests and, thus, they and 
the laws they represent are not above individuals, but serve some against 
others. While not a direct rule of man over man, it is a rule by interests 
and the cunning of those, who can compel to establish laws to favor them.
To what extent is such relativism valid; can it maintain itself as liber-
alism without reaching a contradiction? On the basis of relativistic liberal-
ism, it is impossible to defend the institutions of freedom, equality, rights, 
duties, tolerance, since such institutions are temporal, expressing tempo-
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ral interests. Indeed, this liberalism cannot pass any negative judgment on 
social systems, which have no freedoms, rights, responsibilities, equality 
– the interests in such systems do not require liberal institutions, since 
the main interest is to stay in power at any cost. Yet, the question must be 
directed to the right either by a government or by a majority consensus 
to abolish irrevocably the institutions that guarantee autonomy, equality 
and rights. Relativistic liberalism would have to accept such abolition and 
yet it would have to contradict itself by claiming that we must tolerate the 
views, rights, freedoms of others. After all, it allows the abolition of insti-
tutions that guarantee freedom and tolerance of others. In other words, if 
every political orientation, including the one, which abolishes democratic 
institutions, has equal validity, then power orientation, which abolishes 
such institutions, according with the thesis of relative interests, has an 
equal right to abolish such institutions. As just mentioned, even despotic 
systems, as expressions of material, psychological or even theocratic inter-
ests, must be tolerated. Whatever occurs within such system should be re-
garded as “internal matter” precluding any right of external intervention. 
Relativistic liberalism opens the door to “scientific” progressive liber-
alism. The latter is closely related to the Scientific Enlightenment. Although 
the first intention of the latter called for man to be a master of nature, its 
principles are also at the root of reduction of everything to material pro-
cess – including humans. This state of affairs leads to the oppression of the 
first intention premised on establishing autonomy by scientific technology 
and oppression of the Political Enlightenment and its institutions. Instead 
of liberation, there emerges a consciousness of the causal logic of “condi-
tions-results”. Armed with scientific ontology, progressive liberalism can 
claim that political institutions are results, products of material interests 
and conditions and have no universal necessity. Indeed, such institutions 
are a hindrance to scientific technocracy to establish a scientific society. 
Using this planned society as a base, Marx proclaimed that although the 
Political Enlightenment liberated humans for the freedom of religion, 
opinion, expression and the rights guaranteed by institutions, such libera-
tion is inadequate, since humans were not liberated from religion, from 
autonomy, and from institutionalized laws, under which all are treated 
equally. True liberation is possible only through scientific-technological 
planning of material conditions, which will liberate humanity from the 
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Political Enlightenment. What this means is that such institutions must 
be oppressed, disallowed as obstructions to the Scientific Enlightenment.
Following this logic, the elite, armed with scientific knowledge, elevates 
itself above laws and institutions in order to carry out the planned “libera-
tion” of humanity. Historically speaking, such institutions are no longer 
valid, are conservative and reactionary hindrances to progress. The scien-
tific consciousness incorporated in the liberating elite must justify its being 
above laws by the future society constructed by the followers of the Scientific 
Enlightenment, such as Marx and Marxism. It should be emphasized that 
in this context freedom must be suppressed, while equality is promised on 
the basis that the entire population is equivalent to labor power that can be 
treated as equal means for the production of the future society and the new 
man. The progressive liberal regards himself as one who knows what kind of 
conditions are necessary to cause the human labor power to be transformed 
into a different entity. The elite technocrats are above the law for yet another 
reason: since the working majority lack scientific sophistication, they are in 
no position to know what is good for them and their opinions cannot have 
any weight. Hence, freedom to express an opinion would mean spreading 
falsehoods and detracting from serious duties of the technocrats. Indeed, 
the majority does not realize that institutions, formed by one group’s mate-
rial interests, are designed to make the majority accept enslavement under 
the illusion that everyone is free and equal. The scientific elite, having seen 
through such illusions, can rule the population for its own liberation from 
such enslavement. Thus, the scientific elite will not allow any interference 
with the building of scientific society. 
Progressive scientific liberals, Marxists-Leninists, armed with a his-
torical mythology – to be explicated in the next chapter under the rubric 
Soviet Paradigm – propose a “materialist-technical-economic “explana-
tion of all human affairs. The scientific technocrats, whose aim is to ac-
quire power, become rulers (humans over other humans) and lead history 
and, of course, humanity to the future society, shape of which is known 
only to them. Thus, all liberation movements must be supported and, if 
need be, helped by eliminating the populations that still cling to the illu-
sions of outdated institutions. This means that no deviating opinions and 
no different consciousness is to be tolerated. According to Landgrebe, the 
consciousness of the Scientific Enlightenment explains the transition from 
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Hegel to Marx. According to Hegel, only the absolute knows the direction 
and progress of history. Armed with scientific consciousness that knows 
the conditions and results of all material events and thus the very aim 
of history, the scientific technocratic elite finds itself in an absolute posi-
tion. Marxism-Leninism becomes the absolute spirit of Hegel and, thus, 
assumes a position that cannot be challenged – their rule is one variant of 
an autocratic civilization depicted in the previous chapter. Thus, there is a 
conjunction between the knowledge and power of the elite – absolute. This 
is the point at which the population need not interfere and simply obey 
the pronouncements of the leaders. Being in absolute position, the lead-
ers need not submit to any laws, while the population is the means for the 
leaders’ plans. Here, even “free press” is irrelevant, since what the public 
must know is what the omniscient elite decide to pronounce – the great 
achievements and progress made in the material domain by the elite for 
the benefit of humanity. In brief, such “luxuries” as free press are redun-
dant and, for the most part reactionary, based on outdated subjectivism 
and, thus, illusory beliefs. As we shall see subsequently, the logic of the 
Scientific Enlightenment, interpreted within a paradigm called “Dialecti-
cal Materialism” attempts to show that everything that one might want to 
say, such as freedoms, equalities, rights, responsibilities are qualities of the 
humans of the past, and thus scientifically surpassed by progress. It is sig-
nificant to point out that wherever scientific technocracy and its progres-
sive liberalism appears and assumes power, wherever liberation move-
ments become successful, there also appear immediate efforts to dominate 
and shape human consciousness; the educated and the industrious usually 
provide a target as the exploiters of “the people” and must be eliminated. 
In comparison to this notion of liberation from rights, the state with rights 
is only a second best. What is required to achieve the best is the change of 
conditions, and to achieve this, revolutionary movements demanding the 
chance to establish such conditions. This suggests that we should not fall 
into the trap of confusing this kind of liberation as if it were an extension 
of the state with institutionally guaranteed rights. While both have mod-
ern origins, they have different aims. 
The opposition between the two notions of liberation, liberation 
through right or from right, has become a fundamental global conflict. How 
are we to understand the millions of refugees, fleeing the “liberated” lands 
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both of the newly established third world regimes, from Vietnam, Cambo-
dia, Mozambique and the second world of the former Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, and currently from the same regions, although renamed 
Central Europe and the Russian Federation? It seems that their rights have 
been denied both individually and institutionally. The problem is that the 
Western liberalism is sympathetic to this experiment of liberation and is, 
therefore, silent; the youth is taught the same kind of view: change the con-
ditions, which will liberate from institutions protective of rights (Kriele). 
If someone announces the violation of rights, then that someone is either 
discredited, or when this fails, the violations are justified by such notions 
that these second and third world regimes are interim structures, which will 
disappear once the material base and true technocratic rules are established. 
They might even be a necessary defense against imperialistic infiltration and 
an attempt to reestablish the old institutions. At times, one even claims that 
the true liberation was betrayed; one simply has to correct the system and 
liberation will follow of necessity. In brief, the ones who will engage in lib-
eration will not betray the true establishment of the necessary conditions 
(Gorbachev, 1987). There is a kind of double standard: the people of the 
non-Western people, according to Western intellectuals, should enjoy equal 
rights and protections and the Western “imperialists” should desist their 
interferences; but the same, intellectuals neither demand the same rights for 
peoples under the rule of the second world regimes, nor the interference by 
these regimes in the rest of the world, an interference which abolishes the 
rights. The only way that this attitude can be explained is the common intel-
lectual presumption that the true liberation is liberation from rights and in-
stitutions on the basis of establishment of conditions, which would abolish 
the need for rights (Revel, 1985).
The second revolution will use means to establish the scientific-ma-
terial conditions for liberation and hence will manipulate the institutions, 
the opinions for this purpose. One problem is that this revolution does not 
tell anyone what will take the place of rights, what is the aim apart from 
the vague notion of liberation from, i.e., negative liberation. It is charac-
teristic of the second liberation movement that its proponents claim that 
the evolutionary way, the inner adjustment of the institutions to abolish 
residua of rights violations is functioning within the institutions; hence, 
the only way to liberate from such rights is through revolution, the sup-
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pression of rights and their institutions. In this sense, those, who affirm 
the institutions, are seen as conservative, regressive and those, who declare 
their abolition, are seen as progressive. Here, the eschatological salvation 
turns into a political hope; here, the regressive maintenance of institutions 
is bad consciousness, while the progressive and revolutionary is good con-
sciousness. 
The catch words of the second revolution are determined negatively 
against the rights of the first revolution: dissolution of rulers and rules of 
man over man, mastery of material conditions, equality, total autonomy, 
etc. Yet, in a unique reversal, this leads to the submission to the rule by 
sciences, specifically of “scientific socialism”; spontaneity is transformed 
into technocracy, and freedom becomes a “consciousness of necessity” 
(Wetter, 1963). It is possible to decipher what this liberation is all about, 
specifically in face of such confessions as those of A. Koestler, I. Lepp, M. 
Sperber, and in face of the excesses of Leninism and Stalinism, and why 
the cultural milieu is still there, which subsumes and blinds so much of 
intellectual acuity. In the second revolution, humans are to be liberated, 
who are not yet aware that they need to be liberated. Primarily, it is the 
act of liberation, which depicts the “objective” conditions that allow the 
subject to realize that he was not free. As long as the liberation remains 
in the future, we are not aware of the need for it and, hence, live in false 
consciousness. What this presupposes is that despite living under objec-
tively oppressive conditions, some people, whether due to their inherence 
in the proper class or whether due to their reflective acuity, anticipate the 
condition of freedom. Thus, they have to educate the rest; they relate to 
the population like teachers to children; later, you will see that what is 
now done to you is for your best (Sloterdijk, 1985). This is a variation of 
the divine complex. 
This notion of liberation divides society into two classes: the enlight-
ened and the unenlightened, the liberators and the liberated. The liberators 
define the conditions, under which the rest are unfree and under which they 
must be free. Thus, the left would say that although the population might 
believe in the ideology of private possession of means of production, the 
population lives in false consciousness. The liberators claim the right to op-
pose the majority. In a state with institutions affirming human rights, each 
individual is regarded as capable of understanding his needs and interests; 
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the liberators, on the other hand, proclaim that the very institutions hinder 
the population to come to awareness of the true needs: the population must 
therefore be educated. This is the justification of the liberators. The claim 
by the liberators is the claim for power to control, without any institutional 
hindrances, the opinions and the direction of human interests. This is not 
only a two-class system, but above all the liberators need not follow any laws 
or respect any rights, since they themselves know – and not the public – 
what is the liberated situation and are in a position to get us there. This is 
why when a state is called to defend the institutionally guaranteed rights it is 
called by the liberators as “oppressive”, “authoritarian”, “fascist”, “reaction-
ary” and even “imperialistic” (Lakoff, 1974).
With the second revolution, “good” is what abolishes the institutions 
supporting such rights and progress is the tendency toward absolute lib-
eration from institutions. We find, here, a hidden return of man’s rule 
over man. This change of the meaning of concepts is usually obfuscated 
till finally the “intellectuals” find themselves using them in the name of 
liberation through whatever means. The result is a change in the concep-
tion of morality, which reaches from the political to daily concerns. This is 
manifest in the political arguments, when an argument is not refuted by a 
better argument but by designations, such as “conservative”, “reactionary” 
or even “fascist”. Thus, the question whether the argument is true or false 
is not even taken into account. Those, who have or are using opposing ar-
guments, are perforce discredited by such imputations that they represent 
the ruling interests. What is obvious is that those, who so “discredit” the 
argument are no longer interested either in truth or falsity, nor are they 
interested in maintaining the semblance of rights, not to speak of the insti-
tutions, which support them. Why are the liberators attempting to disrupt 
the institutions founded on and for the sake of rights? The institutions 
defend the freedom of individuals. But the quintessence of liberation is to 
dominate the mind. Although superficially, it seems that one is intent to 
abolish private property, capitalistic imperialism and exploitation. Indeed, 
these play a role, but only an instrumental and not an essential role; the 
ultimate and fundamental aim and the fascination is the domination of 
mind. In place of the freedom of consciousness, we should have liberation 
from consciousness. After all, the Marxian liberators could insist, on the 
basis of their own theories, to guarantee the economic base and let the 
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mental development free; yet, precisely the opposite is the case; they ruin 
the base and use it as means for the domination and control of minds. The 
communistic states should not fear to embody the International Agree-
ment of Human Rights, proposed in 1966 and established in 1976. 
This pact does not claim the freedom to private property (Kriele, 
1980). What this pact demands is an all-encompassing protection of hu-
man rights against all state intervention; it demands independence for 
judges from any political commitments, right to travel, believe, commu-
nicate, express, gather and debate. But this is not embodied in the tech-
nocratic states; this means that such states want precisely not liberation 
from private property, but domination and control of human thought by 
controlling all property, by allowing all means of subsistence to become 
state property. The abolition of institutions, which protect the freedom 
of thought means the taking on of the task to control human thought by 
arbitrary decisions of individuals or groups; after all, they would be above 
any institutions and laws due to their self-appointed wisdom. What is the 
best way of controlling human thinking? By controlling human means 
of subsistence, by allotting social functions to individuals as a reward for 
obedience. While this is more obvious in the communist nations, the same 
tendency appears globally in the guise of technocratic bureaucracy. The 
proclaimed ability to establish conditions for equality should, in fact, be 
the condition for the public discussion and solution of the persistent eco-
nomic problems; all this is obviously not the case. This suggests that the 
basic interest is not in helping “the people”, but in controlling their think-
ing. And this is indeed the reason for the fascination of Marxism exercised 
over the Western intellectuals. They are well aware of the “base” problems 
in the “communist” societies; yet, they overlook them. This suggests that 
the basic aim is not the socialization of the means of production, but the 
“spiritual liberation” along the lines to be taught by the intellectuals. This 
is the reason for “spiritual dictatorship” and also for the justification of 
terroristic activities. 
The liberation from rights is the liberation from the ontological justi-
fication of rights and, hence, a fundamental rejection of human value and 
the conception that humans are ends and not means. It is a form of reduc-
tionism exposing the human being to be means, to be something that can 
be manipulated through opinion formation and material conditions. Ter-
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rorism, i.e., the use of humans and even the taking of their lives as means 
for the liberation movements, becomes justifiable. Liberation from rights is 
also a liberation from the ontology supporting such rights; but this means 
that we would lack any justification for treating humans as valuable, i.e., it 
is an attempt to subvert and pervert any consideration of the human being 
as something special. What permits this perversion is the obfuscation of 
the end. The obfuscation is such that one is made to believe that the basic 
striving for liberation is founded upon human worth; but implicitly with 
the abolition of final justification of human rights, human worth is also 
abolished and what one offers is a liberation from this worth leading to 
the notion that the human being is a product of conditions and, hence, the 
self-appointed “wise” can change the conditions, manipulate opinion, i.e., 
use humans as means for the nebulous liberation. The purported battle 
against injustice, exploitation, imperialism, etc., is fundamentally a battle 
against the conditions, which allow the human rights and the institutions, 
which enhance such rights (Hoeffe, 1979).
One variant of this liberation is behavioral psychology, which projects a 
scientifically liberated situation: there are the controllers and the controlled; 
the latter live in peace, without aggression, but also without biography, his-
tory or decision and “superstitious” notions, such as freedom. It is a life 
without joy, suffering, tragedy, purpose, without destiny: functional mecha-
nisms. This liberation, indeed, frees one from freedom, dignity; they are sur-
passed. There are, nonetheless, classes: the controllers and the controlled. 
This is Bacon’s dream realized: elite scientists and the thankful population. 
Hence, the abolition of institutions, which protect human rights, where the 
latter, in fact, can force the change in the institutions, is a permission of the 
establishment of this second liberation. Lars Gustafsson in his novel “Sigis-
mund” tells a story of a person, who made a pact with the devil and was per-
mitted to see hell; there he finds a population, whose all needs are satisfied. It 
takes a while to realize why it is hell; what is missing is what constitutes our 
humanity. Hell is the realized scientific utopian liberation (Kriele, 1980). In-
deed, Skinner placed his hopes once on the Soviet Union and then on China 
to realize precisely this two-class scientific utopia.
This is the fundamental sign of the liberators: the elimination of hu-
man value and the reduction of the human to a creature of needs in the 
context of technological understanding. This is “the new man”, whether 
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Soviet, Chinese, Skinnerian or technocratic. This is the aim, although it re-
mains obfuscated by the notion of “liberation”. Of course, one may argue 
that such a consequence is not a consequence of technological-material-
istic interpretation of the world, but a product of the political system and 
its institutions, which can be surpassed through liberation. But once such 
institutions, supporting human value and rights, are abolished, all one is 
left with is technical and materialistic control of human life and thought. 
This is to say, the human being is also reduced to matter or material pro-
cess and, hence, exposed to technical controls instituted on the “higher” 
ideas and their realization of the controllers; they become “divine”. This is 
what Richter calls the “divine complex” (Richter, 1985).
It is indeed remaking of man. As Skinner suggests, we have not yet 
realized into what man can be made by man. This is the rule by scientific 
elites, whether such elites are behaviorists, liberators through scientific 
socialism or technocratic bureaucrats. Liberation, thus, means: in place 
of rights man is ruled by man and things. This is to say the technocra-
tization not only to master and control material events, but also human 
thought. A creation of an organism, in which human rights of free expres-
sion, association, belief and dignity become disruptive factors, which must 
be suppressed. In place of institutions, there emerges the elitist machine, 
in place of a person having an occupation, there appears a functionary, 
and in place of occupational ethics, there appears functional obedience, in 
place of equality, there appears a two-leveled society with the lower level 
having no recourse to check the “upper” level, no institutional protection 
against the arbitrariness of the elites. In place of a moral judgment, the 
necessary aims established by the elite, and in place of conscience, there 
appears functional readiness. The aim of the second revolution, freed from 
the enlightenment’s political rights, is the monopoly of control of human 
life through technocracy. Thus, an absolute liberation turns out to be an 
absolute dictatorship by the technocratic elites, specifically using scientific 
means to control human thought. It seems that we still live in the shadow 
of Hegel, except now the absolute spirit and, thus, subject is the techno-
cratic process, for which the human must be an object, a means for the 
realization of the divine elitist dream: total control of the human. 
Democracy presupposes the juridical validity of human rights and 
the division of state powers. Without the security of such rights and the 
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separation of powers, the citizen would become an object of the whims of 
the state. The development of human rights presupposes democracy, i.e., 
the freedom of the population to establish the laws and public control of 
the three institutionalized powers. Thus, the circle closes; division of pow-
ers presupposes democracy and the latter presupposes human rights. The 
three comprise a unitary process. If one of the factors is lost, all are lost. 
The division of powers is more important than the catalogue of rights, 
since without such a division the executive powers cannot be checked. In-
deed, the technocratic and the liberated new states subscribe to the U.N. 
catalogue of “human rights”. But due to the lack of division of powers, 
such a catalogue is meaningless. In this situation, the executive and juridi-
cal power is one and, hence, stands above the law (millions of people have 
been eliminated or incarcerated).
The Political Enlightenment claims that all are equal; freedom and val-
ue of all and not of some. Each has a claim to freedom, respect and equal-
ity. Humans are not to be “made” equal, but rather have an equal right to 
self-determination in political and social affairs. Free people are never equal 
with respect to their talents, wants and aims. What is at issue is the right of 
each to realize such aims with respect to others. It is claimed that there is an 
unbridgeable opposition between freedom and equality. The more freedom, 
the less equality, and conversely. This thought is analyzed in a volume by 
politologists in a work with a sub-title called “The Square Circle”. It says 
that in a political system of freedom there emerges social inequality. The 
stronger, the frugal, more endowed have more chances to attain power and 
fame. Thus, there emerge inequalities, dependencies and in extreme cases 
exploitation and suppression. If one wants equality, one must limit the free 
unfolding of the talents and in extreme cases to abolish freedom. Freedom is 
achieved at the expense of equality and equality at the expense of freedom. 
This is the alternative, which purportedly distinguishes technocracies from 
democracy. But is this a necessary opposition? The political thought of the 
enlightenment did not think so (Volkmann-Schluck, 1975).
When extreme freedom leads to extreme inequality, to dependence 
and suppression, then it also leads to unfreedom for the dependent and 
the suppressed. Hence, in the land of freedom, the United States, there 
were slaves and there is still poverty, which promotes unfreedom. In turn, 
if the establishment of equality is promoted at the expense of freedom, 
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then there is no equality but inequality between those in power, who at-
tempt to enforce equality and those, on whom it is enforced. An example 
was former East Europe with the Soviet Army on its borders enforcing 
“equality”. There would still be the oppressors and the oppressed even if 
one were to establish equal pay (by some miracle). This means that the 
alternative between freedom and equality is not an alternative at all. Who-
ever attempts to take freedom over equality also must accept unfreedom; 
who takes equality over freedom must accept inequality. This means that 
in principle freedom and equality are not alternatives, but mutual. This is 
the wisdom of the enlightenment; the claim to freedom is equal to all, and 
equality means freedom. What this leads to is a conversion of the ques-
tion: how can freedom be grounded to the question of how limitations of 
freedom can be justified. The classical answer was offered by Kant, who 
said that the freedom of one must coexist with the freedom of others. The 
freedom of each must be respected and freedom limitations are justifiable 
when they are necessary to establish equal freedom of everyone. We shall 
consider this question in the last chapter of this work. This guarantee ap-
pears in the ideal case, when there is a consensus concerning a given law. 
Even if a total consensus cannot be established, the majority must guar-
antee the right to the minority “its day”, i.e., to allow the minority to work 
for the restriction of the law.
Although necessary, the democratically established laws are inad-
equate. After all, the law forbids equally the rich and the poor to beg, sleep 
under bridges and steal bread. Who lives in poverty is not free, but is com-
pelled constantly to grub for survival. Hence, the abolition of poverty, ex-
ploitation and dependence is not only a matter of equality, but also of 
freedom. Thus, freedom means more than the deflection of state’s inter-
ference and arbitrariness; after all, freedom is threatened not only through 
despotism, but also through hunger, need, ignorance and material de-
pendence. Hence, there must be economic, cultural and social rights. This 
is the fundamental demand of the social revolutions of the 19th and 20th 
centuries. But this should not be seen as counter to the idea of freedom, 
but rather has the same philosophical roots of the conception of freedom. 
The “equalizers” are in error, when they think that freedoms must be sac-
rificed; rather, such rights must comprise an enhancement of freedom. 
It would seem that the scientific-technical enlightenment would pro-
vide the means useful for the socio-political enlightenment, where each 
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individual has a claim to freedom, dignity and self-determination. In this 
sense, the Scientific Enlightenment should be politically and socially neu-
tral; a means for human self-realization. While Horckheimer and Adorno 
claim that Kant, Sade and Nietzsche were the final expressions of enlight-
enment, it is essential to differentiate between Kant and his conception of 
dignity and self-determination of the human from the other two. Now, 
if we were to raise the scientific question whether each human has an 
equal right to freedom and dignity, we would have to say that there are 
no grounds for such a claim. If that is the case, is it then a superstition or 
is there something more between superstition and science? (Kriele, 1980) 
It might be necessary, with Kant, to differentiate between scientific 
and practical philosophies. This distinction is abolished, when in scien-
tific-technological comprehension we reduce the practical to the “theo-
retical”. For Kant, theoretical reason cannot decide practical issues and, 
hence, is to be subservient to practical reason. The reduction, thus, is not 
liberation and progress, but a regression. Positively, the scientific reason is 
in no position to demand the abolition of institutions established by prac-
tical reason: democracy, self-determination, dignity, freedoms and rights. 
This means that the regression to the claim by technocrats to scientific 
reason is not a claim of that reason, but a claim by power seekers wanting 
to “master” others, including the institutions, i.e., their will to subvert the 
very technological process and, thus, the primacy of practical reason. 
The key to unravel this subversion lies in the notion of liberation. 
The scientific-technological conceptions are efforts to liberate the human 
from the rule of nature in the form of becoming masters over it. Hence, 
massively introduced technologies seem to contain the notion of libera-
tion from everything and liberation from such reactionary conceptions 
as human rights, which too must be seen as products of a humanly tech-
nologized world. This technical liberation is then seen as the new moral-
ity. Horckheimer and Adorno, despite their insights into instrumental 
enlightenment, did not raise the question whether the enlightenment re-
quired the abolition of political institutions as a condition for liberation. 
And this is what allowed the revolutionary youth to proclaim that they 
remained half-way without demanding full liberation. They are wrong 
insofar as they claim that the evils come from the “dialectics of enlight-
enment”. The problem is that the scientific-technological enlightenment 
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wants to subsume and even abolish the other factor of enlightenment, the 
socio-political (Kriele, 1980).
Bacon, the major force of the Scientific Enlightenment, battled Coke’s 
attempt to insure the freedom of Peacham’s expression – to criticize the 
absolutistic tendencies of the monarch – and the separation of powers. The 
behavior of Bacon is troublesome. After all, the scientific process should 
have nothing to do with political process, and indeed should allow such 
process its own direction. In short, the basis of science ought to be truth, 
while the Political Enlightenment deals with freedom. Whoever claims to 
be a representative of truth might have some inclination to a tyrannical 
claim to elitist mastery, since freedom is not scientific (although freedom 
is a condition to engage in scientific pursuits unhindered by anything). 
This is not only a psychological inclination, but an attempt is made to 
justify it by scientific truth claims, in which politics should be reduced to 
physics. Politics and morality belong to superstition and the population 
is full of superstition. Freedom, in fact, would allow numerous religions, 
which would confuse the people. Hence, it is best to have one religion for 
the sake of politics capable of maintaining a unitary political order. The 
best way to achieve this is to reduce all to physics. 
While for Bacon science is power, for his follower Hobbes science cur-
rently is small power, but in the future it should gain unrestricted domina-
tion; this is the scientific-technological enlightenment. This is somewhat 
contradictory, since scientific progress presupposes political freedoms. 
After the scientific-technological enlightenment will have overcome the 
primitive stages, then it must become a Political Enlightenment and, thus, 
must surpass the institutions established by the Political Enlightenment, 
i.e., liberation of humans from religious freedom by freedom from religion, 
from opinion freedom by the scientific-technological explanation and ma-
nipulation of opinion. In brief, the political institutions of democracy will 
be shown to be ideologies and will be replaced by scientific legitimation. 
The problem is that this claim is a facade for power of self-appointed elite; 
the abolition of political freedoms in favor of scientific rule allows the elite 
to rule over the population by a temporary scientific dogma, whose truth 
is contingent and fallible, and, hence, its imposition as “truth” constitutes 
a dogma, which, while in operation, might force the population to live 
under fallible conditions. It is a pseudoscientific dogmatism. Scientific 
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truth cannot become a dogma without ceasing to be scientific and becom-
ing merely a political tool for power claims. This power elite, imposing its 
dogmas of truth, would in fact demand restrictions in sciences and, hence, 
pervert the scientific freedom. The essential condition for science is the 
guaranteed political freedom from imposed scientific dogmas. Freedom, 
in brief, is what allows science to grow. The opposite of freedom in science 
is orthodoxy, which is counter-scientific. 
At base, the liberation in the name of science would be placed in the 
hands of technocratic bureaucracy, which would be the silent force ad-
vising and indeed compelling the political institutions to adhere to cur-
rent scientific dogma. It would be an institutionalized problem solver 
and, resultantly, a controller both of political and social life. The libera-
tion movements, and those in Central Europe, who even today advocate 
their resumption, are claiming the duty to bring humanity to realization 
that salvation lies in the Scientific Enlightenment, capable of solving the 
“riddle of history”. In this sense, the progressive liberals place themselves 
above subjective views and desires and can sacrifice contemporary gen-
erations in order to abolish the illusion of freedom and even to eliminate 
vast populations as obstructions for the attainment of future known only 
to the elites. Somehow no one to date has raised a question why is it that 
wherever progressive liberals took power, there was an immediate and de-
liberate killing of millions of “enemies of the people”. These enemies were 
of two kinds: people, who were literate, thinking and thus critical of any 
proposed dogma, and people, who were productive and knowledgeable in 
practical affairs, whether they were shop keepers or good farmers. The case 
in point is Lithuania after its occupation and annexation by the Soviet Un-
ion. It was decreed that anyone who owns land is enemy of the people and 
the working class. Imagine the absurdity of such a claim, where seventy 
percent of populations were farmers, whose entire families were working 
their land, indeed doing hard labor to provide for themselves a modicum 
of “good” life – they all became enemies of the people to be shipped to 
concentration camps and even killed in their homes. Those, who were not 
killed or deported to concentration camps to be “reeducated”, were herd-
ed into collective farms to be equal labor power for scientifically managed 
production – what followed this “scientific experiment” was precipitous 
drop in simple food production, almost reaching levels of starvation. Yet, 
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mass media, under the management of elites, lauded this state of affairs 
as a shining victory of “scientific socialism”. Of course, there were mass 
murder and deportation of the educated, the teachers, doctors, writers, 
who were a major critical group that might challenge the claims of the 
Scientific Enlightenment in the name of the Political Enlightenment and 
its institutions. The latter are the last hindrance to the power and arbitrary 
rule of the liberators. But the joyous media pronouncements were replete 
with examples of “equality”, where no one could be different from others, 
where individual initiative was regarded as redundant showinism.
Suppression and the Suppressed
While there are numerous critics of modern consciousness, specifi-
cally of “objectifying” of the human and the quantification of all events, 
thus, emptying life of meaning, there is another and more profound issue 
that stretches through the Soviet Union and current Lithuania: it is a con-
frontation between Modern History I and Modern History II. Although 
in divergent ways, both histories developed together. The basic principle 
of both was freedom and equality and, above all, human autonomy to cre-
ate an environment and correlatively a specific human that by creating a 
specific environment he also became limited to what he has created – ma-
terial conditions. The Political Enlightenment promoted a creation of in-
stitutions, required to guarantee human autonomy and equality. Yet, the 
Scientific Enlightenment, as a technical promise to create a scientific soci-
ety, led to reduction of everything to material production and, hence, to a 
separation of freedom from equality. One is free to select ones occupation, 
education, free to engage in enterprises, specifically in those that began to 
require greater technical sophistication and, thus, increasing reification of 
the environment, making the latter into “material resources”. Those, who 
were capable of advancement in the management of such resources, their 
production into “values”, claimed their right and freedom to engage in 
these ventures. Yet, they ceased to be “equal” to others. Hence, freedom 
to do what one could in material, technical sphere led to social inequali-
ties. The Scientific Enlightenment demanded the abolition of freedom in 
favor of material equality, managed by scientific technocrats. The latter 
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had to demand the suppression of freedom in favor of equality – creating 
a project called “scientific socialism” as a future solution to the separation 
of freedom from equality. This is to say, once scientific socialism is estab-
lished, freedom and equality will become identical. 
Meanwhile, equality is to be maintained, but freedom must be sup-
pressed, since the latter might lead to separation of people into unequal 
social, economic and even educational positions. Since for neutral science 
there cannot be any objective value standard, then all positions are func-
tions for social benefit and neither are more or less valuable. Of course, 
there is an issue that scientific socialism has not resolved: while no grada-
tion of social value can be ascribed to labor power, the elite of this social-
ism have assumed that their functions are most significant and that their 
lives – at least in a foreseeable future – must have greater rewards. Perhaps 
this claim is premised on the view that the working classes are in no posi-
tion to understand the complexities of social life and the aim of history, 
while the elite, armed with absolute knowledge, must be above the mere 
mortals. Indeed, it is their very “immortality” that permits them to under-
stand how much more important they are in comparison to the working 
class. Besides, if the working class were allowed to have possessions and 
even some “luxuries”, then it would become decadent and reactionary. 
The elite, enjoying all the luxuries it desires, will not be corrupted. It is like 
the clergy, telling their flock not to read certain books, because they might 
corrupt the soul, while reading those books themselves without becoming 
corrupted. This suggests that in scientific socialism there is a class dis-
tinction between the corruptible and fallible masses and the omniscient, 
incorruptible elite. There is no need to go into the lives of the incorruptible 
immortals – volumes of jokes have told us otherwise.
We can now point out how the hermeneutical methodology has 
played a crucial role in the analysis of modern West, its philosophical ar-
guments for the appearance of the Political and Scientific Enlightenments 
and how their initial prejudgments formed a horizon of consciousness that 
contained two distinct circles, such that while, the political, allowed both 
Enlightenments to live together, by the logic of the other, the scientific, 
the political became redundant, since scientifically speaking such notions 
as freedom rights, responsibilities are not aspects of science. Hence, in or-
der for science to function without obstructions, by reducing everything 
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to material base, including all human functions and “wants”, no one can 
demand rights, freedoms, dignity or honor. 
Nonetheless, the question of the supremacy of the Scientific Enlight-
enment cannot be settled with the suppression of the Political Enlighten-
ment, specifically when notions, such as the “purpose of history” or “new 
man”, constantly are employed to justify the grand Soviet experiment. 
Without a purpose, such an experiment would be mechanical, perhaps 
increasing in power, but having no other reason apart from increase in 
technical power over nature and society. But it is obvious that the logic 
of power is unrestricted: “more power” for the sake of more power. It is 
also obvious that power and its accumulation is equivalent to accumula-
tion of more means for the sake of accumulation of still more means – 
but for what? This question can be shifted to scientific technology and its 
constant translation of ends into means for the sake of more ends, which 
will become more means but without answering the question what, in 
the final analysis, do these means serve? The answer cannot be that they 
serve humans, because humans are equally designed to be means, results 
of conditions as means to yield a different “man”, who, in accordance with 
the logic of instrumental reason, will become means for other ends, and 
the latter will be means for still other ends. And yet, the logic of power 
and of scientific technology as instrumental reason must bring in Political 
Enlightenment as an answer concerning the final purpose that can offer 
a criterion whether all the progress, all the accumulation of power and 
technical mastery run on mechanical wheels for their own sake and have 
no direction, or whether such means and their direction can be judged by 
another standard, which does not belong to the context of instrumental 
reason. Here, the suppressed interpretation of what a human being is “in 
itself” reappears and challenges the entire mechanical universe. The hu-
man “in itself” as an unavoidable criterion cannot be suppressed, even if 
on the surface it seems that scientific technology and all the experiments 
to remake the human into a “new human” still require the “human”. 
There is no doubt that scientific technology, instrumental reason and 
progress have performed brilliantly at improving the lives of vast popu-
lations, and hopefully will continue to do so. We can even suggest that 
the scientists, who engage in reductionism of humans to various material 
(genetic, biological, chemical and even physiological) domains, are well 
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meaning persons; but it is equally the case that they tend to forget the 
“more” in human life than the sum of such material parts or functions. It 
seems then that the technocratic dominance which, if left to its own logic, 
becomes man’s rule over others, requires the institutions maintaining hu-
man autonomy, equality and rights. Otherwise, the entire modern project 
would be a failure. No doubt, the institutions may be flawed since in con-
trast to scientific omniscience, humans are fallible and equally responsible 
to correct their mistakes. This is one reason why the Political Enlighten-
ment required not only autonomy and equality, but also tolerance, since 
its suppression means that there is someone or some group presuming 
itself to possess absolute truth. In this context, it is instructive that the 
Soviet elite, while forbidding any “negative” news and, thus, attempting 
to convince itself, the population and the world of infallibility, constantly 
had to revise scientific prognoses concerning the dates for the appearance 
of scientific socialism. In brief, this was a silent admission of fallibility. Of 
course, scientific technocrats suggest that the institutions have no precise 
edicts and lead to constant abuses and corruption and, thus, they should 
be abolished and replaced by imposition of strict discipline. This argument 
misses the point. It is not the fault of the principles and institutions of the 
Political Enlightenment, but of the citizens, who fail to live in accordance 
with autonomously established laws and, thus, disqualify themselves as 
free and equal. The argument is equivalent to saying that mathematical 
rules should be suppressed because people use mathematics for cheating 
and stealing. In brief, principles do not cease to be valid simply because 
persons fail to live up to them. Human frailty does not comprise an argu-
ment against principles. To the contrary, a judgment that humans fail is a 
demonstration of the validity of the principles. 
We have reached a level of discussion that requires an extension to 
understand the ways that the Scientific Enlightenment will accomplish the 
task of mastering the environment and submitting it to human controls 
and above all human remaking of all that is not under human power. This 
extension is most important for the understanding of the Soviet “experi-
ment”, insofar as it is premised on the rhetoric of “scientific socialism” 
and, above all, on constructing the conditions for the possibility of a “new 
society and a new man”. The Soviet Revolution, after all, did not follow the 
“logic of history”, wherein the building of communism was premised on 
111INSTITUTIONS AND LIBERATION
the established industrial-productive conditions of capitalism, leading di-
rectly to workers appropriation of the means of production. The entire in-
dustrial base had to be planned and constructed in order to begin the long 
journey to socialism. In this sense, the logic for the construction of such 
technical conditions had to be at the basis for the establishment of such 
conditions. The following is an explication of the modern logic of con-
structivism that is completely involved with the Scientific Enlightenment. 
As already noted, the theoretical-methodological, or termed other-
wise, the quantitative-formal, are not within the domains of the contingent 
world, posited as transcendent. It is not found even in the directly intu-
ited morphological composition of the lived world. It is regarded as dif-
ferent from these domains. Not having any other locus for the formal, the 
thinkers of the modern age invented a container called “mind”, in which 
these quantitative and formal components reside. They belong to the im-
manence of the subject. The immanence assumes an ambiguous status: it 
is the container of the theoretical-methodological formal necessities, and 
yet it is factually contingent substance. This contingency is expressed in 
Cartesianism in two ways: first, the formal composition, with respect to 
a posited absolute being, cannot be regarded as necessary. This is to say, 
the absolute being can will different formal systems; this is an analogical 
expression of a conception, which offers an initial indication as to the arbi-
trariness of the formal. Second, the formal is seen as capable of continuous 
analyses; any break in the analyses is a matter of decision. In this sense, the 
formal domain swings in the ambiguity between necessity and will, rules 
and choice. The importance of this “indecision” consists precisely in the 
option to either regard the formal as a priori given or as a construct of the 
subject. Various expressions are offered at the dawn of the modern age to 
indicate the shift toward the latter option. The notions of nature as cre-
ated in accordance with mathematical laws comprise one such expression. 
When this notion is coupled with the view that even the mathematical-
formal domain is subject to an absolute will, the result is obvious: the em-
phasis is on the primacy of construction of the formal systems. They too 
are chosen, although they cannot be regarded as contingent in the sense of 
the contingency of the material world. Their emergence requires unique 
intentions that have to be regarded as capable of formal construction and 
of arbitrary signification. Moreover, such intentionalities must include the 
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possibility of extending and proliferating formal compositions and divi-
sions at will, and of disregarding the perceptual, intuitive content. 
A brief analysis of this disregard will clarify the constructive inten-
tionality, necessary for the understanding of the composition of power 
in the modern age at the level of signs. To note, while the conception of 
homogeneity of the transcendent reality can be described by geometrical 
structures, corresponding to the morphological and perceptually intuited 
world, the shift from the geometrical signification to the mathematical and 
formal abandons any kind of intuitive correspondence between the shapes 
of geometry and the morphological compositions of the lived world. 
Hence, any theory of representative correspondence, copy of the world 
in the “mind” substance, has to be abandoned. The signitive symbolism of 
quantitative and formal compositions does not offer any intuitive coun-
terpart in the perceptual world apart from the sounds or marks, selected 
arbitrarily. But these marks, while part of the morphological world, do 
not resemble the theoretical-methodological composition; they simply 
provide the arbitrary means for perceptual expression. While there are 
many complexities in the constitution of the quantitative-formal modes 
of theoretical-methodological “thought”, in principle, this thought does 
not offer any possibility of correspondence between theoretical-method-
ological compositions and the perceptual world of shapes and structures. 
The operations with signitive symbolism – the perceptual side of the 
quantitative-formal – offer themselves in a precise order: they must be 
arranged sequentially and uni-directionally. They must follow a temporal 
sequence and must be constructed as sequential. The perceptual intuition 
into the morphological side of such signitive processes offers an aware-
ness of “progression” from a “starting” point to a “finish”. The problem of 
the finish is not to be taken in a finite sense: the formal procedures lend 
themselves to indefinite progression and articulation; hence, what could 
be regarded as “finish” is a decision to stop the formal articulation of the-
oretical-methodological compositions. As noted above, the quantitative 
and formal processes can be continued indefinitely; any cessation in our 
operations with them, as was already noted at the dawn of the modern age, 
is a matter of choice. Phenomenologically speaking, there appears a specif-
ic “lack” on the basis of the transformation from the morphological lived 
world, present to perceptual awareness, to the formal signitive symbol-
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isms, expressed serially by arbitrarily selected marks. The intentional di-
rection toward the perceptual world, capturing the morphological consti-
tution of the lived world, can be designated as “vertical”. The maintenance 
of the vertical intentionality requires the presence and continuity of the 
directly intuited morphology; this intuition can be unfolded horizontally, 
and if need be in horizontal performances composed of grammatically 
structured marks or sounds. Thus, the morphological awareness of a par-
ticular object can offer a possibility of eidetic variation to yield a pure geo-
metric figure, whereby the morphological awareness becomes an intuitive 
exemplification of a corresponding eidetic structure. Each morphological 
variant has a representing capacity, i.e. it can give an intuitive similarity to 
the eidetic structure, held by vertical intentionality. Yet, the constitution 
of the mathematical-formal needs no longer signify the object present to 
vertical intentionality. It becomes free from any morphological moorings 
and vertical intentionality and can be explicated on the basis of its formal 
procedures horizontally. This is to say, it can “progress” uni-directionally 
in a process of either increased formally analytic differentiations or even 
an indefinite repetition of functions. 
The specificity of this horizontal process consists of the fact that the 
criteria of articulation, differentiation and analyses are intrinsic to the for-
mal “discourses”. This is quite fitting, since the criteria of the experienced 
world, the given morphological structures, are no longer signified by the 
formal processes. After all, what the formal process signifies is its own ar-
bitrary selection of means of expression. The formal can be still regarded 
as “necessary” and the selected expressive “material” as contingent (al-
though with the previously mentioned ambiguity), yet what leads the pro-
cess is the possibility of increased formalization of propositions, resulting 
in the concept of formal systems, which can be differentiated into formal 
sub-systems and or splitting up of systems into distinct formal systems. 
Disregarding the morphological composition of the lived world, this pro-
cess pretends to subsume under itself all domains of the world not on the 
basis of any intuitive content, but on the basis of formal designations and 
differentiations. 
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Contingency
The previously indicated problematic of the transcendent world 
emerges here in a new guise. The excluded morphological lived world 
yields, in accordance with formal systems, no visible necessity. The pos-
ited homogeneous world, the so-called “material reality”, transcending 
all perceptual and intuitive access, does not offer any viable view, which 
would make its necessity present. This is to say, it too must be regarded 
as contingent. Being inaccessible, it must be posited in accordance with 
the formal definitions and procedures, necessity of which would provide a 
“model” of explanation not for the perceptual components, but for “pos-
sible construction of conditions to achieve projected results”, as was the 
case with Marxism-Leninism. The contingent is so designated because its 
necessity comes from another and in two senses. First, from the formal ar-
ticulations comprising the theoretical-methodological domain presumed 
to be correlative to the posited transcendent reality, and second, from a 
presumed act of an absolute creation (Galileo), such that the theoretical-
methodological composition is the very way, in which reality is created. 
This is the symbolic support designated to “necessitate” the functioning 
of this reality and to guarantee that our theoretical-methodological forms 
constitute adequate descriptions of reality, thus, the Galilean exclamation 
of our “greatness”. Analogous symbolic ploy was used by Descartes to 
guarantee the necessity of the objective phenomena. This persistent insist-
ence on securing symbolic assurances for necessity of the processes of the 
transcendent reality indicates a fundamental realization that left “to itself” 
such a reality is contingent, unless it acquires its necessity from elsewhere. 
This is to say that an appeal to an absolute geometrician is not an attempt 
to placate the ecclesiastics, but a symbolic effort to legitimate the necessity 
of an otherwise contingently construed reality and the correlative neces-
sity of the presumed objective theory and method. 
If we were to exclude such a symbolism, we would be left with a con-
tingent reality, necessity of which would come from another and this is to 
say from the theoretical-methodology. Contingency excludes at the same 
time essentiality, i.e. the possibility for a vertical intentionality to maintain 
something permanent with necessary characteristics, accessible to percep-
tion, or in case of induction, essentiality with universal validity in the sphere 
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of ontology. The abolition of essentiality (the Greek notion of essential com-
position of something real) opens the door to the notion of an access to 
this reality in terms of “possibility”. This is to say, since what “is” cannot be 
perceived, and since its being posited as transcendent reality does not offer 
any necessity for its composition, then it can be accessed and dealt with in 
accordance with theoretical-methodological formal possibilities. This is pre-
cisely the juncture, at which it becomes “necessary” to regard this transcend-
ent reality in accordance with what it can possibly be. Before continuing this 
line of constitution, it is advisable to interject the first moment of power, 
which offers itself through the articulations presented so far. 
Power
The problematic of power have been discussed from ancient Far East 
all the way to modern political thought and even post-modern semiotics. 
The last has admitted that power is not to be located anywhere, although its 
exercise is everywhere through discourse. Such an admission is well taken, 
but without a proper grounding in awareness. The task at hand is to indi-
cate what grounds power in awareness and why it cannot be located. To 
recall the previous discussion and its basic composition: the lived world of 
morphologically constituted and intuitively accessible events and objects 
is bracketed under scientific skepsis; the posited transcendent homogene-
ous reality is inaccessible to perception. The constitution of the theoretical-
methodological formalisms has no intuitive counterpart, i.e., no vertical 
hold. They can be articulated horizontally in a serial, uni-linear progression 
in accordance with their own intrinsic rules. The homogeneous transcend-
ent reality is contingent and hence open to possibility. As a result, there is no 
necessary connection between the theoretical methodological formalisms or 
their signitive functions and the transcendent reality. The connection is ar-
bitrary. This is to say, it requires a specific intentionality, which is not neces-
sitated by any real compulsion or law to connect the formal signitive factors 
to the posited reality. The arbitrariness appears under various guises: the 
“application” of theory to “praxis”, the most lyrically stressed intoxication 
that the purpose of all science is its reshaping of the environment in accord-
ance with human designs, the humanistic efforts to “humanize” nature and 
the “human animal”, the aims at improving nature and the exclamations 
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that something is good because we say it is good in accordance with our own 
tablets, etc. In principle, the intentional connection between the formal do-
main and the posited reality has no hold in anything, and it need not respect 
any prescription and qualitative composition of the lived world. And yet, it 
is a required nexus between the theoretical and the real. After all, the signi-
tive formal compositions do not point to anything that would be intuitively 
similar to them. In this sense, arbitrary selection of formal components for 
possible correlation to the homogeneous quantified world offers no other 
option apart from the imposition of the formally constituted methods on 
the real. One variant of this requirement is the Marxian pronouncement 
that all theory must become praxis.
While this might seem obvious, there appears an unnoticed require-
ment for this correlation: concrete activity. The latter is directed by pro-
jected choices of what is materially possible, i.e. what can be made. The 
formal compositions, not having any similarity to anything intuitively 
present to perception, cannot be correlated to anything perceptual; if the 
perceptual awareness is excluded, then the correlation requires an active 
intervention and construction of the posited homogeneous world in ac-
cordance with the formal requirements. Since the latter are constructs, 
they too are invented for the sake of the reconstruction of the material 
reality in accordance with our chosen projects. All this seems to rest on 
nothing. Indeed, Fink has argued very cogently that modernity emerges 
as if out of nothing. In this sense, the formal requirements comprise pos-
sibilizing arrangements, which lead the construction of the real or the real 
in accordance with formal constructs. This is to say that the “intention” 
to control the environment under whatever guise is not a power aim of 
Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Buffon, the capitalists or the Marxists, but the 
constitution of the possibility of arbitrariness with respect to the connec-
tion between theory and “reality”, an arbitrariness of the priority of will 
over reason and nature. It should be obvious that the “praxis” of Marx-
ism can disregard any norms and regard everything, including humans, as 
material conditions to be arbitrarily used, controlled and even discarded 
in accordance with the “will of the party”.
Arbitrariness, as a ground for power, might run counter to the usual 
notions that only set restrictions comprise power, e.g. discursive practices 
of a tradition. Indeed, it is possible to extend the argument that the classical 
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conceptions of human nature and essence, and indeed an essence of every-
thing else, submitted nature to power under the guise of limits, restrictions 
and impositions; yet, such restrictions were not external, but comprised 
the very way of being without violation. It could be argued that a continu-
ous or at least somewhat stable framework restricts activities and disallows 
violations “without notice”. Yet, arbitrariness lends itself to an emergence 
of power without “reason”, or at best from psychological whim, enhanced, 
prompted and fed by “unlimited possibilities” of formal and, as a result, 
material constructions. This turns out to be one of the bases of technology 
and of reason as instrumental. The intentionality emerging here between the 
theoretical and the “real” swings between two possibilizing structures: the 
formal possibilities, operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs, reach a 
point of realization that the formal processes are also arbitrarily constructed 
and, hence, can be reconstructed at will, purely empty significations with-
out any immediate fulfillment in the perceptual intuition. And the formally 
designed possibilities are also in a position to align the transcendent real-
ity toward intuitive fulfillment by human intervention into the processes 
of the lived world and, by disregarding the given perceptual morphologies 
of that world, to shape the presumed underlying homogeneous matter in 
accord with formal designs. This shaping comprises the source of both, the 
labor theory of value and life – the primacy of homo laborans – and technol-
ogy, inclusive of the appearance of political technocracies, which promise 
to redesign the environment and the human in line with theoretical-meth-
odological requirements: a world produced by scientific technology. Some 
scholars, in fact, suggest that the modern world has two intentional histo-
ries: one that is completely unstructured world of autonomous individuals, 
and two, a complete redesigning of the world in accordance with the formal 
designs we ourselves posit. Yet, in either case arbitrariness is assumed and 
the intentionality of the will that swings between the formal and the trans-
cendent is the decisive arbiter – without precedents. 
This intentionality is not identical with Kantian autonomous will and 
with Nietzsche’s will to power. Its engagement is with possibilizing con-
stituents both at the formal and material levels. The possibilizing allows for 
formal variations and differentiations of processes into systems and sub-
systems, until the sub-systems can become distinct sciences, carving out 
their own fields and accessing the environment in accordance with their 
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formal requirements. This simply means an increased refinement of appli-
cation and realization of the formal constructs in the material sphere. This is 
the technological process. As Husserl argues, technologization posits formal 
operations, with a total disregard or indifference to the meaning and truth of 
nature in the lived world. Such formalism, coupled with the homogeneous 
and “indifferent” reality, results in two structural processes when introduced 
in the lived world. First, a complete disregard of the perceptual phenomena 
and their horizons, including their enactments in the lived world, leading 
to increased contingency of the environment, and second, the detachment 
of the formal and technological structures and processes from intentionali-
ties that connect the subject to the morphologies and the phenomena of the 
experienced environment. These points constitute the problematic of the 
relationship between contingency, detachment and nature. 
Both, the formally designed systems and the transcendent material 
nature, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary 
correlation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point 
of detached formalism and regard qualitative and essential distinctions 
with indifference. As already suggested, the formal indifferent and dis-
connected constitution lends itself to a horizontal division and increased 
formalization of language in such a way that there emerge increased for-
mal differentiations of formal systems themselves. Correlatively, the ma-
terial world can be increasingly differentiated and reconstructed along 
more complex and yet more distinct technical masteries and controls of 
the transcendent reality. In short, an incrementation of formal complexi-
ties and differences is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of 
the material domain, leading to more possible rearrangements of the in-
different material nature. As Jonas suggests, every refined and produced 
material process offers possibilities for further formal refinements and 
material rearrangements. The lateral differentiation of formal systems and 
their correlative material structuration provide a basis for disciplinary dif-
ferentiations, each having its own formal approaches and each capable of 
possible construction of material realizations. 
A brief note should be inserted to point out the reasons why the de-
limited constitution is the condition for the possibility of discursive power. 
The very languages, the formal systems and their differentiations can ac-
cess the transcendent world only by remaking it, by subjecting the materi-
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al to formal and technical transformations. Thus, the more one subdivides 
the formal domain into increasingly refined concepts, the more one is able 
to criss-cross the material by technical procedures in terms of the formal 
definitions. In this sense, the very language of the disciplines is coexten-
sive with the power of shaping the indifferent material to fit the definitory 
requirements. One could argue, furthermore, that this continuous divi-
sion and formalization of discourse is coextensive with the militarization 
of language and society. Each increasing refinement is correlatively a re-
striction of signs to signals followed by an attendant restriction of human 
functions to being a reaction to precise and efficient codes. In this sense, 
the discoursive power to make leads in two directions: the making of the 
environment and the control of the human. In general terms, this process 
of militarization is one of the bases for the emergent language of “war”. 
We are at war with each other, the environment, poverty, affluence and 
with our own divided selves. 
While this process requires the adherence to its principles of formal 
and material detachments, it “progresses” toward a differentiated inclusion 
of all events, both “natural” and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally 
differentiated world, where semi-independent spheres call for semi-inde-
pendent functions and “work”. What is relevant in human life depends and 
is contingent upon the manner, in which the formal constructs divide the 
human “material”: the human is economic, social, chemical, physiological, 
psychological, biological, etc. set of differentiated “behaviors”, each semi-
independent of the others. It would be redundant to analyze the obvious: 
the “power” of these differentiations comprises also the separations of social 
functions and tasks, leading to a society of semi-independent groupings of 
“expertise”. Yet, what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no 
necessary connection with other spheres. Hence, the results of “research” 
in a specific domain can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts 
of each domain, there is no recourse to any external criterion concerning 
the intentionalities, which would correlate the results as possibilities in an-
other domain. This is to say, the material, i.e. technically produced forces, 
can be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social domains, such as politics 
for possible “application”. The lateral differentiation decentralizes respon-
sibility, thus, increasing the contingency and arbitrariness, and the latter is 
increasingly unchained from any constraints. Every formal rule and every 
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material result made to fulfill the formal design become totally arbitrary, 
offering possibilizing formal and material combinations without end. Each 
domain is released from the concrete lived world implications, each an 
“expert” in its own sphere, need not relate to any other sphere; each can 
claim that there is no such thing as “conclusive” evidence precisely because 
the formal systems and their fulfilled material arrangements are arbitrary 
designs and carry no necessity; they are, insofar as they make, and with 
the making they produce their “reality” and, hence, increment power and 
“prove” their momentary success. The significance for understanding the 
continuous postponement of the communist society to a future “final” sci-
entific liberation from the material environment rests on this continuous 
division of experts, capable of continuous reconstruction of the environ-
ment and the human, never reaching a final position. And this leads to the 
requirement of increasing controls and subjection, leaving the human as an 
intersection of many disciplines.
It would be redundant to speak of “needs” since the latter are part 
and parcel of the possibilizing procedures and become at the same time 
needs and fulfillment. We can make it, therefore, we want it, and we want-
ed, therefore, we can make it. What this suggests is that the process of 
increased contingency and arbitrariness as sources of power comprise a 
self-referential domain. This means that there are no restrictions for the 
“search for truth”. After all, such a search has lost any boundary and any 
distinction between knowledge and object. Even in social understanding, 
the relationship between the formal and material processes is determined 
by “science”, i.e. the very self-articulation and production. One, thus, 
cannot find any trans-scientific criteria to check this process. And each 
domain has no built in reason to stop the proliferation of its own form 
of knowledge and praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease making 
more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to stop 
the economic “growth”, no biological reasons to stop remolding the liv-
ing processes along new combinations, etc. Limitation would be regarded 
as an infringement on the “autonomy” of “research”. Any science, which 
would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to be a science 
in the context depicted above. 
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Progress and Instrumental Rationality
Given the key intentionality, which swings without any essential ne-
cessitation between the theoretical methodological and the transcendent 
homogeneous domains, there emerges the attendant factor, which is per-
manent: “progress”. It must be without regression, without death, and all 
formal systems and all transformations of the lived world into calculatively 
remade world are enhancements, maintenances of this permanent struc-
ture. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no “subject” that would 
progress. It must be recalled that for modern philosophy, despite various 
surface claims concerning human nature, the sole objective reality is basi-
cally a sum of material parts and humans are no exception; at this level, hu-
mans cannot claim to be essentially different from all other material events. 
In this sense, humans are also a function to be calculated within the context 
of various formal systems and their ability to design a new man. All for-
mal systems as rational are instrumental, where a positing of a specific aim 
requires calculation of material means for the attainment of such an aim. 
Yet, the attained aim will become material means for other aims, while the 
latter will also become means for further aims, but without any final aim. 
In terms of instrumental rationality, progress cannot have a final aim and 
hence it cannot have a direction. Its aim and its subject is itself and, thus, it 
is self-referential. Progress is its own destiny. It constitutes its own increas-
ing formal refinements, efficiencies and “perfectabilities” without, of course, 
attaining perfection. No attained construction is left without possibilizing 
and, hence, “improvement”. In this sense, one could say semiotically, and 
yet on Husserlian basis, that the signifier and signified are one. 
The question that arises in this kind of progress, and as pointed out, 
its proliferation of increasing arbitrariness with respect to all phenomena, 
is the appearance of crisis. What is immediately notable is the dispropor-
tion between the sub-system called science and the rest of the culture. The 
efforts by the theoretically-methodologically designed systems to “master” 
the “material” nature have become exponential. Let us be clear about this: 
there can be only one domain of progress, and this is the coded and for-
malized transmission of practices or “techniques”. A culture can increase 
its mastery and practical control through the increase of formal differen-
tiations and physical interventions in the environment, yet it cannot in-
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crease what the environment as a whole has to offer. There is no “progress” 
in nature. We cannot increase material resources, but only the efficiency 
of their uses. Only the latter can progress. And this is precisely the point 
of crisis: the sciences are entering human life on the basis of this “use”, 
i.e. making humans function in accordance with the very prescripts that 
are imposed on the presumed physical world. Thus, the question arises: 
is this a progress for human life, or is this the arbitrary treatment of the 
human and, hence, the subsumption of the human under arbitrariness 
and its opening up of power over the human? Obviously, the “use” and 
interference is inherent in the processes of modern science, requiring the 
intentionality, which can connect the formal and the material. The human 
then is submitted to and subsumed under an arbitrariness, which includes 
her own operations. That is, the human also functions in this modern in-
tentionality and treats, or at least is exposed in principle to treat every-
thing arbitrarily, i.e. violently. Arbitrariness is a “power”, which opens an 
initial experience of violation. But this violation cannot be avoided within 
the context of modern understanding of theory and method and their “ap-
plication” or, to speak with Marxism, their “praxis”. 
The brief discussion of the emergence of power in the modern tradi-
tion resulted in sign systems as all-encompassing eidos of power. Other tra-
ditions should be deciphered and variations performed in order to discover 
the complete noetic-noematic correlation constituting power. One notion 
seems to be warranted in the context of our discussion: it is not the discur-
sive limits that exercise power – after all, Greeks were capable of linguistic 
“dance” within a well-designed form – but an arbitrary proclamation of a 
homogeneity and an imperialism of a method that reduces all phenomena 
to a transcendent and reified realm that lead to a disregard not only of the 
limits, but also the uniqueness of any individual. Arbitrary “lingualisms” that 
violate experienced limits is what will yield modern power. This can open 
our understanding of political rhetoric and, specifically, its extension toward 
political technocracy that subtends the so-called “ideological camps”. 
No doubt, numerous thinkers of this century, specifically in herme-
neutics, semiotics, linguistic analysis, have rightly argued in favor of the 
priority of language and its power to designate. The task of this essay was 
to explicate the conditions for the possibility of such views. The condi-
tions are neither epistemic nor ontological, but more fundamentally the 
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appearance of a set of issues that led to the selection of a certain theoreti-
cal and methodological prejudgment that textually constituted ontologi-
cal and epistemological problematic leading to the postulation or at least 
tacit introduction of mediating functions that were neither theoretical nor 
ontological; rather, they opened the portals to indefinite selectivity of pro-
ductive methodologies leading to a transformation of the material sur-
roundings. Such demands are, in principle, arbitrary and, hence, power 
laden. 
Russian Revolution 
The various major critiques of enlightenment, from Adorno through 
Heidegger, Habermas, Derrida, Levinas, to Deleuze fall within the param-
eters of one or another variant of the enlightenment, whether it is ration-
alism, psychologism. sociologism, economism, biologism and, above all, 
preoccupation with language. Valuations that are available, such as utili-
tarianism, deontologism and voluntarism, are equally variants of the en-
lightenment. It is essential for our task to show what sort of life world was 
being offered to Russia before the revolution as advanced and progressive 
and how Russians received such a world. Hence, the task is to extricate 
the life world of the enlightenment from such variants at its very limit 
in order to reveal its eidos. The first is the well-known dualism of subject 
and object, the former is mind, the latter is matter. The subject is the un-
conditional source of all theories and values, while the material world is 
an irrational and valueless sum of homogeneous matter to be constructed 
in terms of the subject theories and values. Second, the subject is uncon-
ditionally autonomous source of all laws in both the social and material 
realms. Since there is no other criterion concerning the material and social 
worlds, then all subjects are equal concerning the way that the material 
and social worlds are to be constructed. Third, construction is uncondi-
tional to the extent that no causes can be assigned to the structures and 
procedures, by which the subject interprets and shapes itself, social rela-
tionships and the material environment. In the language of the Enlighten-
ment, all are projections of human autonomy. Various terms have been 
used for projection: objectification, alienation, humanization and even 
self-realization. It is important to note that the term “projection” is basic 
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to the Political and the Scientific Enlightenments. The Political Enlighten-
ment posits the subject as an autonomous center of the public domain 
and all public rules and appointments of governing entities. Moreover, the 
public domain of autonomous subjects is strictly distinguished from the 
private-social domain of needs, wants, desires and their fulfillment. If the 
latter entered the public domain, it would abolish autonomy and equal-
ity. The Scientific Enlightenment posits the subject as a rational bearer of 
theoretical and methodological constructs, by which to manage the mate-
rial environment in terms of projected human “needs”. The latter are to be 
understood either biologically or psychologically and, thus, can be satis-
fied by scientific invention of “techniques” of fulfillment leading, to what 
is known, the reduction of scientific reason to instrumentality. Fourth, 
invention of history and its progress toward a utopian society; the lat-
ter assumed various interpretations, yet common to all is the notion that 
humans can construct a material and psychological setting, wherein all 
previous ills would be abolished. It is obvious that this utopian notion, as 
“the aim and end of history”, is a mixture of the Political and the Scientific 
Enlightenments. Fifth, the reason that this mixture had to be posited as a 
future aim is that the Political and the Scientific Enlightenments became 
incompatible; the Scientific Enlightenment, and its promise to fulfill mate-
rial and psychological wants, had to abolish the interpretation of human 
life as autonomous, unconditional and self-creative. The first requirement 
and interpretation of human life became material and psychological sum 
of wants and their immediate gratification. As we know, current reading 
of life and experience is regarded as a multiplicity of intensive pleasure 
nodes, each clamoring to be tickled, gratified, in order that new pleasure 
nodes could pop up for more gratification. Utilitarianism is the general 
ethical position, wherein all things and humans have a value to the extent 
that they produce pleasure. Second requirement is the massive technol-
ogy and its progress, designed for the constant fulfillment and constant 
invention of needs. The conjunction of these factors results in the aboli-
tion of historical aim and its replacement by progress for the sake of pro-
gress. This is obvious from the essence of instrumental rationality. Sixth, 
the notion of autonomy, the view of the subject as self-creative, had to be 
postponed and forever deferred, and also regarded as scientifically irrel-
evant and contradictory. It is impossible to claim that once the material 
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and psychological conditions are fully established, then they will cause the 
human subject to be autonomous. As we know at the outset, autonomy 
cannot be caused. As just noted, this is equally problematic due to pro-
gress that can never reach any end and, hence, establish all the necessary 
conditions for emergence of autonomy. Every new condition, as a result of 
instrumental reason, becomes means for new conditions and new needs, 
and the latter split up into more novel needs. In this sense, it is impossible 
to fulfill all human needs and then establish autonomy. Seventh, we are 
left with a democracy, which principle of human autonomy and the public 
domain, wherein such autonomy is maintained and exercised is no longer 
available. It has been completely pervaded by instrumental rationality and 
the proliferation of needs and their fulfillment. Hence, the members of a 
political and democratic community are reduced to material life, psycho-
logical titillations and chemical prolongation of boredom. 
It is now possible to turn to the essence of the life world of the En-
lightenment: it is a process of valuation. Everything in the universe as-
sumes a value to the extent that it serves our interests. Contrary to claims 
that the world has no value, the world constructed by the Enlightenment 
is full of values: labor theory of value (accepted and expounded by Rad-
ishchev), values for sale, values produced and to be produced, values of 
stocks and bonds, values of education, family values, religious values, ide-
ologically constructed values, the changing and the new values, value of 
life and even calculated death, social values, and persons are judged as to 
their value in all of these settings. Indeed, the basic mode of awareness is 
valuative selectivity. It should be clear also that awareness and perception 
are no longer given in some pure empirical sense, but are selected on the 
grounds of valuation. In this sense, what is given as a plethora of empirical 
environment is, for the most part, ignored. What is perceived depends on 
its specific value. Indeed, there are social mechanisms that not only consist 
of values, but evaluation of values that select specific ones deemed relevant 
in terms of future value projects. It has been argued that all these values are 
human and, hence, the primacy is placed on modern subject as the source 
of values. This claim would hold if the human were a distinct and decisive 
category, wherein all other categories and processes were subservient to 
humans. But this is no longer the case, since other values, such as tech-
nologies of various sorts, from electronic media to genetic biochemistry, 
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compel the understanding of the human to be equivalent to the rest of 
the values. This means that genetic biochemistry will not treat the human 
as a special category, but will have to reduce all human functions to bio-
chemistry. Thus, the environment, that is constructed on the basis of the 
process of valuation and is deemed to be objective, requires that the hu-
man be treated equally objectively in terms of what such an environment 
demands, i.e. interpretation of the human as material, chemical, biologi-
cal, physical entity in order that such constructed technical values could 
be applied and, thus, useful and valuable. Russian literature follows this 
trend as scientific modernization, expressed in writings of persons, such 
as Turgenev, Chernichevski, Pisarov and others, where “objective” value 
constructs abound in the form of the new society. 
We are now in a position to extricate the fundamental intentionality 
that constitutes this life world that means it in a very specific way. To have 
some sense of this intentionality, it is necessary to explicate the directly 
lived awareness that could not be posited as an object by the thinkers of 
the enlightenment. It ought to be understood that such a lived awareness 
is transcendental and, hence, accessible only reflectively from the meant 
objects that such a lived awareness intends. What then are these objects? 
While the process of valuation of events in favor of human “needs” was 
briefly indicated, i.e. various reductionisms of the human to biochemis-
try, genetics and mechanics, the lived awareness subtending this process 
intends an objectivity, which is unique to the Enlightenment. One level of 
this objectivity is designed to be accessible to quantification and, hence, 
it has to be measurable homogeneous matter. This design, of course, is 
meant by a specific exclusion of the entire perceived world and, hence, in 
no wise accessible to experience. Yet, covered by this homogeneous ma-
teriality as an intentional object is another intended objectivity: temporal 
possibility. Here again, we encounter the major Russian writers, such as 
Herzen and just mentioned others, who advocate the total destruction of 
what has been a tradition and its replacement by not yet existing, possible, 
form of constructed society with the constant rejection of the possibility of 
capitalist economic system. 
The live awareness that intends such objectivity is an empty will, prior 
to the question of its being free or determined. Phenomenologically speak-
ing, there can be eternal possibilities, as Plato and Husserl have noted, 
but such possibilities have been already enacted theologically and, in part, 
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metaphysically. The Enlightenment rejects eternal possibilities and is left 
with temporal, although in the first lived intentionality, empty temporal 
possibilities. It is to be noted that the term “temporal” does not suggest 
“being in time” ,but an open horizon without any specific ontological lo-
cus. Hence, any temporal location would have to be established within 
such a horizon. If we attend to the language of the Enlightenment up to 
date, we shall note that subtending the question of “reality”, there is a prior 
discourse concerning the “conditions for the possibility of reality.” Such 
discourses are premised on the first lived intentionality of empty tempo-
ral possibility. It opens a horizon of possible intentions and their fulfill-
ment, requiring a second constitution of objectivities: possible valuations 
of what the will intends as valuable for us, but recalling that at this level all 
value possibilities are open as temporal. In principle, it is possible for us 
to be all that we will as valuable in time. This is Enlightenment’s alpha and 
omega: empty temporal possibility and its temporal fulfillment by all that 
we value as our mode of final being. Both Marxism and capitalism offer 
the same intentionality. The intentionality of fulfillment of possible valu-
ations as temporal does not lead to perceptual awareness, since the latter, 
in its naturalistic mode, is quite limited and merely qualitative. Hence, the 
fulfillment requires a constructive intentionality that can establish possi-
ble conditions for possible reality. One minor aspect for this establishment 
is the shift of reason to instrumental rationality, which task is to calculate 
what reality is valuable for us and then calculate the conditions how such 
reality shall be achieved. Values, in this sense, are calculations of possible 
results realized solely as material. To achieve any value, the human has to 
be reduced to a system of interests, needs, desires, power and all must act 
aggressively against others to fulfill such wants. Indeed, language itself is 
split into numerous technical discourses. No doubt, the Russian West-
ernizers took this type of instrumental intentionality for granted, but also 
recognized that values signify a field of instrumental connections and are 
not ends in themselves. 
The issue of temporal value possibilities is the driving force of the En-
lightenment at this level. Transcendent or eternal possibility is abolished; 
hence, temporality is the pressure that demands a prolongation of our 
temporal existence. There is no other option; being temporal, we want to 
live as long as possible and, hence, the frantic rush for the latest technolo-
gies that promise to protract our lives. Such technologies have become 
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equivalent to the value of life and death. The public domain is an arena 
for the struggle for life itself, and any means can be used, whether lying, 
killing, wars, all will do as well, as long as they promise to keep us safe, to 
insure our continuity at any price. All the changing technical inventions 
promote other inventions as values of life: we want to go on, thus, the 
political shift to dramatic conservatism. The latter is a promise, by what-
ever means, to guarantee our security, safety, protection and continuity, 
as long as we surrender our freedoms to participate in the public domain 
and to engage in public dialogue. In other words, the public domain, as 
the condition for other democratic institutions, is no longer maintained, 
despite all the rhetoric about democracy and its “values”. We are closer 
to Hobbesian world than to that of Locke and, above all, Kant. The inten-
tionality of the Enlightenment has worked itself out to reveal its truth two 
centuries later. Indeed, we are living this intentionality as an awareness 
of our life world in such a way that while speaking of democracy, rights, 
equality and freedoms, we intend such a world as a struggle for temporal 
and technical continuity. Thus, all is valuable that enhances this continu-
ity – and purely materially. The life world of the Enlightenment that Russia 
encountered consisted of possible construction of iron, coal, cement, chem-
istry, biology, physics and even physiology. The human acquired a material 
value as producer, maker, a homo laborans, a man of science and ulti-
mately a technocratic functionary in a system of conditions and results 
that became the Soviet model.
The Great Russian literatures faced this Westernization and “mod-
ernization” and, hence, were written between two life worlds: one that 
was maintained as an established tradition, the other as a construct of the 
Scientific and the Political Enlightenments of the West. The former, the 
feudal-aristocratic, was deemed to be decadent, corrupt by some and by 
others as spiritually superior although of need for revisions, specifically, 
its serfdom. The latter, the West, while partially unknown and alien, was 
regarded as the bearer of ideas that would transform Russia and bring it 
into its proper place as a European nation. While numerous texts catego-
rize Russian philosophies in terms of Slavophiles and Westernizers, ide-
alistic and materialistic, nihilistic, theocentric and secular, our task is to 
disclose the lived awareness that comprises eidetic invariants, which are 
not posited as objects of reflection. Rather, they comprise a tacit aware-
ness, in terms of which all judgments are made, whether such judgments 
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are phrased theologically, politically, ethically, socially or economically. In 
this sense, the appearance in Russia of Western Enlightenment brought in 
various systems, from Romanticism through Idealism to Materialism, but 
the eidos of such systems is what has to be understood in order to disclose 
Russian challenge to the Enlightenment and its own tradition. Russian 
writers constitute a point of crisis between two worlds – tradition and West-
ern modern Enlightenments. But to understand these literatures, it is nec-
essary to offer a brief sketch of the Russian tradition before the revolution.
A brief historical sketch is provided by James Eddie, while the signifi-
cant aspects of that tradition are dependent on the reflective method pre-
sented in the second chapter of this text. While tradition demands respect 
for customary rules and social arrangements (and Bozarov rightly asks from 
what such respect follows), but respect for them implies something more 
basic, some lived awareness that connects to the worth of a singular person 
beyond his/her value and demands a treatment of oneself and the others in 
an honorable, noble, truthful, elevating manner. In Turgieniev’s Fathers and 
Sons, there appears a reflection raising the question of legitimation of the 
traditional Russian life world of aristocratic privilege in contrast to the value 
of the world of the Enlightenment, and this very question places the ques-
tioner in a crisis situation. While we may think that this provides a com-
parison for choice, in lived awareness there appears an intention that raises 
a question: which life world would provide actual fulfillment of the essence 
of a human being as having worth in principle. In the most degraded figures 
and the most elevated rebels, there appears an intimation of human self-
worth. Dostoyevsky gives back the key to paradise because the ruler of para-
dise values equally an innocent child and a decadent master. For the master, 
a favorite dog is more valuable than a child, and in the life world of feudal 
lords this is an acceptable standard. Dostoyevsky’s rejection is an affirma-
tion of human worth for its own sake. He will accept eternal damnation, but 
will not accept a life world, in which crimes against children are permitted. 
He raises an absolute question: is life worth living in a world, where such a 
degradation of human worth is a standard, sanctioned and accepted even by 
the highest authority. Indeed, the entire corpus of Dostoyevsky’s writings 
is a striving to disclose this awareness. In Brothers Karamazov, the main 
figure, Dimitri, insults and degrades an impoverished elderly captain, who 
no longer has any social value; yet, toward the end of the story, Dimitri at-
tempts to apologize by offering the captain money; impoverished as he is, 
130 CHAPTER IV 
the captain refuses to be bought and, thus, degraded again. He reveals his 
self-worth as being above any price, above any social value, and “compels” 
Dimitri to recognize his own self-worth in face of the other and his nobility, 
dignity and honor. In short, it is “illegitimate” to attempt to place a moni-
tory value on human self-worth.
The question of legitimation of a life world may appear in a quiet 
and solitary figure, such as the one depicted by Gogol. There is no doubt 
that the main character is depicted to comprise a search for self-worth 
in face of a most bleak life world. It has been argued that this figure is 
driven by psychological desire for self-importance or by a search for the 
appearance of a higher social status. Such desires may well be part of a 
personal morphology and a social situation, but they do not provide an 
adequate understanding of the intentionality involved in these drives or 
desires. Subtending and covered over both by psychologically and socially 
constructed phenomena appears an almost quixotic quest to reach some-
thing psychologically and socially unreachable and yet totally present in 
his lived awareness: I am worthy, I have dignity, self and other respect, and 
honor. The point is that such awareness is not within the realm of preva-
lent social values or psychological feelings, since his social value will in no 
wise change with the acquisition of the Great Coat. He will remain in his 
meager occupation, still hungry and without candle light at night, without 
any hope for a better tomorrow. In brief, he will not get any value out of 
his struggling and striving apart from the recognition of his intrinsic worth 
for its own sake. Across Russian literature something given to awareness 
appears that is akin to Kant’s thing in itself that possesses no purpose, no 
functional value, yet it is to be respected unconditionally. While the En-
lightenment opened up an entire level of constructs called values and an-
nounced that the thing in itself is unknowable, Russian literature is intent 
in showing that any question of legitimation of a given life world discloses 
a transcendental constitution of human self-worth as the thing in itself.
Let us look at the logic of intrinsic worth. In the life world, where 
everything is a trash bin of values, there emerge personal actions and ex-
pressions that demand honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness, not only of 
themselves, but of others. Indeed, their actions are equally an indication 
of intrinsic self-worth of others. The intentionality of consciousness as 
teleological is accepted both by the “rationalistic” Westernizers, from Be-
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linsky through Herzen, wherein consciousness is irreducible to scientific 
explanations, and the writers, who emphasize Russian spirituality. This 
intentionality aims at its telos, which is the point of critique of Russian and 
Western life worlds. Yet, both reject the materialistic-rationalistic West as 
decadent, purposeless and even nihilistic despite its technical sophistica-
tion, and extol the Russian man as a model of salvation. This model is 
distinguished from Western and Asiatic types by its striving, despite the 
Russian cultural veneer, to exhibit dignity, honor, truthfulness in action. 
Thus, Mikhailovsky makes a distinction between types and levels of civili-
zation. West may have a higher level of material civilization, but Russia is 
a superior type due to its intuitive understanding of the personal dignity 
and intrinsic self-worth of an individual. Even Herzen and Bakunin, while 
living as exiles, extolled the superiority of the Russian type of awareness of 
this dignity. Indeed, all the social degradations imposed by serfdom as a 
traditional value gradation reveal the common Russian acceptance of the 
absolute worth of a person. After all, it would be impossible to degrade 
others without recognizing the other as a possessor of intrinsic self-worth. 
We cannot degrade a creature who, in its life world, does not recognize a 
need to justify its deeds, to make a choice between two life worlds; in short, 
to call a dog – dog, is neither a degradation nor a negation of intrinsic 
worth. Only another person can be degraded on the basis of recognition of 
her intrinsic worth. This is to say, degradation, reduction, insult, are pos-
sible only when we recognize hers and our own intrinsic worth, honor and 
dignity. Degrading of others in an effort to elevate oneself is an indication 
of the worth of others, an indication of our anxiety in face of the other’s in-
trinsic self-worth, her unavoidable height. Unable to withstand the other’s 
self-worth, we condemn her to death and, thus, prove that we are unwill-
ing to admit our own self degradation, our own crisis, and cannot with-
stand the dignity of the intrinsic self-worth of another. The outcasts, the 
exiles to Siberia, who have lost all social value, still strive to exhibit dignity, 
honor, respect, and, thus, reveal the final human position for its own sake 
that cannot be abolished, even when threatened by death. This is the Rus-
sian positive negativity. This appears in extreme cases, where the guards 
who manage prisons immediately condemn to death anyone, who shows 
self and other respect, dignity and honor. Here is a recognition and a lack 
of honor and dignity in the guards, who function as valuable servants of 
the state. This logic calls to the others to recognize the crisis in their lives, 
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to legitimate the life world, in which they live and to ask whether such a 
life world fulfills their lived awareness of their intrinsic worth. This is to 
say, the very presence of the other, who is aware of her intrinsic worth per-
forms a tacit phenomenological bracketing and, hence, challenges a blind 
inherence in this life world. One can then raise a question whether such a 
life world is worthy of one’s intrinsic worth. 
The Russian writers were not professional philosophers, but persons 
who demanded the recognition not only of their own, but of everyone’s 
unconditional self-worth. All of them (with an exception of Tolstoy who, 
nevertheless, was excommunicated) placed self-worth above their own 
safety, wealth, security, social position and were exiled, imprisoned, per-
secuted and censored. They placed self-worth above their life and dared to 
say no to their own and that of Enlightenment’s life worlds. In this sense, 
the claims that various Russian writers, inclusive of Chernichevsky, Turg-
eniev, and even Dostoyevsky, were nihilists are wrong. Nihilism rejects the 
world of values and meaning without offering anything positive in their 
place. Not so with the Russian writers, whose transcendental awareness 
of self-worth is the only viable position, from which life worlds can be il-
luminated in essence and disclosed as to what kind of activity cannot be 
fulfilled. No doubt, they toyed with democracy and equality of all persons, 
but they also realized from their experience in the West that democracy 
was in crisis. West, in general, has abolished the public domain, where 
autonomous citizens could rationally debate public issues, by reducing it 
to the clashing sum of private interests and power confrontations. The ra-
tionality of Western man, as Dostoyevsky noted, is a facade, under which 
there lurk all sorts of irrational drives, such as greed, envy, aggression and 
incivility. Hence, the notion of freedom and, above all, self-worth can no 
longer be offered by the West. Hence, despite their loss of social value 
positions, wealth, freedom to write, they subsumed themselves under this 
absolute awareness of what a human being is and acted accordingly.
It seems that the initial or founding intentionality of the Enlighten-
ment has permitted a partial fulfillment of self-worth in the awareness of 
autonomy, yet the interpretation of the latter became restricted to the un-
derstanding of its period, which mixed scientific explanations with free-
dom of research, rights to self-invention and subject to no one. Scientific 
explanations were extolled as the sole avenue to truth and offered categori-
cal divisions of all things, while humanities, wanting to be scientific, en-
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gaged in equal categorization of its own disciplines, from theologies and 
their classification, to literatures. Categorization also subjected the human 
activity to become substantivated into categorizable characteristics: so and 
so is valuable, a business person, a teacher, etc., thus, excluding the quest 
to return to activities that could be the sole understanding of what such 
categories mean. As we know, suddenly such categories, defining a per-
son, could be acquired by numerous means, including money. Self-worth, 
as an enactment, a participatory engagement vanished behind epistemic 
terms. We are all citizens, with characteristics, such as rights, freedoms 
and even entitlements, but if a citizen is only the one, who actively main-
tains the public domain as a space of self-worth, then how can one speak 
of inhabitants, who refuse to participate in public’s life world? This is the 
point of crisis, requiring of all inhabitants of a society to become citizens. 
As was noted above, society formed by the Scientific Enlightenment and 
established by Marxism-Leninism consists of numerous, defined and cat-
egorized functionaries with their “value positions”, but unable to raise the 
question whether such a life world is adequate to human self-worth. 
No doubt, the Political Enlightenment comprised a domain of par-
tial fulfillment of self-worth, yet the latter demands more in the sense of 
integration of autonomy, equality and responsibility. As we saw, the ten-
sion between freedom and equality still remains and has to be mediated 
by responsibility in face of the requirements of self-worth, self and other 
respect, honor, truthfulness and dignity. These aspects are not epistemic 
or categorical delimitations of social value functions, but required enact-
ments by everyone. With the other side of modern world, the Scientific 
Enlightenment, the human is reduced to pure technological value func-
tion, completely covering over of self-worth. After all, even “professional” 
philosopher, such as Berdyaev, parted both with Marxists, who completely 
disregarded concrete persons, and with Kant because beyond duty there is 
worth and dignity of a person. For Berdyaev, Marxist ethics were different 
for each social-historical period without providing a criterion, by which 
to judge their worth. Resultantly, there must be an absolute standard, an 
eidos, and invariant as intrinsic self-worth of a person. We know how 
Marxism-Leninism labored to censor any Soviet writer, who rose above 
all functional values and demanded a criterion, by which to judge the life 
world of the Soviet Union. We shall return to this question when dealing 
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with Lithuania and its transformation to the paradigm of the Political En-
lightenment. What is significant is the way that Marxism, as a variant of 
the Scientific Enlightenment, reduced everything to material interests and 
labor as the only value, and Lenin brought back the traditional Russian au-
tocracy and, thus, betrayed the fundamental Russian revolution initiated 
by writers. This could be regarded as an ultimate liberation from what is 
essentially the basic quest of philosophy – who are we?
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DIALECTICS: SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUAL
Introduction
In the following discussion, three major themes will be articulated to 
show the problematic relationship between society and individual (at base 
an ontological debate concerning parts and wholes), the appearance of 
modern concept of history and, finally, the efforts of resolving the prob-
lem of parts and wholes by Dialectical Materialism and its failure. While 
discussing Marxism (which includes the various writings by the followers 
of Marx and Engels, such as Lenin and, above all, the formation of the 
guiding theory, Dialectical Materialism), we shall have to address complex 
ontological and epistemological issues in terms of levels of consciousness, 
their limitations and their background assumptions. This means that Dia-
lectical Materialism, while by necessity of its logic must suppress some as-
pects of modern tradition, such aspects will appear as a principle, without 
which the Soviet paradigm would not be possible, and yet its very appear-
ance will require the transformation of dialectics. This is to say, the con-
cept of “limits” will play a crucial role in understanding what is meant by 
essence, evolution and revolution. Given this setting, let us open the philo-
sophical question of limits and the way it grounds various problematic 
levels that lead to unresolvable paradoxes demanding a shift in paradigm 
from classical philosophies to modern philosophical debates. Indeed, the 
ontological question of limits also frames the modern tension between 
an understanding of society as sum of individuals, and society as being 
“more” than such some in a way that society as a whole has its character-
istics and needs beyond those of the individuals. The task of subsequent 
chapter of this text will require an explication of a paradigm, relevant for 
Lithuania that would resolve such a tension. The same ontological issue 
frames the appearance of modern Western notion of history, and thus, in 
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this chapter, the ontological debate can deal with society and history. We 
already spoke of the modern West and its two Enlightenments, but now 
it is essential to disclose the basic ontology that both gave birth to the Sci-
entific Enlightenment and to the Political Enlightenment. The task of next 
chapters will involve a paradigm that must integrate both, if Lithuania is to 
become both democratic and scientific without a contradiction.
It has been well established that not all traditions are historical, not 
even some that belong to the Western civilization. Hence, it is necessary 
to explicate the philosophical aspects that gave rise to the conception of 
what, in the modern West, is called history. The subject matter that is at 
issue is one of ontology. The latter is reserved for the exposition of the 
basic principles that constitute the very essence of nature. The question of 
nature formed a debate within and among major schools of philosophy, 
yet all of them will have to be explicated at the level, wherein the neces-
sity for history arises. Despite some variations, classical Greek thought 
understood all natural events from their limits (peras). Every being is de-
termined to be a specific kind of being by the limit, which cannot be trans-
gressed. Whether the limit is located in topos noitos (the place of ideas) or 
is the morphe (the inherent form of a thing), in each case they are the very 
essence of a given thing. In turn, the essence of a being is what comprises 
its very purpose, its alpha and omega, its intelligibility such that from the 
very inception of a given being, the form, the essence is what determines 
the way the given being will unfold its dynamis, kinesis, its dynamics, the 
shape of its movement. The dynamics, therefore, is intelligible at the out-
set because it manifests its own form as the very purpose of its unfolding. 
In this sense, every being has its own purpose, which is one qualitative 
dimension of its own essence. This means that the necessity of all beings 
is inherent in them. 
Contingency or accidental encounters do not alter the essence of be-
ings. An animal, engaged in the unfolding of its essence as its purpose, 
such as grazing, may encounter a lightning, which too is unfolding its es-
sence, would encounter an accident. The latter may be mechanical, but not 
essential to the beings of either event. Moreover, any notion of evolution 
is excluded a priori. A being does not evolve from previous beings nor 
does it evolve from itself by addition of elements from other events. In 
the former case, a parent does not produce something essentially higher 
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than itself. It is the rule of aitia, an efficient cause, since the result can be 
equal, but never more than its cause. In the second case, a being, as a result 
of its essential cause, cannot evolve, since at the very outset it contains its 
essence that will unfold to full actuality, but it will not change in itself. A 
monkey will produce monkeys and cannot be a cause of something more. 
In turn, beings have no histories, apart from differences in the unfolding 
of their essence. A human may become a carpenter, a baker, a scientist, but 
these factors do not change the essence of what a human being is; they are 
accidental encounters in specific settings. In brief, a human is born and 
will die a human. That we have Herodotus and Thucydides as “historians” 
does not mean that there is anything necessary in “historical” accounts. 
Such accounts depict chancy encounters, accidental intersection, which is 
subtended by the pursuit of human telos as human essence. In this sense, 
historical events, such as encounters of armies, will be essentially forever 
the same, regardless of time and place. Essentially, there is no difference 
between Alexander, Napoleon, Bush or Hitler, battle of Gorillas or charge 
of elephants; they all pursue their essential natures. It would be nonsensi-
cal to speak of the history of Alexander or a history of a snail. 
The question of limits, nonetheless, requires an investigation into the 
problem of parts and wholes, since this problem also frames Dialectical 
Materialism and its attempt to account for the “essential” characteristics 
of the whole, such as society. The problem of whole and parts is concerned 
with the question of the ontological priority of the whole over parts or of 
the parts over the whole. We need not go into protracted philosophical ar-
guments framing the problem, since a detailed account is already available 
in another text (Mickunas, A. Social Value and Individual Worth. Vilnius: 
Mykolas Romeris University, 2012). This philosophical debate includes 
anything in the world, trees, animals, humans, and includes the issue of 
the attributes of the parts and the whole: does the whole possess attributes 
of its own, as a whole, or do its attributes equal the sum of the attributes 
of the parts? The modern resolution of this issue comprises the ground of 
instrumental reason and, indeed, of technological conception of the envi-
ronment and, finally, of the human. What then is the issue? Let us take hu-
man society and ask whether society has characteristics that are more than 
the characteristics of individual members? Classical Greeks argued for the 
notion that there is social good that belongs to society and is not identical 
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with the sum of individual goods. Modern philosophies took the opposite 
position and accepted the premise that there are only the characteristics 
of individual members and society is a numerical sum of individuals. In 
this sense, we get a modern “individualism” such that each individual is 
separate from other individuals – each is an unrelated atom – and the only 
social whole is an established agreement to form a political society with all 
the individual rights and responsibilities. This kind of position is equally 
relevant for any other thing in nature. The tree is a sum of its parts and 
there are no characteristic that belongs to the tree as a whole. Hence, the 
tree is “analyzable” into the smallest parts – atoms, just as everything else 
is divisible up to its smallest part. If we take the sum of parts and add them 
together, we shall have an appearance of a thing as if it had characteristics 
of the whole, but the latter has no objective support. The color green of 
a thing is not part of the atoms and, hence, the color must be attributed 
to a posited entity called, in modern philosophy, the subject. As one can 
readily see, this prefigures the modern distinction between secondary and 
primary characteristics and, by implication, the subject-object division. 
Ontologically speaking, the world is a sum of the “smallest” parts. 
In this case, the perceived whole, to say once again, is a “mistake of the 
senses”. Given this irresolvable dilemma, the thesis of the ontological pri-
ority of the whole was rejected, and a theory of the parts – atomistic – was 
accepted. It was granted that the basic ontological unity is a material part 
that cannot be altered or destroyed in the whole. This suggests that if the 
whole is a sum of parts, then there is no unity of a whole; everything is 
an aggregate of material parts in space and time. The visible whole and 
its perceived attributes have no objective basis; they do not belong to the 
“things themselves”, but to the perceiver. What is perceived directly must 
have a “place”, and this place was designated to be a subject, containing 
the secondary qualities, while the real objective world was composed of 
primary, quantitative particles – modern materialism. The latter was inter-
preted atomistically, leading Basso to argue that if the parts in the whole 
remain unchanged, then there is no unity of the parts in the whole. Every-
thing is an aggregate of atomic or the “smallest” parts, which in contem-
porary jargon are called “the building blocks of the universe”. The social 
consequences of this ontology are well developed by modern writers, such 
as Hobbes, Locke and the British school of the “labor theory of value”. For 
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Hobbes, contrary to classical Greek conception of the essence of the polis 
as being more than the sum of individuals, all we have is a society that is 
equal to the sum of interests of individuals, each seeking to survive and 
each being at war with each other – war of all against all. The resolution of 
this war is monarchy with total power to rule by the monarch’s will. 
At this juncture, there is the birth of the modern subject, a container, 
a sack, so to speak, of appearances that have neither status nor place in 
“reality”. We already discussed the modern notion of autonomous and 
self-creating subject, and here we presented the arguments that led to its 
philosophical appearance in the form of a distinction between subject and 
object. In principle, we are led to the primacy of reflective thought and, 
hence, to the primacy of the subject as the foundation and validation of 
theoretical and methodological avenues to objectivity, requiring a rejec-
tion of the relevance of things of awareness for the understanding of the 
world. In turn, this rejection would lead to a “voluntaristic individualism” 
and the primacy of absolute human self-determination. The success of the 
arguments for such a reflecting subject is premised on the abolition of the 
whole and the positing of parts as the primary ontological components 
of nature. These components are not accessible to perception, but only to 
a subject as a calculating reason. The result is that whatever is deemed to 
be real must be established, synthesized, worked over and shaped by the 
various activities of the subject. Some aspects of this trend are obvious in 
Kantian synthetic thinking, in Lockean and even Marxian notion of the 
labor theory of value and even in Hegelian conception of the absolute idea 
as working itself through history to self-realization. In short, reality in it-
self is inaccessible to experience. Thus, one needs to devise an access to this 
reality by other means. What is accessible to experience does not belong to 
the world, but only to the “mind”. 
It must be pointed out that while the modern choice of nature as a sum 
of material parts has been a dominant trend, sciences and indeed human 
sciences are in a constant quandary to understand characteristics of things 
that are different from the characteristics of the parts. All that scholars in 
various disciplines can come up with is a thesis of “emergent properties” at-
tributed to an anonymous master called “evolution” or to “dialectical leaps” 
in nature. As is well known, this thesis dominated the dialectical thought 
of the nineteenth century, while evolutionism appeared again in biology, 
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genetics and even social and political sciences to “explain” the experienced 
phenomena of things. Hence, the modern Western scientific thinking is 
constantly facing its own limitations. It cannot derive the “more” in nature 
and experience than the thesis of a sum of parts would allow and at the same 
time must accept due to their own theories the appearance of “new quali-
ties”. As if by unexplicated philosophical intuition, they insist on the priority 
of perceived things as the most obvious presence to awareness, and yet such 
awareness becomes unreal and irrelevant to science and philosophy. 
The ontological shift in modern philosophy toward mechanistic at-
omism strips all essential structures from nature and replaces all beings 
with a sum of material parts functioning in accordance with mechanical 
laws. Therefore, no beings of nature have any purpose. This ontological 
conception of all nature leaves one entity, the human as a thinking sub-
ject, who has purposes. But such purposes have nothing to do with the 
real, material world, including human bodies that function mechanically. 
Moreover, such thinking and its purposes have no fixed rules or laws; it is 
basically voluntaristic. Hence, human actions, directed by will, make their 
way that is distinct from the world of ontologically posited reality. Hu-
mans make history as a purposive process, which might aim at some final 
end. The latter has been depicted by various utopian images, including 
some versions of Marxism. If material events are counted in this purposive 
history, they are not ontologically material, but practically, i.e. what can 
we make of the indifferent, mechanical, and purposeless stuff for our aims 
and presumed needs. As was discussed in previous chapters, the modern 
story contains progress of technology and human mastery of the material 
environment (including the material human as part of the environment). 
We also pointed out how autonomy became a human characteristic and 
a source of “laws” over nature and society. We also know the story of the 
efforts to impute into consciously constructed events some sort of causal 
connections – conditions-results – as a prejudgment of the Scientific En-
lightenment and, thus, even make history into science. Moreover, we have 
been told that historical writing is based on research and, therefore, it is 
scientific. There is also a plethora of proposals to ontologize history by 
presuming that it is explainable in terms of material interests in the form 
of economy. As we shall see later in this chapter, the assumption of such 
materialism dominated the Soviet Union and produced a theory of scien-
141DIALECTICS: SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUAL
tific socialism, couched in a theory of Dialectical Materialism. We shall 
address this theory and its efforts to find a way to get from material parts 
to an essence of the whole, i.e., to resume the debate of classical thought. 
Hence, any qualitative features of the whole are actually features of a 
perceiving subject. In turn, this means that what the subject perceives are 
not attributes of the real, while the real, the atomic parts, cannot be expe-
rienced. In short, reality in itself is inaccessible to experience. Thus, one 
needs to devise an access to this reality by other means. What is accessible 
to experience does not belong to the world, but only to the “mind”. The 
invention of this modern Western mind that belongs to a subject leads to 
numerous and nonsensical stories, such as solipsism, subjectivism, psy-
chologism, impressionism, even empiricism and, finally, representational-
ism, where this mind does not know the world, but creates all sorts of “rep-
resentations”, from which the world is reached by “inferences” or finally 
becomes an arbitrary construct of the subject. Moreover, all constructs can 
become equivalent in claiming that underneath human perceptions reality 
is material, spiritual, vital, static, energetic, divine and demonic. For our 
disclosing of the basic modern understanding, this newly invented mind 
thinks its own thoughts and decides what thoughts shall count as relevant 
for science or for that matter reality. Yet, as was noted in the methodologi-
cal chapter, there is no way of simply discarding the entire world under-
standing that has become not only Western, but global, as well.
Critique of Historical Reason
The notion that history is human and not natural phenomenon leads 
to the way that modern Western thought had to account for time. All 
events, depicted mechanically, follow a causal sequence. What is given 
now can be explained by previous causes. Yet, at present, the previous 
causes are no longer available; they require an introduction of awareness 
of the past, called memory. The future not being at present also requires 
an awareness, which is called projection of temporal possibilities. Both 
are, of course, phenomena of consciousness. The latter must provide tem-
poral connections, so well recognized by Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger 
and, finally, Sartre. Some, such as Hegel, realized that human memory and 
projection are inadequate to account for past events, which are beyond 
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human memory. Hence, an introduction of an absolute consciousness, 
a sort of all-encompassing, eternity, is manifesting itself in a continuous 
historical time. Such an eternity is incompatible with temporality to the 
extent that eternity, as an infinite position, cannot be divided into his-
torical, temporal periods, without ceasing to be infinite. Kierkegaard made 
sport of Hegel on this point. Once the infinite collapses, what remains are 
contingent, historical events, having no necessary connections, apart from 
human memory and projected future. To save the day, scientific reason 
introduces the method of quantification and the ability to measure math-
ematically (presumed to be objective operation) of events of the past and 
expected events of the future. All is well, but the problem is not solved – it 
is only postponed. First, how can a subject, living in the present, extend 
its measures on the past if the latter is no longer and the future is not yet? 
What does one measure? Second, mathematical devices are not temporal 
and do not provide any clues whether what is being measured is in the past 
or in the future. Hence, one has to assume awareness of the past and of 
the future, which, as was seen, are not given, except in the present aware-
ness. Space is no mystery; all spatial events are present now, deployed one 
next to the other but, as material, do not signify their past or their future. 
Hence, once again, the signification of both is conscious phenomenon.
Historical reason encounters broader issues. Assuming that there is 
a continuous historical process, having a future aim as its final purpose 
that is posited as a necessary condition for necessary connections between 
temporal events, the assumption results in a positing of historical rules, be 
they dialectics of Hegelian or Marxian brands or some presumed evolu-
tion. In brief, future final purpose is posited as a condition for the inven-
tion of necessary rules of historical development. It is significant that the 
final purpose is in and part of history and, hence, one aspect of history and 
thus defies the very notion of a final purpose. After all, one historical event 
cannot be the aim of the whole. After this “final event” is reached, his-
tory does not cease and, thus, abolishes such event as final. This outcome 
forces the thinkers of historical reason to posit a transcendent historical 
aim above or beyond history. Such transcendence cannot be historical and 
properly must be designated to be eternal. The results of this transcendent 
view are as follows: first, the best that can be obtained from it is a change-
less dialectical structure or system and, hence, in principle static, yield-
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ing no historical development; second, transcendent, infinite being is un-
knowable by contingent historical actors (well noted by Kierkegaard) and, 
thus, cannot be a source of claims as to whither of human destiny; third, 
infinity has no temporal orientation and would not be an indication of a 
purposive direction of history; fourth, historical consciousness cannot es-
cape self-destruction in terms of its claim to be universal and all inclusive, 
because, one, if all consciousness is historical (expressed pedagogically as 
an accumulation of knowledge) and must be historically contextualized, 
then such a conscious claim is equally historical and must be understood 
within its historical context; and two, the very ontology, which gave rise 
to the conception of mechanical world, is equally historical. Hence, if the 
mechanical universe were to be reinterpreted as one of having open mean-
ing, i.e., signitive, then historical consciousness would cease to be relevant. 
These aspects place the current historical consciousness at a complete loss 
and crisis. No doubt, the wrestling with this crisis led numerous philo-
sophical and scientific efforts into all sorts of metaphysical postulates of 
infinity and cosmic order, all attempting to find some permanent compo-
nent, even an eternal recurrence, as a saving grace. Theories are proposed 
and discarded like spring fashions, continuously disclosing our confusion. 
What remain, in principle, are the following modes of awareness: 
first, material nature and its continuity are premised on necessary me-
chanical laws, devised by sciences. While the material reality is not accessi-
ble to perception, it is accessible to controls by human quantification, i.e., 
by humanly devised method of interpretation – mathematics. Second, the 
modern subject, as the sole entity with purposes, is contingent, having no 
objective necessity, is free from all the constraints and, hence, can define 
itself at will, as noted in previous chapters. It names itself to be an autono-
mous free activity. Only the subject and society of subjects have history 
and whatever environment it builds out of the material environment be-
comes part of human history. By making the environment, humans build 
their history and, thus, the latter has a purpose or purposes to the extent 
that making of history in Modern West is coextensive with scientific tech-
nology and its progress. As we saw in previous chapters, progress is an 
increasing control of the material environment for human benefit. But the 
benefit must be qualitative as an aspect of awareness and as a condition for 
judgments whether there is a progress as judged by an improved quality 
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of life. Yet, it is necessary to ask the question whether the quality of life 
can be achieved by an “atomistic” individual subject, or must it involve 
another sphere of the public, even if such a sphere is social? It is significant 
that in the modern industrial society, the social factors are more complex 
than they were in the eighteenth century. The well-being of the popula-
tion at various levels has called upon the polis to manage social affairs. In 
this sense, the social principles have become associated with the questions 
of political principles and rights. But even this more encompassing social 
activity of the state, an activity, which need not be regarded as totally inap-
propriate, must assume its fundamental task to be the maintenance of the 
public sphere of freedoms and rights. If this is forgotten, then we fall back 
into the social domain and face the composition of the political merely as 
another social group looking out for its own interests and power against 
those of others. In other words, Hobbes draws an unavoidable conclusion 
that the only function of the government is power, since the only domain 
that is important is the domain of drives, happiness, self-preservation and 
interests. Within this domain, freedom has no role, and even the sovereign 
must function in terms of his needs and happiness.
The social-political question concerning the role of the public domain 
in adjudicating social issues appears in the debates concerning the limits 
of “political” intervention in social affairs. Despite all the progressive in-
telligence in many areas of Western societies during the last two centu-
ries, they have failed to understand that the various labor movements only 
seemed to be social movements for the well-being of the worker. Almost 
without exception theoretical thinking was concerned basically with the 
social welfare of the worker. This focus was oblivious to the political di-
mension. Yet, the basic direction of the movements was the legitimation 
of each laborer as a full and autonomous citizen having a voice in the pub-
lic arena. This suggests that one is a citizen only if he is a participant in a 
public arena as a law giver, a member of res publicum, matters of the pub-
lic. But in these matters, each individual is a master, having no masters, i.e. 
he is his own person. This is one quality of a citizen of the polis. To speak 
with Kant, such an individual cannot be used by others as means, and, as 
a free being, cannot live compelled by necessities. While understood as a 
mechanical object, the individual has a right to his body and, hence, the 
latter is his own property. 
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The main problem that emerged by the nineteenth century for the 
polis is the industrial revolution, creating a condition for a large segment 
of the population, whereby such segments have only one thing that is its 
own: possession of labor power, which this group regards as its property 
and yet exposed to provide for the needs of sustenance. Of course, this is 
different from the autocratic understanding, where the body and labor of 
the “masses” belonged to the autocrat of whatever definition, and yet the 
modern individual in industrial society has to “contract” his body to an-
other person for a specified fee. This conception leads to the possibility of 
subordination of one person by another in the area of social powers, creat-
ing a situation, in which one group is much weaker than another group. 
While the modern polis might want to equalize matters through laws and 
regulations, by themselves the latter are insufficient to achieve the quality 
of individual self-sufficiency and independence. As history has shown, the 
Marxian effort to abolish private property has failed precisely because it 
dealt with the balances of social power, leading to a change of social pow-
ers instead of an establishment of a polis for the public. In this sense, what 
one finds in the “communist” camp are struggles for social power, eco-
nomic oppression of one group by another, but not a polis or res-publicum, 
where the matters of public would be accessible to the public arena for free 
adjudication and law giving. Marxism repeated the autocratic notion of 
the working masses as exclusive property of the state. The Western popu-
lations, specifically the working masses, have taken another path, which, 
seen in light of our conception of the citizen, has the following composi-
tion. Since the person who depends for his “independence” on another 
has little say solely by his own devices, he formed organizations capable 
of equalizing the social balance of power and allowing the organization to 
speak in the name of the individual in the public forum. While at a first 
glance this might seem as a way of falling back into the social domain, 
nonetheless, there is a political moment allowing the individual independ-
ence from the socially superior powers of those, on whom the individual 
is dependent for work. The organizations became the condition for the 
access to the public arena of the individual and, hence, in a mediated way, 
of independence in the process of public discourses for rights. By these 
means, the individual acquires recognition as an equal. Of course, the or-
ganizations would be “over determined” if they were relegated to be the 
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sole means, by which the individual acquires a voice in a polis. Yet, it is 
also obvious that the organizations are both possible in and a means for 
the maintenance of a polis. There is one danger, which will be discussed 
subsequently: the usual interests of such organizations tend to be inter-
preted as purely social and, hence, the organizations tend to reduce them-
selves to the balancing and achieving of social power. 
Currently, there are trends, which tend to isolate the individual and, 
thus, to abolish his participation in the polis. It appears in the sophistic 
and even demagogical misuse of language. One associates freedom with 
the actions and will of a solitary individual, while organized action is re-
garded to be “collective” and, henc,e unfree. Yet, since Toqueville’s analy-
ses of the modern democracies, it could be claimed that the individual 
can defend his public freedoms against social powers, when he associates 
with a plurality of organizations, which allow the individual to speak and 
to have a louder voice. This is to say, the social powers, which can enter 
the political arena purely for the advancement of their interests, powers 
such as economic, cannot be countered by an individual. Precisely, the 
effort to isolate the individual is coextensive with the effort to push the 
social-private interests into the public arena. One counter to such efforts 
is a plurality of organizations, which task is not to bring social pressure for 
their own interests, but the maintenance of the political arena and its equal 
access to everyone, irrespective of social posture. Indeed, Kant’s analyses 
of the efforts to isolate the individual under the guise of “independence” 
have revealed these efforts as a sophistry at the service of social powers. 
Given the thesis of the original covenant as the essence for the foun-
dation of a polis (not historical origin), there still appears a constant issue, 
which has to be addressed, if not solved: laws comply with the essence of 
rights only if they are in accord with the fundamental law, i.e., the law of 
the original covenant, stemming from the will and participation of the 
people. But what about the laws, which were not concluded by the pop-
ulation? This could not be answered simplistically that the laws should 
be disregarded, if for no other reason than the fact that the law becomes 
effective by virtue of state power. Since the state includes the totality of 
laws and is empowered to maintain them, then the law passed by the state 
can equally be imposed. Moreover, in various cases, the state might be 
justified in taking measures to prevent injustice, e.g., when social events 
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change and when laws no longer correspond to the idea of rights, the laws 
become unjust and call for changes. It would be quite inappropriate to 
resist such establishment of new laws. Obviously, the resistance to law is 
one of the most controversial issues in the political arena. Of course, we 
must reject the resistance in case the state establishes a law, which is in ac-
cordance with the principle of rights; this calls for resistance as a duty in 
cases, where such rights are violated for whatever reason: religious, racial, 
educational or economic. The principle of rights sets the parameters both 
for the enactment of laws and for the power of the state. 
Within this context, every determination of law, which goes coun-
ter to the idea of the original covenant, is to be brought to the open po-
litical arena for adjudication. This rejects some views, which would want 
to maintain a right to resistance and, indeed, to the overthrowing of the 
state. The rejection cannot be easily justified in an age of “revolutions”, 
where one or another group keeps “taking political power”. Yet, what 
has become quite obvious in the age of revolutions is that they do not 
constitute political revolutions; rather, they manifest social struggles of 
one group against another, each taking for a while the position of ruler-
ship over the other, without in any way establishing a polis, i.e., a public 
arena. Apparently, the nature of polis does not allow its overthrow. First, 
its overthrowing would reduce the community to a state of social struggle 
for power without a requisite area for common adjudication. One either 
has or does not have this arena. If one fails to have it, then fundamentally 
man rules over man. Second, given the social power confrontations, there 
is no instrument of adjudication within social parameters. Striving social 
groups cannot become “impartial” judges, i.e., neither of the groups can 
be a judge. Each would want to judge in favor of its own interests and, 
hence, would not resolve the power confrontations. A polis is necessary 
not only as a fact, but also as a principle for the adjudication of differ-
ences without the intrusion of social status or power. Third, the rights of 
every citizen are possible within the polis, and its abolition would mean 
the abolition of the citizen as a political being. This is to say, the more cur-
rent conceptions of revolution, claiming that the population has a right to 
revolt against any polis makes very little sense, if such polis is de jure if not 
de facto democratic and accessible to all. In case of other forms of revolu-
tions, where the people are “led” to overthrow a dictatorship and, thus, to 
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establish a social system, in which the revolutionaries rule in the “name” of 
the people, there, in fact, was not a political, but a social revolution of one 
group against another for power; here, one will not find a political revolu-
tion, since no polis was overthrown and none came into existence. This 
was the case with the Russian Revolution; there was no political society, 
but only a society ruled by autocracy with absolute power and arbitrary 
whims to do whatever the autocrat or his/her supplicants deemed “fun”. 
The revolution by Marxists-Leninists merely changed the autocracy – one 
was overthrown and another established such, that the new autocracy was 
just as arbitrary in wielding its power: after all it murdered millions and 
used Siberia as a disposal place of vast numbers of “erring” members of 
society. Same system of spies following every “suspect” resembling the an-
cient Persian empire, where the ruler had eyes and ears everywhere and 
had no qualms of torturing and dispensing with any conceivable threat 
to his power. In brief, the Soviet Union was another variant of Autocracy.
In contrast, the publically appointed representatives of the polis have 
the power, which is public and not private, and this power must be prac-
ticed in public and in the open and not in secret or private domain. If the 
officially appointed persons begin to exercise private power, the popula-
tion has a right not to overthrow the polis, but to bring such persons to 
a public accounting. Polis cannot be overthrown without an abolition of 
the domain, in which the very citizen would lose the means of bringing 
to account any person, who is exercising illegitimate power over others. 
Citizens have a duty to bring to public attention the incursion of social 
power into the political arena and to call for the expulsion of such a power. 
Indeed, the citizens should not enter the public arena with the aim of abol-
ishing the polis, since such move would sanction the very social power 
brought in by the public official into the public arena. 
The rule of law can be interpreted in various ways. If, for example, the 
law is designed exclusively for the securing of rights, i.e., empowering the 
polis to maintain legal norms, then such rule can leave untouched the power 
relationships in the social arena and, indeed, can constitute a sanction of 
such power. The sole function that the law would perform is the security 
of rights, leaving the socio-economic arena to the confrontation of pow-
ers, wherein the political equality of the citizens would be pitted against the 
social power concentration in economic sphere. The adjudication between 
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the two cannot be simply imposed by an edict, specifically in light of the 
problems of political equality in the public arena and the condition that no 
social power or status should assume any priority in this arena. The Politi-
cal Enlightenment points out that the task of the polis is a place for rational 
public debate and education, through which an enlightened public would 
see the irrationality of some of the social activities, such as “each man for 
himself” or “each man must seek his own happiness”, and would recognize 
that the danger of incursion of such irrationalities into the polis becomes 
a danger to the autonomy of the individual as a citizen. In turn, the edu-
cated citizen should be cognizant that even in the social arena the irrational 
power confrontations might lead to dangerous inequalities translating into 
political inequalities, public apathy and an incursion of the social into the 
political, thus abolishing the polis, in the sense of making it subservient to 
the social. The political equalities can be extended toward the social in order 
to make the social less dependent on power confrontations and irrational 
forces and more on rational understanding of the public well-being. The 
above discussion was needed to point out that organized labor and other 
organizations are political and not just social. This understanding demands 
an all pervasive and publicly accessible education.
Establishment of Polis in a Democratic Revolution 
The central question, which determines modern revolutions of dem-
ocratic type, is the possibility of freedom in an egalitarian democracy, 
whether the latter pegs itself on libertarianism or socialism. It is possible 
that in either of these freedom may be a mere appearance, a surface ritual 
without any substance. One must also be cognizant of the fact that there 
are flawed misinterpretations of democratic revolutions, specifically those 
by Jacob Burckhart, who was led toward total pessimism concerning free-
dom in democracy: for him, the dangers of democracy lie in centralism 
of government and administration, the domination of the public opin-
ion over the individual and the restriction of personal sphere of freedom. 
We shall see that these points are not fundamental. Basic direction con-
sists of rethinking the possibility of freedom in egalitarian democracy and 
modern political economy. Thus, there arises a demand for addressing the 
question of the new social class of the industrial workers not on the basis 
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of universal rights, but in terms of the principles of egalitarian democracy. 
While the liberal bourgeoisie saw the plight of the industrial worker as a 
humanitarian problem, in principle it is a political problem to be resolved 
on the basis of universal equality in light of freedom.
While in previous chapter the discussion was focused on the “will to 
equality” and its relationship to the maintenance of autonomy, in demo-
cratic revolution the equality of social relationships offers for our con-
ception of the public a specific direction: for our conception of the law – 
a unique form, for government – new principles, for the people – new 
customs and duties. Moreover, the egalite sweeps in a multitude of novel 
conceptions, concerning human relationships. Of course, we must keep 
in mind that this founding of the democratic revolution on the ground 
of egalite des conditions should not be understood as a principle, from 
which one could deduce socio-political events; while egalite is posited as 
a principle, it must relate to other principles that are not derived from 
egalite, although are conditioned in their functions by the latter. These 
principles must be maintained in view if we are to get a more encompass-
ing picture of democratic revolution. Yet, it should be stressed that egalite 
des conditions, spelling the equality of social conditions, is a major sign of 
the essence of democracy. Modern age demonstrates an overall develop-
ment toward equality, indicated by essential signs: it is universal and per-
manent. We find here something most unique: the notions of “universal” 
and “constant” designate in the Western philosophical tradition some-
thing “eidetic” that can be deciphered in, and range over, a variety of indi-
viduals. Indeed, the designation “universal” stems from Greek kath’holon, 
meaning the “eidetic”, which comprises the truth of the singular; and the 
“permanent” was in Greek the aei on, the ever present. In this sense, this 
claim should signify that the unfolding toward equality of social relation-
ships is the permanent and essential truth in the Western history. Indeed, 
another tenuous claim could be added: since the Western “model” ruled 
by the “eidos” of equality has become the sign-post for the globe and its 
sundry revolutions, then the question of democratic “eidos” is one of the 
most important “truths”, unfolding in humanity. 
There are various ways of regarding the “eidos” egalite, but for the 
present task it will be understood as a tacitly given “rule of experience”. 
We can point to a development in medieval period, which did not have 
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egalite as a telos, yet which constituted the permanent, all-encompassing, 
although tacit, condition for thought and action. There appeared a devel-
opment and expansion of the political power of the clerical class, which 
opened an access to politics for otherwise socio-politically very distinct 
classes: peasant and aristocrat. Then, there is the increasing significance 
of the jurists, who, with the increasing complexities of social life, have 
opened the doors to anyone, who is capable of learning. There emerges 
a sense for literature and art and the spread of education, breaking down 
the feudalistic barriers between “classes”. The more these factors increase 
in significance, the less important appear the factor of birth. Indeed, while 
the aristocratic “birth right” might be present, the person from the peas-
ant class, having developed his talents through education can sit as a judge 
and in this respect be equal to the aristocrat. With the dawn of modernity, 
all events “chase” one another, revealing the tacit eidos of egalite. With the 
appearance of Protestantism and its proclamation of universal “priestli-
ness”, the equality of all persons is taken for granted as far as the highest 
symbols are concerned: human relationship to the absolute. 
The eidos of the democratic revolution was not dissolution of the ex-
isting government and its replacement by another, but a complete rejec-
tion of the existing form of society. While being social, the revolution was 
also political. It retained and, indeed, increased the public arena. Every-
one became religiously free, i.e. religion was not abolished, but disassoci-
ated from the public arena, and every public rank lost its preeminence in 
this arena; other equalities were advanced and promoted through public 
education. The latter establishes similar habits, tastes and literary under-
standing. This equalization effected another and surprising tendency: each 
newly emerging group, with specific interests, calls for specific rules to 
protect its own position, thus, constituting a specific sub-society with its 
own limits and functions, without entering the interests into the public 
arena. The aristocratic group became restricted under specific rules of 
taxation and privileges, the bourgeoisie became split into various bodies, 
separating one from others by various “rights”, although each was striving 
for “supremacy”. Each of these efforts at some gain in privileges spells also 
decay in the political ethos. The polis is divided into specific social “rights” 
in isolation from others. The absolute monarchism was, in fact, a sign of 
this decay.
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The crumbling of the old reveals the constitution of the new with an 
entirely different form. What is of theoretical interest in this process is 
the appearance of the above suggested awareness of “history”. The no-
tion of “history” as a continuous unfolding must be challenged: on one 
level, the apparent, there seems to be “development”, while on another, 
the “eidetic”, there appears to be a “transformation”. To use the language 
of semiotics, the “diachronic” is an unfolding of the “synchronic” and, 
thus, constitutes a continuity of some specific “eidos”. This unfolding is 
not historical, but rather expressive of a given eidetic configuration “from 
various sides”. The historical moment is constituted in the shift from one 
eidetic configuration to another, and once the latter takes root, history 
“ceases”, and the unfolding is again an expression of the “new eidos” from 
“various sides”. One way of observing history is given in such transforma-
tions; the latter appears in the vast shift toward democracy. The novelty 
of egalite appearing in the Feudal order is manifest through the decay of 
the political ethos. There is a central body that rules in all public domains. 
The same minister runs all affairs; a singular official runs all things in a 
given province; the official is characterized by his hate for anyone, whether 
aristocrat or bourgeoisie, who would want to preoccupy themselves with 
the public matters. This appears to be the governmental despotism, which 
would pose the danger for the above delimited eidos of egalite, appear-
ing “under” the social and political events, such as education, religion and 
social groups; yet, this danger coming from absolutistic “above” is also 
“egalitarian” in a specific way, since it began to prescribe rules for all in 
all of the domains of its power, i.e. an equalization of rules irrespective of 
social position. The feudal inequities cease to have any power, even if the 
aristocrats, who had surrendered it, are supporting an absolute monarchy; 
this support is no longer political, but social, i.e. maintenance of tax rules 
and land privileges, but not political preeminence. This withdrawal away 
from the public, the political into the social, left a lacuna, which had to be 
filled, and it was filled by the intellectuals, the literari, who, while being 
remote from any political praxis, had to project a construction of a polis. 
While there are marked differences in the projections, all of them concur 
that the polis should be a product of “reason” without any prejudgment of 
a tradition. Indeed, what other standard could be used except the stand-
ard, which is “equal” for all, i.e., free, but not social. 
153DIALECTICS: SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUAL
All these pre-given elements signify the constant efforts to depict the 
egalite as the motive for democratic revolution. The sole missing link was 
freedom of all in the political arena. Since the very notion of freedom can-
not be equated with any natural preeminence of one person over another, 
it carried with it the call for abolition of the determination by naturalness 
and a call for a rule of unprejudiced reason. And, indeed, this reason, not 
taking for granted any preeminence of natural birth rights, i.e., any dis-
tinctions based on some inborn human nature, had no other recourse, 
but to reveal an eidos of egalite, which was not found in existence, but 
was taken for granted as a rule of experience. This sort of egalite is at the 
same time a manifest freedom, in the previously mentioned sense: some-
thing that can be regarded to be an eidos, not derived from some preexist-
ing nature or condition, is rational and only rationality offers freedom. 
But as just mentioned, this rationality as freedom, confronted by the ei-
dos egalite, has to be established, and the establishment is an act of will. 
Here appears another factor in the democratic revolution: something that 
works, functions or establishes some specific state of affairs in terms of an 
eidos given rationally is a willing of a free will. This is an expanded version 
of the “will to equality”.
What appears here in another form is the phenomenon that we en-
countered in Thucydides: the eidos is not something that is directly mani-
fest, although it is something that is closest to our experience. In a peculiar 
way, it remains unannounced. Thus, the democratic revolution, which fi-
nally took egalite explicitly, had a long “preparation” through events and 
decisions, in which egalite was not announced as an object of reason to be 
realized by will in the future; the future of egalite was not present. Only at 
the end of this development that the eidos, which was the rule that com-
bined numerous events and decisions, appeared for what it was and was 
posited as something to be achieved in a revolution and in a future. What 
has been present in its ruling immediacy assumed reflective objectivity 
to be enacted as some “project of the will”. We have seen the emergence 
of this domain both as reflection and as the establishment of the public 
arena, in which reflection is required and sanctioned both as a method and 
as a condition of modern subject’s self-understanding.
The unnoticed immediacy, the intimate taken for granted of the eidos, 
constitutes an experiential tradition that can become a “given”. The given, 
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apparently, maintained under various guises in the Western thought, had 
a principle of democratic revolution and egalite. No doubt, the recogni-
tion of the taken for granted experience, the eidos, has to be understood 
in a specific mode: the eidos that was present tacitly had a force of natu-
ralness was regarded as “the way things are”. The reflective recognition 
of the eidos reveals its experiential character, extricates it from its natural 
prejudgment, showing it in its unique structure and making it available 
for enactment without obfuscations, without the presumption that it has 
a natural compulsion. After all, if it were natural, submitted to the laws 
of “human nature”, then it would make no sense to call for its establish-
ment. The reflective revelation of the experiential character of eidos is at 
the same time a manifestation of freedom as rationality, and the possibility 
of rational choice for an enactment of this eidos. Of course, once a demo-
cratic revolution occurs, there is a drastic change in human self-regard: in 
an unprecedented way the human is called upon to take up the responsi-
bility of its own “history” or the enactment of the eidos egalite. It becomes 
a matter of the free will and responsibility. Yet, it must be recognized that 
once the will takes up the establishment of this eidos, it opens all of its 
possibilities, except one: it cannot reestablish the old “natural” order and 
claim to be compelled by its necessities. It is inescapably responsible for 
the unfolding of its history. Any effort to “return” the populations to an 
“order”, which does not spring from the eidos egalite and its free enact-
ment by the will is an effort based precisely on such a will and its choice of 
an “order”. All such undertakings must be called “reactionary”, regardless 
where they might occur. For example, the hilarious attempts by the Soviets 
or the Christians, the Muslims, etc., to “establish” a “proper order”, by rev-
olution are attempts, which are founded on the will, following a reflected 
eidos, and not the necessities introduced by their “explanatory” theories. 
Freedom and Equality
Taking for granted the eidos egalite, each individual has an equal claim 
to participation in governance; this claim guarantees that in the public are-
na no social differences are to be counted. In this sense, the citizens, in the 
public domain, are fully free because they are equal. In this extreme case, 
freedom and equality are convertible. At the outset, the basis of modern 
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freedom is equality, although subsequently freedom assumes a more fun-
damental role and, indeed, becomes the basis for equality. One could claim 
that the democratic revolution is an effort to maintain the identity between 
the two. Of course, this identity is an intentional eidos to be maintained 
and supported, so that every deviation from it would be judged as anti-
democratic. Yet, they appear in various social compositions differently, and 
this provides us with a clue as to their difference. There can be equality in a 
social sphere, but not in the political, i.e. each is socially free to pursue his/
her own interests, but does not have political freedom with respect to the 
establishment of laws and participation in public decisions. There can oc-
cur variations along hierarchical gradations, both with respect to equality 
and freedom. There is political inequality within social equality and con-
versely. Indeed, there can be a total political equality and yet a complete lack 
of political freedom, whether under one ruler or under a collective. What 
this shows is that freedom and equality assume intentional identity, i.e., are 
subsumed under an eidos of identity to be established, but they are essen-
tially differentiated. Their eidos of identity seems to intimate that a complete 
equality is identifiable with freedom, and yet even in a democratic polis they 
can assume extreme opposition. Of course, the democratic revolution is led 
by the intention toward the eidos of their identity, being fully cognizant of 
the danger that a complete disappearance of freedom might be compatible 
with equality. One could point out that the more recent dictatorships were 
and are compatible with equality, but with a full exclusion of freedom. This 
seems to rest on the failure to distinguish between society and polis. Only 
the latter offers the identification of equality and freedom. Hence, such dic-
tatorial systems as the Soviet Union can well claim that they are democratic 
societies, i.e. offering equality, but they are not equatable with a polis. There 
is, of course, another fascinating side to this phenomenon. Calling them-
selves “political” while being only social, they are most effective; democracy, 
which has lost its essence, is, in fact, most virulent, effective and, as we shall 
see subsequently, efficient and real. As we already saw, in modern Western 
world equality and freedom tend to separate and in many cases in a way that 
freedom usually comes up short. 
Once equality becomes the principle of social formation, it becomes 
very difficult to overcome such a principle. It becomes embedded in hu-
man habits, customs, and beliefs that, under any ontological interpreta-
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tion, fundamentally we are equal. Freedom remains only as long as it is 
insisted upon and maintained. The maintenance of equality requires no 
effort, while its abolition would be more difficult. Freedom requires con-
tinuous vigilance and it vanishes by a simple neglect. Of course, the pres-
ervation of freedom might become anarchistic if it is not secured by laws 
of freedom; yet, anarchy can appear in another form: given such laws, they 
might become ineffective and powerless by neglect, i.e. neglect would al-
low some social power and its interests enter the vacuum left by neglect 
and to rule by an arbitrary will. Indeed, the arbitrariness here is anarchistic 
and tends to promote itself by claiming that it is ruling in the name of “law 
and order”. The “dangers” of anarchy are very much obvious in the calls 
for “law and order”, in which context each can pursue his/her private aims 
in peace. This attitude tends to neglect freedom, and when “law and order” 
is threatened, the “good” people will always call for the “restrictions” of 
freedom. This is to say, when the social interests enter the polis by default, 
then such interests tend to call for “law and order” and to accuse those, 
who call for freedom of being anarchistic. In this sense, all the dangers 
to freedom are usually well hidden, specifically when one is assured that 
freedom is guaranteed by law.
The advantages of equality are obvious: all professions, all positions, 
aims are open to everyone; each can attain every wish in accord with his 
dedication and talent. Every person has equal social conditions and ad-
vantages. The advantages of freedom are more difficult to recount. They 
become visible only with the disadvantages after freedom has been lost. 
Tacitus has argued that the erosion of freedom under the guise of its main-
tenance ruins the political ethos and with it both the public and even the 
private commitments and, indeed, specifically when everything seems to 
be functioning well in accordance with “law and order”. If we strive to 
maintain the public sphere and free existence, our requirements change: 
instead of following our own individual interests, we must not only “tran-
scend” ourselves but be willing to maintain this transcendence in face 
of our own social disadvantage. In this sense, freedom is not necessarily 
identical with one’s social and material wishes. Indeed, its maintenance 
is an effort and in many cases a sacrifice. History testifies that only few 
were willing to rise to the level of public and demand a polis, in which the 
socially disadvantaged were deemed politically equal to the socially ad-
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vantaged and in which the few were willing to disregard their own private 
concerns. Thus, once again, it is obvious that the advantages of equality 
are easily acceptable to most, while the advantages of freedom tend to be 
disregarded and left out, specifically when the domain of freedom is dif-
ficult to maintain and might have no advantages in the area of social and 
private concerns. 
Given the primacy of equality and the disappearance of freedom, 
egalite des conditions might also disappear. This is what happens with 
Marxism-Leninism, everyone is equal (except, of course, for the elite), but 
equality is reduced to being “all alike” without any right to follow your 
own interests, profession, talents, indeed to be different, because such a 
difference might mean inequality with others. In the Soviet Union, one 
was equal all the way to being anonymous. There is a chorus and a singer, 
but the name of the singer is not even announced because that might lend 
the singer a status, which is not equal to others. In other words, one cannot 
follow one’s talents in commerce because he will become unequal to oth-
ers, leading to the abolition of equality of conditions and an establishment 
of equality of identical. This simply suggests that equality to pursue one’s 
own “wants” and talents is not possible without freedom. Once again, 
democratic revolution requires both and, thus, requires an establishment 
of political society. 
It must be maintained that the democratic revolution bears, within 
itself, an effort to maintain as close a correlation between equality and 
freedom as possible. We should note that in democracy freedom can only 
exist in unity with equality, while the converse is not true; equality need 
not call for freedom and can exist in correlation to despotism, as is the case 
with Marxism-Leninism. In this sense, freedom is always less secure and 
constantly exposed to the neglect by the population, enjoying the fruits of 
social equality without the public arena of freedom. Given this, we must 
rekindle the question concerning the preeminent “will to equality”. Seen 
superficially, it is almost taken for granted that “no one is better than an-
yone else”, but this does not account for the fact that in face of glaring 
human differences in talents, abilities, inclinations, etc., there should be 
the claim to equality. In theoretical terms, any effort to maintain equal-
ity based on some kind of “naturalism” makes no sense. Naturally, hu-
mans are diverse and unequal, and our resistance to any “scientific” ploy 
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to show our inequalities, whether physiological, genetic, psychological or 
theological, testifies to our tradition and its experienced eidos of equality. 
There is this constant that deflects all efforts to “naturalize” and, hence, to 
create inequalities. And in addition, any reference to history would testify 
against equality and convince us that inequality was the most pronounced 
human condition. Currently, entire populations of various traditions and 
on various continents are demanding equality “among peoples and na-
tions”, without ever raising the question of the source of this equality. No 
doubt, the notion of equality might have been present among the Greeks 
in a limited way; each group, e.g. the aristocrats, was equal among them-
selves, and the demos were also equal among themselves. But in the demo-
cratic revolution, there is a will for the equality of all, a will that seems to 
have drawn in its wind the entire mankind. At the outset, we must ex-
clude any explanations of this will to equality by the Christian notion of 
“everyone being equal in the eyes of a god”. In a fundamental sense, this 
equality is reserved for the future and another world, in which everyone 
will be judged equally, but not for this world as social and political engage-
ment. Obviously, the feudal system maintained this “other worldly” equal-
ity, but also established vast social inequities. The same can be held with 
respect to the fundamentalist movements and pronouncements: only the 
fundamentalists are equal, while the rest of the human race is to be either 
converted, oppressed or destroyed. No doubt, some of the Christian sects 
offered deference to equality once equality became a “calling card” of the 
modern age, but deference is not a principle of social and political organi-
zations. The question of equality must be sought elsewhere.
It is the contribution of the Greek philosophical thought, and not pri-
marily of the concept of polis, that led to the understanding of equality. 
Even the Aristotelian distinction between “natural slaves” and “natural 
masters” took for granted that as humans the two groups are equal. To 
encounter someone as a “human”, according to Greek thought, one has 
to have a taken for granted vision, eidos, which allows one to decipher 
among the different events and varieties that the encountered is a human. 
This eidos is the permanent among the variations. But how is such a vi-
sion, a sight acquired? It stems from the question of the unity of qualities, 
which would make the human into human and nothing else. This is to say, 
the raising of the question of what constitutes the “being of the human” 
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irrespective of the innumerable differences; only in light of this question 
that the humans appear, in the final analyses, as essentially equal. One 
could validly claim that without the philosophical question that raises the 
problem of the “essential being of something”, there would not have ap-
peared the notion of human equality. Thus, with the emergence of phi-
losophy, there also emerged a fundamental determination of all humanity 
as equal. Philosophy, in this sense, subtends the modern democratic revo-
lution. We should be more careful with respect to the notion of the “eidos” 
of the human; it has been deemed that we can extricate human “essence” 
by comparative means insofar, as we can discover the common human 
characteristics. The question that such a procedure must answer is this: 
even if we discover universal characteristics, we still have to presume them 
to be human, i.e. how do we decide that these characteristics, describable 
in their own right, are also human? It seems that before we delimit the 
characteristics, we already have the understanding of the human. Thus, 
the human is in some way “pre-visioned” and not generalized. This sug-
gests that the pre-visioning is not inferential; yet, it could not be said that 
it is a priori, since a priori each culture has its own categorical systems, 
each defining the human in specific ways; yet each claiming in these differ-
ences and specifications, that they are dealing with the human. Thus, it is 
impossible to derive the view of equality either from comparative or from 
a priori postures. Anytime we seek comparisons or a priori assumptions, 
we already find that we take for granted our acquaintance with the human, 
irrespective of its definition. 
Philosophy reveals in principle what the comparative and a priori 
positions transgress, i.e., take for granted. This state of affairs was clearly 
grasped both by Plato and Aristotle, leading us to suggest that the views on 
Plato, present in numerous interpretations, might be inadequate. Plato’s 
notions of “form” and “idea” need not be identical with “essentialisms”; 
rather, form and idea indicate a more fundamental grasp of the difference 
between specific delimitations of the human and the “prevision” of the hu-
man, which is used both in comparisons and in the definitions of form 
and idea. In this manner, the fundamental sense of our usage of the term 
“eidos” does not signify anything “universal”, but something subtending 
the universal and the particular. The Platonic riddle rests on this misunder-
standing of eidos: on the one hand, eidos is the universal, and on the other, 
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the universal points to an arche, which cannot be explicated, since all expli-
cations, whether universal or particular, take it for granted. The form and 
the idea, as universal, are founded on the eidos as arche, and the latter can-
not be founded; rather, it is self-founding in the sense that whatever comes 
into view, does so in light of a “prevision”, which founds what is to be given 
in vision and in thought; in this vision and thought, the arche is equally 
given. This state of affairs, stemming from eidos as arche that founds all 
our particular, universal and even essential understanding, is what consti-
tutes the basis and the problematic of equality even for our modern age. 
The controversies whether there is something “universal” to being human, 
e.g., common human nature, which would account for the “similarity” of 
cultures, or whether cultures, in fact, indicate differences, suggesting that 
there is no visible essence, rest on the assumption that, on the one hand, we 
already “know” what humans are before any of these controversies, and on 
the other, that we are failing to deal with the assumed eidos as arche and, 
hence, claim that no commonality is given. But as noted above, these claims 
take for granted the “prevision” of what the human is. 
In the Western tradition, the Greeks have regarded the human as ba-
sically zoon logon or noun echon, a living being capable of the view of be-
ing of everything; a being that can conceive of every being for what it is, 
how it is, and through what it is. The latter is what constitutes the logos; 
hence, the human lives in the world with others and is open to logos. The 
latter, in human affairs, constitutes the basic arche of the human as a be-
ing of a polis. As a being of reason, the human is at the same time a being 
with others, living with its kind on the basis of knowledge and wisdom. 
This determination does not yield a direct call for the political equality of 
all persons. Rather, it is the condition for such a call. It is obvious that the 
condition need not be taken into account when forming social relation-
ships. In medieval times, there was no opposition to the eidos as arche of 
equality, yet, there were vast social and political differences and inequities. 
Thus, we must raise the question concerning the reasons why the taken for 
granted equality became something unconditionally desired or wanted, 
i.e., whence the will to equality that was expounded in precious chapters 
The understanding of this question and a deciphering of an answer 
require some interim considerations. All that lives signifies the world. The 
human is no exception, although he not only relates to the world, but also 
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“represents” the signified, toward which she aims, and represents herself 
as the one, who aims at something. Facing the aim, the human also faces 
himself. Such a striving, that posits both that, toward which it aims and 
the one that is striving, is the essence of praxis. Since the human lives with 
others in a society and is in a position to constitute a polis, then the politi-
cal praxis is the highest and most genuine. It requires a representation of 
both, the aim and of the subject, who does the aiming: political praxis and 
its ethos. Now, if we include in this political praxis the aim toward equal-
ity, the will to equality in the public arena, we shall note that here we are 
facing a democratic political ethos. But this ethos requires modern foun-
dations, which, in their basic constitution, might not appear to possess 
any political import. The task is to show that despite this appearance, the 
modern age calls for a polis and a political ethos delimited above. But what 
is the eidos, the essence of will to equality? For this, we must offer a brief 
explication of reflective thought.
In philosophy, the modern age was initiated by Descartes, not in a 
sense of scientific revolution, but in a more fundamental conception of 
the constitution of thought and its relationship to the world. Although 
human thought has been considered in its representational form such that 
thought is an envisagement of what is Descartes reveals the character of 
reflective thought and with this sets the basis for the modern age. It is a 
thought, which sets itself as its own object, and, thus, assumes a preemi-
nent place, indeed a dominating place in the understanding of the world. 
It is notable that in his cogito me cogitare, Descartes found the certitude of 
cogito sum in such a way, that the cogito me cogitare constitutes the certi-
tude of existence, of sum. This delimits the way, in which the human is. We 
find here a specifically notable shift – to be explicated later in its various 
modalities in relationship to praxis and power – away from the classical 
Greek thought. For Aristotle, being has its fundamental determination in 
actuality, energeia, while with Descartes being, the sum is determined by 
the cogito me cogitare or the self-consciousness of a reflection. But in this 
case, there appears an eidetic shift offering one possibility, in which the 
entire being of man and of nature itself are drawn into the self-realization 
on the basis of human self-representation. But this is what makes up will 
in the sense of self-willing. While this novel mode of thinking might be 
overburdened by the Cartesian assumption of the Medieval concept of 
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substance, it slowly sheds this burden and appears in its more purified 
eidos during the development of modern history. 
This line of modern development, apart from others to be considered 
subsequently, is the novelty, in which the self-reflective thought reveals most 
intimately what prior to modern philosophy was still obscure: the essential 
equality of the human represented eidetically since the classical tradition; the 
eidos is now connected with a will as a function calling for the realization of 
what was hitherto envisaged purely as a presence. Thus, we are in a position 
to suggest that what the human wants is only what he can and must want: 
the already taken for granted eidos of equality in a concrete instantiation. 
This has far reaching consequences: the self-conscious reflective thought, 
cognizant of essential human equality, can only want that this represented 
equality should also become reality. Since this reality of essential human 
equality depends on the will, i.e., a will that follows human representations, 
then the establishment of this reality is a matter of will and political praxis. 
Basically, what is at issue within the context of this unfolding possibility is 
that there is no concern with human essence; this is deemed to have been 
decided. Rather, the issue is its realization, which is a matter of will and 
action. Indeed, we would think the basis of democratic polis and equality 
quite inadequately if we were to conceive human action as aiming at some 
purposes with equality being granted a priori. Rather, we must realize that 
thought dominated by self-conscious reflection transforms the social action 
into a political action of the desire of the will, which first and all pervasive 
object of willing is the equality of all humans. 
Obviously, the reflective and self-conscious thought of the equality 
of all, which demands the realization of this equality, is a free activity. It is 
the reflective representation of human equality, and not the social reality 
of human inequality, that determines human action toward the realization 
of equality. This is to say, the social fabric of unequal powers and causes 
does not determine the call for human political equality; to the contrary, the 
self-consciously reflected human essence as equal calls for an activity that 
would first realize this equality. In this sense, the representation of human 
equality elicits a new concept of freedom in the modern age: freedom as 
self-determination. Thus, the political praxis is the working out of equal-
ity in the mode of self-determination. This offers us a brief indication for 
the conjunction of equality and freedom in modern democratic revolutions. 
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Equality is represented and is the object of the will; the latter does not want 
what is there, does not want existing social options, but wants the realiza-
tion of equality and this is only possible in a polis. This willing, is in fact, 
the self-realization of man on the basis of its own self-representations, and 
the self-representations determine the will, which is a will of self-realization. 
This self-effecting process is, indeed, self-determination, i.e. free activity. As 
we saw, this free activity is initially negative, i.e., abolition of the conditions 
of inequality by an establishment of a polis, in which equality is instituted 
not as a social, but as a political praxis. As we have seen, such an institution 
will have to do with two modern trends stemming from an effort to achieve 
total power. The trends, nonetheless, will not be able to establish equality 
and indeed will abolish freedom. This is obvious from previous chapters.
Our brief discussion of the understanding of self-worth in previous 
chapter has to be extended reflectively across Western philosophical tra-
dition in order to demonstrate that any attempts to degrade the human 
being, any efforts to build a “new man” will have to contend with the back-
ground presence of the criterion – self-worth as a good in itself. Thus, we 
reached a juncture, at which the founder of Western philosophy – So-
crates – can make his entrance. His life is precisely a reflective turning to 
the question of activity in the polis, an activity designed to be of service to 
all citizens. This activity is designed to keep the public domain open, de-
manding that all must participate in it. Although scholars locate Socrates 
as the relentless seeker of truth, i.e. categorical epistemologist, we must 
also recall that the first condition of the search for truth is the good and a 
life world, where a person can live in accordance with the demands of the 
good as one expression of human intrinsic worth. Only under these con-
ditions can Socrates search for truth as another aspect of intrinsic worth. 
After all, the search for truth was, for Socrates, a practical-existential com-
mitment and activity of a good and truthful life. Thus, Socrates, like many 
others, was an object of derision and caricatures. He accepted the Athe-
nian verdict of death in order to show that his and others intrinsic worth 
demands a life world, in which the search for truth cannot be forbidden. 
He placed his internal worth as the good above his personal life and could 
demand that such a good should be a part of his life world. The decision 
by the jury to forbid Socrates his daimon, his eros, to “philosophize”, was 
equivalent to a destruction of a life world, in which his intrinsic worth 
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once had a place. Socrates is compelled to face a crisis and reveal a crisis 
of his life world. He reaches and lives an awareness that places his entire 
life world into question and demands a decision: is the life world, offered 
by Athenians, adequate to fulfill his intrinsic self-worth. In turn, have the 
Athenians, by their own action, degraded themselves to a level of social 
value, where truth, dignity and honor will have no place. After all, such 
degradation to social value is obvious from the trial, when Socrates is of-
fered a chance to surrender his troublesome quest and, thus, become a 
valuable citizen, and when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept a pension 
from the state for “whatever little services that he might render”. Here 
appears a depiction of the first crisis of democracy and Socrates reaches a 
lived awareness, which demands a legitimation of the life world, which is 
being offered to him. Can his lived awareness, correlated as it is to intrinsic 
self-worth, have any perceptual affirmation in such a life world? The lat-
ter, after all, demands self-degradation and, thus, the denial of self-worth. 
Socrates resolves the crisis by accepting the verdict of the Athenians with 
a warning: if you condemn me, my fame will spread far and wide; do not 
do this, because it will be forever a black mark on Athens.
But what do we get at the other end of Socratic tradition, where lived 
awareness of intrinsic self-worth, seems to be destroyed in the pronounce-
ments of Nihilism that appeared amidst Russian intellectuals and writers. 
Perhaps the most extreme pronouncements came from persons, such as 
Herzen, and even from writers toying with the death of god theme. After 
all, Dostoyevsky proposes a thesis that if god is dead, then everything is 
permitted. As we know, Herzen not only challenges the continuous life 
world of values, but attempts to devalue all values, to discard all meaning, 
aim and purpose, to burn down all that has been achieved and to set hu-
man life adrift on a turbulent ocean in a ship without a rudder. What is left 
over is blind, irrational, clashing powers, arbitrary decisions and complete 
self-degradation of the human into materialism. Yet, the same Herzen 
strives to find an answer to a question: given the meaningless, devalued, 
directionless and purposeless universe, how shall we live? He opens the 
lived awareness that intends self-worth as self-creation. It is significant 
that such self-creation is precisely what is required of self-worth: its own 
purpose, having no value for anyone and, above all, for social function-
ing – it creates itself for its own sake. The metaphor of life is no longer “all 
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for nothing”, but self-creation as its own worth. In this sense, nihilism and 
the devaluation of all values does not abolish philosophical quest for self-
worth; to the contrary, it clears away all obfuscations and offers a higher 
opening to transcendental self-awareness. After all, it elevates awareness 
to encompass the cosmos as meaningless and asks the ultimate question 
whether this cosmos is open for self-worth. And the answer is absolutely 
yes and precisely because the constructed and purposeful values have ob-
fuscated the most fundamental human awareness: first and foremost, I 
must demand of myself and others to be self-creators, following directly in 
purposeless recognition of absolute self-worth for its own sake.
What the Russian writers have in common with Socrates is that, just 
as he, they were not professional philosophers, but persons who demanded 
the recognition not only of their own, but of everyone’s unconditional self-
worth. And just as Socrates, all of them (with an exception of Tolstoy who, 
nevertheless, was excommunicated) placed self-worth above their own 
safety, wealth, security, social position and were exiled, imprisoned, per-
secuted and censored. They placed self-worth above their life and dared to 
say no to their own and that of enlightenment’s life worlds. In this sense, 
the claims that various Russian writers, inclusive of Chernichevsky, Turg-
eniev and even Dostoyevsky, were nihilists are wrong. Nihilism rejects the 
world of values and meaning without offering anything positive in their 
place. Not so with the Russian writers, whose transcendental awareness of 
self-worth is the only viable position, from which life worlds can be illumi-
nated in essence and disclosed as to what kind of activity cannot be fulfilled. 
No doubt, they toyed with democracy and equality of all persons, but they 
also realized from their experience in the West that democracy was in cri-
sis. West in general has abolished the public domain, where autonomous 
citizens could rationally debate public issues, by reducing it to the clashing 
sum of private interests and power confrontations. The rationality of West-
ern man, as Dostoyevsky noted, is a facade, under which there lurk all sorts 
of irrational drives, such as greed, envy, aggression and incivility. Hence, 
the notion of freedom and, above all, self-worth can no longer be offered 
by the West. No doubt, equality and freedom remained in the background 
as a reminder of what is being lost, just as equality was in the background 
of the entire Western philosophical tradition, but the demand for its enact-
ment has been pushed aside. Now, the previous principle of self-inclusion 
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can be concretized. A person, who recognizes absolute self-worth, as do the 
Russian writers, does not propose it as a thesis, but a demand in action that 
includes the very person who lives the awareness of self-worth. Hence, de-
spite their loss of social value positions, wealth, freedom to write, they sub-
sumed themselves under this absolute awareness and acted accordingly. 
We are emphasizing this aspect of Western philosophical tradition in order 
to show what transformation of paradigm must take place if Lithuania is to 
become a part of Western philosophical tradition, beyond autocracy and all 
the social functional values.
The point has been reached, where a question of awareness of self-
worth can be answered. First aspect of this awareness is the possibility 
to extricate oneself from a specific life world. Second, the resultant disat-
tachment, or bracketing of this immersion, is the awareness of self-worth, 
demanding the possibility of world orientation that would answer the 
question of absolute legitimation of fulfilling in practice and action what 
the awareness always tacitly maintained as self-worth. Third, it is to be 
noted that such awareness transgresses any specific life world, since any 
life world may offer partial-perceptual or signitive fulfillment of intrin-
sic self-worth. Under any other circumstance, intrinsic worth would be 
an intentionality of a given life world, interpreted, for example, as value, 
equivalent to other values, and, hence, a self-understood part of such a 
world, refusal of which would go counter to what is categorically self-evi-
dent in such a world. At this level, a refusal to participate in such a world 
would be impossible. In other words, intrinsic worth is not a perceptual 
given, but arises “perspectively” to the extent that we can regard our lived 
world as total from the perspective of intrinsic worth. This perspectivity is 
the price for our freedom to survey any life world and ask the question of 
legitimation. In this context, the persons, who were mentioned, whether 
Turgenev or Gogol or even Socrates, articulate phenomena that disclose 
intrinsic worth and demand of us to recognize our degraded state. As al-
ready stated, the recognition of other’s intrinsic worth is equivalent to the 
recognition of our own and conversely. This is relevant, above all, as a 
background of the Soviet paradigm that, while excluded from the herme-
neutical circle of the Scientific Enlightenment, constantly reappears as a 
necessary condition and a horizon of such circle.
The awareness, correlated to intrinsic self-worth, is a transcendental 
background, on which any life world must be legitimated, concerning its 
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adequacy for fulfilling such awareness in activity. It was noted that the life 
world of the Enlightenment at its epitomy offered us a world of values, 
which had no other source except unlimited construction and, hence, un-
bound from any restriction concerning the manner, in which such values 
are used. This leads to arbitrariness and power to the extent that power 
must decide, which values are victorious – for a while. But the transcen-
dental background of intrinsic self-worth was and is equally a given and 
provides a limit concerning the unrestricted valuations. The founders of 
the Enlightenment and its correlate – political democracy – were persons, 
who extolled honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness and justice in their ac-
tions and demanded no less of their adversaries. This comprises the back-
ground, on which the crisis of democracy appears. At the founding, just as 
well as now, there appears a first transcendental rule of awareness: main-
tenance of permanence of self-worth through enactment. This rule then de-
mands, second, an establishment of a first democratic institution – public 
domain – in which every person must fulfill self-worth in praxis for its own 
sake. This is the principle of praxis, which is not defined by ontological 
categories of being, but by self-reflecting awareness that demands actions 
based on honesty, truthfulness, honor, dignity and respect for self and 
others – as a background of equality and freedom. Such maintenance re-
quires the bracketing, exclusion, of arbitrary constructed valuations, such 
as economic, power, religious, ethnic, racist, that would promote the abo-
lition of the public domain and self-worth; indeed, such valuations do pro-
duce rhetorical means to obfuscate their degrading and disruptive tactics. 
Such oxymorons as “free enterprise”, “public leadership” and even “free 
expression” comprise some of the rhetorical means. This sort of engage-
ment comprises a third rule: valuations as disruption of the permanence 
of self-worth. This rule is quite prevalent and has been at the background 
of events, such as public apathy, non-participation in public affairs, and 
pervasive anti-intellectualism and anti-education. When the public arena 
is filled with all sorts of private interests, needs, desires, cultic dogmas 
that are at odds with each other, then either we also push for our interests 
or, lacking knowledge of such interests, we decline to participate. It must 
be emphasized that self-worth and the public domain are not objects of 
knowledge, but are constituted in our active engagement. If we cease to 
act honorably, justly, nobly, respectfully, we shall not have self-worth or 
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public domain, wherein self-worth is enacted. It must be also noted that 
freedom as autonomy is a result of self-worth; after all, we extricate our-
selves from our own and other life worlds and demand legitimation as to 
their adequacy for self-worth. Only ion this ground can we select a life world 
that permits autonomy and equality for their own sake. But autonomy, at 
this level, is valid only if it is correlated and subject to self-worth. Without 
the latter, autonomy may become reduced to “free choice” among things 
and lose its legislative dignity. 
Dialectical Reason
The above explication of self-worth as the condition for autonomy and 
equality, and a political domain which, is a correlate of self-worth, is the 
ultimate background of all sorts of claims to individualism, community, 
progress and even responsibility to others and oneself. While discussing 
parts-wholes issue, it was noted that this issue translates from ontology to 
social thought: is the individual a basic unit of society, or does society have 
its characteristics as a whole and, thus, its needs are more important than 
those of individuals. It is necessary to point out that the “individual” in the 
hermeneutics of Western ontology is an atom, unrelated, separate and at 
times even solipsistic. Society is formed on the basis of individuals coming 
together to establish rules so that an aggregate of individuals could live 
together at peace. Yet, such an aggregate does not change the conception 
that society is a sum of individuals and that the rules express individual 
interests. At this ontological level, society has no characteristics of its own 
and is identical to the characteristics of the individuals, their wants, needs 
and subjective tendencies. Following Marx and Engels, Soviet paradigm 
was designed to resolve this issue, yet its resolution might not have been 
adequate and, thus, pointed to a failure of the entire system. To under-
stand this failure, it is necessary to delimit precisely the principles of the 
paradigm, keeping in mind the extensive discussion of the Scientific En-
lightenment and its assumption of material atomism, accessible to quanti-
tative methodology. Moreover, our methodology of philosophical herme-
neutics, in its modern version, also discloses the limitations of its circle, 
precluding the possibility of individual reflective thought as a ground of 
enactment of the will to equality and, hence, to autonomy and also the 
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disclosing of self-worth that is not identical with the atomistic individual 
accepted by the Scientific Enlightenment. Now, Marxism, throughout its 
unfolding, was submitted to a multitude of critical appraisals and refuta-
tions. Predominant among these were charges that its claims to be scien-
tific turned out to be inadequate, since its prognoses, based on Dialectical 
Materialism, were always flawed. Yet, what is lacking in all of the criti-
cisms is an evaluation of the basic ontological and epistemological claims 
to note whether at base there are some issues that cannot be resolved on 
the grounds of this paradigm and its basis in philosophical hermeneutics 
expressed by the Scientific Enlightenment. Thus, the following questions 
must be posed: can Marxism support the claims that it makes concerning 
social revolutions on the basis of Dialectical Materialism? If there are in-
adequate grounds within Dialectical Materialism, can such inadequacies 
be overcome within such Dialectics. If corrections are introduced, do they 
destroy the notion of social, technical and economic unfolding toward a 
utopian society?
To understand these questions we must delimit precisely the compo-
sition of Dialectical Materialism (at times interpreted as Historical Ma-
terialism). Dialectical Materialism is a theory proposing that nature, his-
tory and society are moved by laws; there are three basic laws that can be 
applied to all phenomena, from sub-atomic particles to theology. More 
precisely, the laws are not applied, but are in the very phenomena. The 
first law of Dialectics states that in all phenomena there is a change of 
quantity into quality. Quantity is identical with the modern notion of 
“sum of individual parts” (to speak in social terms, sum of individuals) 
with characteristics as magnitude, weight, location in space and time, and 
movement. Quantity as such does not have much influence on an essence 
of an object or phenomenon. It is simply a sum of parts. An object made 
of parts might be subjected to quantitative changes within specific limits 
without any qualitative changes. Qualitative characteristics, on the other 
hand, constitute an essence (although temporal) of an object in a way that 
without specific qualities an object cannot be what it is; qualities limit an 
object to be a specific kind or class of objects. Qualitative characteristics 
are more than the sum of characteristics of the individual parts.
The first part of the first law of Dialectics states that quantitative 
change takes place within specific limits; if the limits are reached and sur-
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passed, then a qualitative change occurs. The previous qualitative charac-
teristics vanish (although not all), and new qualities emerge, which cannot 
be reduced to the previous qualities or quantity. A new quality, or quali-
ties, emerges comprising a new essence of an object. Thus, an essence of 
an object is a result of a particular time and the state of affairs of that time. 
This means that when objects with new qualities combine quantitatively 
and reach their limit, other new qualities will emerge. The second part of 
the first law of Dialectics has a twofold claim: the quantitative change is 
evolutionary, while the qualitative change is revolutionary. Marxists usu-
ally employ social and economic models to substantiate this claim: the 
quantitative expansion of productive capacity, its increasing production 
of more “parts” reaches a limit, which yields new social relationships and 
new qualitative characteristics in human, social constitution. Quantitative, 
evolutionary incrementations reach a limit, demanding the transforma-
tion of human essence and the change in social relationships. This means 
that a revolutionary change is inherent in all phenomena: destruction of 
previous qualitative-essential structures and emergence of new ones. This 
supposes to lead to an improved quality of life of all social members. 
The second law of Dialectics states that the unity of nature requires a 
constant antagonism among opposing tendencies. The Dialectical law of 
identity, which states that identity is possible, only if there are opposing 
tendencies. The opposition cannot be resolved by reconciliation, but by 
the destruction of one tendency and an emergence of a new tendency with 
its specific qualities. Social examples are offered: opposition, which can-
not be resolved between the owner class and the worker class; capitalism 
must be destroyed and the working class must gain new characteristics, 
which must change the entire quality of social and economic life. But the 
destruction cannot be complete, since capitalism, as a negative aspect, has 
something positive in it that must be retained; this leads to the final step 
in dialectical paradigm.
The third law of Dialectics is called “negation of negativity”. The su-
periority of one tendency, the positive over another, means the negation 
of the inferior tendency, the negative. Yet, the negative tendency has two 
moments: positive and negative. Resultantly, the superior tendency de-
stroys the negative moment of the inferior, while retaining the positive 
moment. Here, the negation of one tendency by another is a negation of 
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the negative moment, or a negation of negativity in such a way, that the 
positive moment of the negative tendency forms a unity with the superior 
positive tendency. The conquest by the working class of the capitalist class 
is a negation of capitalism, yet such a negation is negated by the positive 
aspect of capitalism – its productive capacity. The positive tendency, the 
working class unites with the positive moment of capitalism to form a 
new characteristic of the working class, such that the workers are also the 
owners and managers of production. The negation of capitalism means 
that the evolution of quantitative incrementation of production cannot 
maintain the capitalist social order, leading to a revolutionary leap and an 
establishment of new qualitative human. In principle, what we call “hu-
man” belongs to a specific historical period. Based on methodological her-
meneutics, it can be suggested that the very understanding – a qualitative 
capacity of humans – is also bound to its historical context, from which all 
other contexts are interpreted. But this means that the claim that previous 
historical periods were determined by their material conditions does not 
imply that indeed such conditions were the ones that shaped human self-
understanding and social organizations. This simply means that due to 
our own conditions, we must interpret all other historical periods in terms 
of our own. Indeed, this could be extended to include the very Dialectics as 
a temporary or current mode of awareness, relevant and applicable to this 
historical period. In another historical period, there might not be anything 
called Dialectics. What is at issue is the impossibility to make Dialectical 
Materialism into a universal theory, since its position is essentially “local”. 
This problematic can be extended to show the limits of Dialectical Ma-
terialism strictly within its own parameters. From what has been said so far, 
Dialectical understanding allows an access to the “past” and what quantita-
tive conditions are given for the current state of the qualitative character-
istics, comprising current “essence” of what humans are. Since the condi-
tions that humans produce shape the producers and their understanding, 
then our access to our environment and ourselves comes from such pro-
duction, period. It is to be noted that for Dialectical Materialism theoretical 
thought is also a result of material conditions and no theory is in a position 
to express more than the conditions would allow. This means that Dialecti-
cal Materialism, as a theory, must also reflect the current material condi-
tions and would cease to be valid under some other conditions. It too is his-
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torically temporal. In other words, on Marxian basis, one cannot make an 
exception to Dialectical Materialism without a contradiction. Hence, there 
is no way to prognosticate the future. This is to say, since human “essence” 
is defined historically in terms of a specific period, then no qualitatively dif-
ferent future human being can be understood without first establishing the 
required quantitative conditions. The argument that the current quantita-
tive conditions might indicate the future qualitative transformation cannot 
hold: first, the current quantitative conditions have not evolved sufficiently 
to yield new qualities, and, hence, we cannot know what such qualities 
might be; second, our contemporary “essential” self-understanding was a 
result of previous quantitative conditions, but since such an understanding 
cannot be reduced to previous conditions, the latter is equally inaccessible 
to us; third, understanding current quantitative conditions that supposedly 
would lead to new qualities cannot tell us anything about such new quali-
ties, since such new qualities cannot be reduced to the conditions, which 
might produce them. The claim to irreducibility is equally a block to under-
stand the new qualities from our current quantitative conditions and our 
contemporary essence. Thus, observing the current quantitative relations 
we are in a position to understand the inessential evolutionary process, but 
not the essential revolutionary leap. We can say with assurance that the 
quantity of parts, when united, must lead to new qualities, are inadequate 
by themselves to miraculously produce something novel that the parts did 
not possess – unless we assume “more” about humans than the historically 
specific essence, resulting from quantitative aggregations. The “more” is 
precisely what our previous chapters explicated.
Dialectical Materialism inadvertently slips in this “more” as a meta-
physical component of “negativity”, which is not available on any scientific 
grounds. When speaking of a positive tendency that negates the negative 
one, there appears an unwarranted designation of one trend as negative; 
after all, factually speaking, there might be a struggle in a society for power 
and, indeed, efforts might be exerted by one group to defeat another group, 
but neither group is negative. There is no need to claim that the losing party 
in war was a “negative”; it was simply weaker and could not compete with 
the stronger. What then can account for such use of “negativity” as a major 
moment in Dialectics? It seems that a criterion of what the future human 
qualities should be is used to judge the present quantitative conditions and, 
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indeed, the present human qualities in order to point to their inadequacies. 
This is to say, the criterion assumes a presence of something that is not yet 
there and, as argued above, cannot yet be understood dialectically. None-
theless, it is precisely what is disclosed, as a background by modern phi-
losophy: self-worth as a source of the will to equality and autonomy. This 
not “yet being there” has no existence and can be equated with “negativity” 
that can disclose among the quantitative and qualitative phenomena an ab-
sence, a lack that motivates the process for its realization. Indeed, the “not 
yet there” is not negativity, but something that cannot belong to categorical 
system, by which all value positions and human functions are usually de-
ployed. As noted above, the will to equality and, thus, freedom is not given 
in any qualitative definition, since it is present only as a praxis, as lived. If 
the Soviet Union had suppressed this demand for praxis, then it suppressed 
the very essential presence of humans. 
This is evidenced by the texts of Marxism-Leninism, wherein the in-
terpretation of the newly formed Soviet Union had the following composi-
tion: the capitalist quantitative conditions for revolution toward the new 
qualitative human were not available; they had to be built in light of what? 
In light of the absence of the new human that was envisaged as the criteri-
on to decide what quantitative conditions must be built. Hence, there was 
dialectically unwarranted assumption of a presence that was completely 
absent from any dialectical explanation – the presence of negativity that 
comprised the motive for the constant claims that the conditions are al-
most present to make a leap into a communist society and the new human. 
The problem is that the leap was never made because the interpretation of 
the Scientific Enlightenment in terms of “scientific socialism” precluded in 
principle the presence of human self-worth, action for equality and auton-
omy established by the Political Enlightenment. Indeed, its suppression in 
Soviet Experiment, nonetheless, demanded its presence, even in a negative 
form, and, hence, in accordance with methodological hermeneutics, it had 
to appear as a limit of Dialectical Materialism. If this is an appropriate in-
terpretation, then instead of a dogma in an ideological form, philosophy, 
as a free search for truth, a free life of every individual, has reappeared 
and with it appears a fuller Western world. To the latter, we now turn to 
note the emergence of a broader paradigm than the one that Lithuania was 
subjected to under Soviet rule.
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Appearance of the Suppressed
Having deciphered the flaws in Dialectical Materialism and scientific 
socialism and the silent reappearance of the suppressed moment – human 
autonomous freedom and equality, it is possible to unfold the suppressed 
consciousness and the manner, in which it appears in modern and con-
temporary paradigm. We can start at the level, at which Dialectical Mate-
rialism fails and disclose the background dimensions that are relevant to 
overcome such failure without complete abandonment of some of its posi-
tive aspects. The sum total of the presently given factual conditions, such 
as economic capacity, specific human characteristics, social relationships 
and mental capacities, constitute an existential milieu of a life world – fully 
knowing that such specifications are limited to a historical present. Since 
the quantitative conditions are such that they limit humans to specific 
and limited qualifications and since humans are capable of altering their 
conditions and, thus, qualifications, there is always an awareness of a ten-
sion between what is and what can be. What can be is an open possibility 
of being more than warranted by present limitations. Here, we are at the 
heart of modern Western ontology: our access to reality is based on the 
“conditions for the possibility of being” and, thus, the very presence of our 
surroundings is precisely what possible conditions humans establish to 
yield possible results. 
The tension between the quantitatively established conditions by hu-
man activity and the new qualitative possibility constitute the basis for 
progress and the demand in the change of existential conditions, which 
would result in the establishment of what is more in human essence. But 
this morphology is correlative to human “free activity” as an interpreta-
tion of human autonomy. In Marxism, there is a demand that any theory 
is empty unless it becomes “praxis”; and this is the moment of truth: in 
the background of Marxian interpretation of society in terms of “scien-
tific socialism”, there is a transformation of the Political Enlightenment 
of human autonomy into “praxis” as “free activity that constitutes the en-
vironment and the human. The problem was this: Dialectical Materialism 
was limiting and, thus, suppressing the praxis of free activity to a specific 
historical period as the ground of all explanations and, thus, obfuscated 
its own modern background that constantly reappeared as a criterion and 
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a critique of the “inadequacies” of the conditions to yield communism. 
Michael Gorbachev realized that such a background is a condition for any 
success of the Soviet Union and, thus, declared “openness and transforma-
tion”. Both terms rest on a realization that by essence humans are not lim-
ited to given conditions and must be allowed to be open to new horizons, 
which would expand free activity.
Of course, we cannot dismiss the temporary limitations by what hu-
mans have themselves established and how they understand within such 
limitations; but we must also disclose awareness, that such limitations are 
our own products and can be changed, opened to more than their current 
limits. In this sense, the “highest” or fundamental aim of history is a con-
scious establishment of existential conditions, which would be adequate 
to human essence: free activity. In this context, it is the European modern 
tradition, which comprises the required openness and a consciousness as 
to the development of a world of human autonomy and equality, inter-
preted as “free activity”. Here, the first step is to revise Dialectics in line 
with the modern ontology of human essence that will become relevant for 
another paradigmatic shift, developed by European thinkers. Of this later, 
but meanwhile another level of consciousness begins to appear and must 
be addressed: it is an awareness of alienation and the ways it appears and 
the manner, in which it can disappear. 
The previously noted tension between established conditions and 
human essence as free activity demands a resolution. Modern ontology, 
leading to the notion of progress, can offer a resolution not in terms of 
the logic of progress as “material transformation of the environment and 
human material fulfillment”, but in terms of “historical aim”, which is 
both a future possibility and a constantly present criterion whether we 
are moving in the right direction. This movement is a way of resolving 
the issue of alienation. First moment of alienation delimits the states of 
affairs, wherein human life is “abstract”. The latter means that while liv-
ing in a specific, limited environment, humans also know that the latter 
is completely inadequate with respect to the total free activity as human 
essence. In this sense, the limitation makes the complete fulfillment “ab-
stract”, uninvolved and, thus, in practical life alien. This is to say, in con-
crete life there is no presence of the reality of full human essence and, thus, 
it is something that one is and yet something that is not lived, something 
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strange. This line of reasoning can be extended to include negativity: if 
one lives under limited conditions, unable to actualize the more, that one 
essentially is, then there is a sense that forces, not under one’s control, 
are negating one’s essential being – intrinsic self-worth. In this sense, one 
regards the humanly constituted environment as alien and negative, to 
be smashed violently in order to be free from it. Correlatively, one also 
regards one’s life equally as an alien thing, made by the conditions and, in 
fact, used as a condition for further oppression of oneself and others. This 
context suggests that the more one struggles to overcome the limiting con-
ditions, the more one employs the means available, the more one becomes 
subjected to them, the more one becomes alienated. 
According to this logic, alienation will diminish and vanish with a 
historical breaking out of limitations created and imposed by humans on 
themselves, whether such limitations are economic, ideological, techno-
logical or even theoretical. All these limitations may be at the base of fo-
bias, intolerance and, above all, closed personality. This is to say, the over-
coming of alienation is also overcoming of ones being closed, of not being 
open to one’s horizons of possible activities and, indeed, open to others. 
This means that the measure of alienation is not just personal, but histori-
cal, involving entire humanity. After all, we are inter-subjective not only 
in thinking, but, above all, in praxis, i.e. the way we relate to others and, 
thus, ourselves. While we regard our individuality significant, and rightly 
so, we must also understand that the unfolding of humanity includes our 
unfolding, that what we understand and are capable of doing depends on 
and is interrelated with others, who expand our horizons and open for us 
abilities, which we did not recognize we had. In this sense, the dialectical 
aim of history as having one purpose might break up into multi-purposive 
and much richer presence of free activity or, more precisely, free activities 
that mutually enhance and enrich one another. These aspects are a task of 
subsequent chapters, since we shall have to articulate the paradigm, which 
is unfolding in Lithuania in the context of Europe. One important issue 
that comes up is political society (that was lacking in Soviet paradigm) 
and what are its principles, above all, with respect to freedom and equality. 
This issue touches many levels, including the so-called “free market” and 
its ideological limitations. The methodology that was used revealed the 
presence of “more”, whether the presence was a background, as in classical 
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philosophy, or was brought to the fore by reflection, as in modern philoso-
phy, it was the irreducible human self-worth insofar, as any efforts to de-
rive it from any variant of sum of parts required its presence. In this sense, 
the quest to “build a new man” by any means, no matter how vast and 
powerful, are doomed to fail, since what is to be built is already available.
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First, we must introduce a brief understanding of civilizations, and 
specifically Europe, since the latter, and in broader terms the West, is cen-
tral to the contemporary global tensions that, in many cases, reject the 
West and at the same time demand Western presence in all resolutions 
of conflicts, ethnic and gender antagonisms, and geographic disputes, in-
cluding demands for aid, technical and educational input, and even sup-
port for different religious groups. Based on Western requirements for 
tolerance of others, respect for their civilizations and cultures indeed re-
quests not to impose “Western values” on the rest of the world, we have to 
decide what such an imposition would mean, and whether there is a way 
of not imposing and yet of being able to participate positively in the lives 
of members of other civilizations. This is a sensitive domain and requires 
the most careful delimitation of what is European civilization and how it 
differs from others. The first task will be to delimit what is called Europe 
and its extended version, the West, what constitutes modern West with 
its two Enlightenments – Scientific and Political – and the ways modern 
West has become “globalized” on the basis of its own devised understand-
ing of reality, political society and attendant requirements. Correlatively, 
it will be necessary to delimit another type of civilization – Middle East – 
and its variants gaining recognition under the designation “fundamen-
talist”. The latter include Hindu fundamentalism, at times covering the 
actions of Buddhists (in Mayamar against Muslims) and even autocratic 
tendencies in Eastern Europe. It is of note that all such movements tend 
to suppress development as Western invasion, and yet they cannot thrive 
without Western technology in the areas of communication and even 
building “defenses” against the “great Satan” of the West. We shall address 
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the bases of modern Western technology and the problems of technologi-
cal transfer from one context into another. Yet, it is necessary to point 
out that the Lithuanian revolution against the Soviet Union and an escape 
from “scientific socialism” was a paradigmatic transformation, the latter 
was not total: the preeminence of technological mode of thinking is very 
much a part of the West, even if it seems to be more sophisticated, innova-
tive, premised on individual initiative and even free. Our close analyses of 
what Lithuania is facing in the new life world will address the role of bu-
reaucracy and technocracy as semi-independent “government” that poses 
a silent danger to democracy.
The West
We claim to be Europeans, but if asked what does that mean, we either 
falter or find a plethora of voices – indeed conflicting claims stemming 
from different regions of this continent and from some adjacent islands. 
There is the European Union, but some regions on European continent at 
times express dissatisfaction with the Union, although they wish to be Eu-
ropeans. The same seems to be the case with Great Britain. Thus, to decide 
what Europe’s role in the world is, we must first decide what Europe is. It 
is claimed today that for the first time in human affairs a group of humans 
declared what in essence is human: fallible, yet living in accordance with 
his/her own established laws, refusing to kneel before some king of kings, 
lord of lords, god of gods. Greek writers, such as Aeschilus, rejected the 
power of divinities and, thus, absolutist claims, since such claims, backed 
by divinities, make humans into play things of alien forces. The wisest 
woman in human “history”, Athene, demanded that while humans are 
fallible and temporally limited, they must decide how to live together in 
accord with their own rules. If they make mistakes, they will be responsi-
ble for them and will have to correct them. Let there be divinities, but do 
not let them determine human affairs. In principle, Europe and the West at 
the outset are secular. This was and still is the case of Prometheus. In terms 
of civilization, the Greeks demanded universal understanding not based 
on some divine dogma, but on Paidea, universal education, articulated 
well by Plato, where it is not a trust in conflicting divinities, but in logical 
reason that can decide what is good for fallible humans. 
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This suggests a revolutionary transformation: humans themselves 
must run the affairs of society. This appears in a direct human way in the 
myth of Prometheus, who rebels against Zeus’ edict that forbids fire to hu-
mans. The supreme authority, Zeus, in his anger denies humans the use 
of fire. Divine intervention initiates human suffering, if not tragedy. Pro-
metheus, moved by the unnecessary suffering of humans, steals fire from 
the gods and gives it to humans. Here, we have practical assistance, for 
which Prometheus does not ask anything. He does not wish to rule or to 
have others follow his way of life. He does not form a party or demands 
to be a judge on the court. There is no revenge present against anyone or 
obedience to some divine command. He simply regards Zeus’ law as unjust 
and, indeed, premised on one aspect of tragedy: revenge by Zeus against 
humans. What is interesting is that the Greeks accepted the action of such 
a rebel as a noble violation of bad or even unjust laws. Although, speaking 
formally, the act of Prometheus was “bad” or illegal, his personal nobil-
ity and his positive attitude and qualities outweigh his formally bad act. 
Prometheus could be regarded as practically rational and worldly “mate-
rialist”. His aim was to help others, but with this help he changes the no-
tion of justice. Even Zeus accepts this change by admitting that his edict 
prohibiting fire to humans was a bad law. The worldliness – secularism – 
of Prometheus appears in his personality, which is independent from any 
authority. He has his own views and is capable of planning his own future 
based on his own knowledge and choices. If he makes mistakes, he admits 
them and corrects them. After all, Prometheus had decided to support Zeus 
in the battle against the Titans, but after the battle he recognized that Zeus 
had become a tyrant. Thus, he decides to correct his mistake by rebelling 
against Zeus’ laws, simply because he decides that such laws are practically 
unjust. Here, the highest authority is negated as unacceptable in principle 
without any question concerning one’s own benefits. Humanity here is in 
charge of its own affairs and demands that gods no longer intervene. 
In Promethean mythology, Zeus is the highest cultural symbol of 
permanence – as authority. Prometheus, in turn, is a cultural symbol of 
action. As an initial supporter of Zeus, he reveals an awareness of per-
manence maintenance and enhancement. He wants to insure Zeus’ vic-
tory over the Titans and his permanent position as the ultimate authority. 
Yet, by becoming a rebel against Zeus’ bad law, he reveals an awareness, 
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which is a disruption of permanence. Such a disruption in the myth of Pro-
metheus reveals, in the final outcome, a very specific relationship between 
permanence and change: the highest symbol of permanence – Zeus – is 
compelled to agree with Prometheus and, thus, to change his absolutist 
and arbitrary position. In this sense, permanence can be open to the re-
quirements of change. This means that this civilization opens a possibility 
to challenge any authority, law, to interrogate them sensibly and, thus, to 
change them. In other words, there emerges a dialogical relationship be-
tween permanence and change. Given this composition of awareness, clas-
sical Greek understanding of mythical figures could not escape democracy 
and philosophy. Every position, tradition, even the thinking of the highest 
figures, can be interrogated openly and reasonably, can be investigated, 
analyzed and requested to justify themselves in a full light of public and 
poly-logical debate or in a public court. If a given position, and even an 
accepted tradition, cannot be justified by reason and by the well-being of 
humans, then they can be openly rejected. This is the reason that classical 
Greece comprised an arena of intellectual tension among multiple posi-
tions, views, all calling for an open public, in whose context such a tension 
could be maintained. This open public space comprises a cultural symbol 
of permanence that tolerated and enhanced all creative flux: permanence 
as maintenance and enhancement of flux. This composition of awareness 
comprises the ground of every person’s rationality and responsibility. It 
also founds the modern Western democratic understanding, although ar-
ticulated by different symbolic language. Modern revolutions were prem-
ised on the notion that autocracies, monarchies and theocracies, the divine 
rights of kings and the infallible rulers were in fact ruling arbitrarily. Their 
permanence had to be challenged – as did Prometheus – and replaced by 
institutions that allowed and promoted openness and change. These revo-
lutions returned Europe to its essence. 
More recent and contemporary Western intellectuals, following Ath-
ens and its subsequent result, the Enlightenment, condemned all dogmatic 
ideologies, all autocratic civilizations, including fascism and communism, 
as unfit for Western mode of life and, indeed, unfit for any human life. 
Thus communism and fascism must be seen as some sort of virus to be 
expunged as alien to European spirit. From the very inception, Occident 
is rational, even scientific, and thus, reason is a base of Western civiliza-
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tion and historical life. Such an understanding is not restricted to Europe, 
although the latter is a cradle and continuation of reason – philosophy 
as a universal project. In brief, Europe, West, Abendland, Occident is a 
site, where human essence, with its universal requirements, is maintained. 
Thus, Europe is identical with philosophy and all of its requirements: 
universality, reason, direct and accessible experience, world, autonomy, 
rights, duties and responsibility. Obviously, these concepts became global 
in that they formed a challenge to others and the others are demanding 
to be Western – and the latter is no longer local, but a universal idea. But 
the latter is not delimited by any specific parameters or categories; to the 
contrary, Europe is strange and does not recognize boundaries. Europe-
an and Western self-recognition has a form of identity requiring critical 
self-reflection, re-creation, reworking, always anew, every year, every day. 
Should this flux be an indication of what is Europe, what is Occident?
No doubt that the seers, shaman’s and high priests, holy men of other 
civilizations, have justifiably accused Europe and the West of engaging 
in terrible imperialism, colonialism, exploitation, arrogance, slavery and 
numerous other misdeeds. Indeed, Westerners bought and sold people, 
bought the Africans, but the same Westerners condemned such actions, 
and slavery universal evil, universally unacceptable, and only the West de-
mands such profound self-reflection. Yet, no one speaks of the Muslims, 
Arabs, African tribes, who captured and sold people into slavery. It is at 
times embarrassing how the Westerners still accuse themselves of all the 
past misdeeds and how they wish to atone for them with vast aid, gener-
ous support for the “downtrodden”, even if the latter are squashed by their 
own chiefs, leaders and self-appointed autocrats. What is noticeable, while 
visiting numerous nations and tribes around the globe, wherever there are 
oppressions, discriminations, depravations, whether originating with lo-
cal governments, tribal battles, cultic murders, there is always a complaint 
that “no one knows about our plight, and no one pays attention to our 
situation”. But this complaint is not addressed to China, Japan, India, Bra-
zil, but to the West. Moreover, the oppressed do not strive to be anywhere 
else, but in the West. Thus, despite all the accusations, the accusers them-
selves want to be recognized and to live in the West. On the one hand, the 
West is condemned, accused and called upon to accept responsibility for 
previous generations, and on the other hand, the West is asked to defend 
the rights, interests, cultures, cults, minorities and even lives of the “oth-
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ers”. Thus, the West, while appearing in possession of identity, always re-
mains open and undefined – even the search for identity of various major 
cults or minor cultures – is Western.
Western universalism ranges through various layers of awareness 
without any having supremacy. Let us begin with care, since hasty pro-
nouncements might lead to confusion. In accordance with Classical West-
ern thinking, universality is premised on open public domain, requiring 
of every citizen to participate in public affairs without introducing private 
wants, desires and prejudices – since only such participation guarantees a 
free discussion, not determined by causes. In this sense, public decisions 
are autonomous and autonomy means that every citizen is equal, regard-
less of social position: equality results from autonomy. All rules are de-
rived from rational dialogue among autonomous, responsible and equal 
persons. It is also important to note that such rules might be partially mis-
taken and, hence, it is the duty of responsible citizens to correct them – 
equally through public dialogue. This state of affairs can be stated as an 
unconditional human responsibility for decisions, their enactment and a 
duty to correct mistakes. What is to be excluded are prohibitions to chal-
lenge any dogma, creed, any absolutist claim, any self-appointed leader 
and, indeed, question oneself. As Socrates, the major force in establishing 
open public dialogue, would say: I have no knowledge, even of myself.
Paradigmatic Transformation
A shock wave across the world – Soviet Union is collapsing, its grand 
“explanation” of all events, human and cosmic no longer holds, and the 
culprit of this collapse, Lithuania. A group of persons, mostly artists, poets, 
philosophers, said “we are tired of being afraid” and declared that hence to 
fore we are autonomous, equal, with our dignity, honor, honesty and self-
respect are the principles directing our actions. It is a Socratic moment, 
enacted in Paris, Philadelphia and now in Vilnius, too. We must under-
stand the radicalness of this stance: the entire autocratic empire, which de-
manded our servitude, our compliance with rules from above, an empire 
that told us what and when to eat, how to think, an empire that supplied us 
with modicum of commodities and “protection” is no longer acceptable. 
Here we stand, naked and powerless, without appeals to any authority, any 
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scientific explanations, any dogma or ideology, without any prospects of 
better tomorrow, armed only with an awareness that it is we, as equals and 
autonomous, must create a political society from our limited and fallible 
understanding, from our own absolute self-worth and the worth of others. 
We reject all the values that lent us our functional positions in autocratic 
empire and we do not seek any positions for ourselves: all we want is ours 
and the peoples of the entire Soviet Union to say “here we stand – we can-
not do otherwise”. This is the paradigm shift: from autocracy to political 
society. By now, this shift ought to be obvious from our previous chapters, 
delimiting Western modern world and its split into two histories: Political 
and Scientific Enlightenments and the tension between them. The revolu-
tion in Lithuania was an enactment of self-worth in the form of will to 
equality and correlatively, autonomy. And thus, there is a continuation of 
the Political Enlightenment, comprising the entire Western philosophical 
tradition. Lithuanian revolution was, in principle, democratic; it abolished 
an autocratic society and opened itself to Europe as something strange, 
something that imposed unknown demands: not only all the rights, but 
also the burden of responsibility for actions and for the very subsistence 
independent from any guarantees by the state; the state itself became the 
matter for the public’s decision. But the shock had another side that was 
a continuation of the defeated autocracy: all the unrealized promises of 
the Scientific Enlightenment – technology or more basically technocracy.
The failures of the Soviet autocratic system, including its theoretical 
inadequacies, left open the other aspect of the Enlightenment, which was 
the political. While suppressed, the latter was constantly present in the 
background as a criterion for the measure of “dialectical progress” toward 
the utopian society. That such a society was not yet achieved was made evi-
dent by the presence of the State and its vast means of owning everything, 
including resources, production and the producers. According to classical 
Marxism, state is a sign that there is a ruling class and the working class, 
such that the ruling class establishes a state as means of oppression of the 
working class. In a communist society, state will be irrelevant and will 
disappear, since there will not be any classes. The Soviet Union was the 
opposite of communist society. Thus, the question must be asked: what 
is the paradigmatic shift from the Soviet State to the Western State? Can 
we speak of a radical break with autocracy and an establishment of de-
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mocracy? If not, can we speak of a totally new paradigm? In this chapter, 
we shall have to be most prudent to delimit precisely what is continuous 
and what is novel in Lithuania and indeed what is still to be done if we are 
to speak of Western democracy in principle. The meaning of “principle” 
is equivalent to the classical Greek arche in the sense, that any effort to 
explain it by something else will necessarily involve such principle or by 
any proposal to abolish it will require its presence. Given this context, we 
shall have to demonstrate what comprises a political state as democratic, 
in contrast to the current state of affairs. If there is going to be a critique of 
such affairs, it will not be based on some interests or even ideology, but on 
the “essence” of political society or democracy. 
Not a shadow of doubt can be offered concerning the daring move-
ment by Lithuanians, with Sajudis at its forefront that it was in principle 
democratic. It was a moment, equivalent to other moments and places 
in Western history, where a declaration was presented by people that re-
jected a rule of human over human, of oppression of anyone by anyone, 
of refusing to be subservient to any autocracy, authority or dogma. It was 
a proclamation, similar to those in ancient Athens of Socrates, in Paris, 
in Philadelphia, where a group of persons told an empire that it could no 
longer rule, despite its power, and so it was in Lithuania. Here we stand, 
without any backing by power, without any laws, since the only laws we 
had were those imposed by autocratic masters, and hence, we start as if 
from nothing. If there shall be laws, we shall make them, if there will be 
education, we shall create it, if there shall be economy, we shall decide 
its shape. No highest authority, no clairvoyant shamans, no unconscious 
forces or power interests will decide the fate of our nation: we shall begin 
from the beginning. We are autonomous and equal and are creating a po-
litical society for its own sake, for the very autonomy and equality, which 
will not be distinguished from the shape of the new and very old basis of 
Western civilization. If we create this political society, it will have to be for 
everyone without exception. This very beginning does not guarantee our 
future, because we do not know what future forebodes; after all, we cannot 
accept blindly the pronouncements of the high priests of sciences – we 
lived under such high priests and suffered. In brief, we cannot offer our 
citizens and ourselves rewards and prizes, and indeed we do not expect to 
be rewarded by high positions. If there shall be such positions, they will be 
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rewarded by the public not to make us powerful, but to serve as responsi-
ble citizens under the same laws that the citizens will decide. Let us unfold 
this founding of the political society with all its rights and responsibilities, 
demands and burdens. 
Having won the Cold War, the West stepped in to extend its ideol-
ogy – “free market” – by offering it as a shock treatment for immediate 
transformation and economic growth, and, as is done in the West, equated 
it with democracy. We must be cognizant of the free market or capitalist 
ideology not as it is present in some images and propaganda, but as it is 
in its essence: the reason for living, acting, dreaming, relating is money. 
The only law is anything is permitted if it results in profit. If capitalist 
society can be called a society, then it is simple: war of all against all and 
by any means. No need to proclaim some romantic notion that this is not 
human, not civilized, not democratic; the latter, for capitalism is either 
inconvenience or to be bought. Resultantly, we shall have to distinguish 
democracy from capitalism, communism, and all other sorts of “explana-
tions”. It is most interesting that in the United States, there are still fierce 
groups and their subservient cadres that, despite the open case that the 
markets – bereft of regulations – self destructed, and yet, such groups still 
insist that markets are the solution. The left ideologues claim to be armed 
with better tools: they know that all problems can be solved by establish-
ing “better conditions” that will cause better results. In brief, throw money 
at a problem and – voila. And nothing happens, because something more 
important is missing. Today, both sides are identical to the former Soviet 
Union, except that we have two unyielding ideologies and they had one. 
But what is the difference, if neither is democratic, if either assumes an 
absolute stance and does not realize that democracy does not recognize 
absolutes and calls for public forum, public debate and the responsibil-
ity of the elected public servants to be accountable to their “bosses” – the 
citizens. While joining the West, Lithuanians must be made aware of the 
dangers of absolute positions and, thus, a lack of dialogue between con-
testing claims. An example might be offered from contemporary United 
States as pointed out by dramatically conservative publications, such as 
The Economist concerning the “missing middle: the woeful gap in Ameri-
ca’s politics”. The point is that we are not inventing this gap; we are merely 
wondering how it is filled to make the public gullible. A couple of decades 
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ago, there was a rhetorical movement called “contract with America”, of-
fering term limits to congressmen, and the public fell for this ploy. Af-
ter they all got elected, term limits went into oblivion, and the leaders of 
the “contract” stayed on, despite their numerous hypocritical actions and 
contradictory statements. But we must also look at the ultimate source of 
responsibility: the public. Those, who still participate minimally and vote, 
do so on the basis of “me journalism” in the sense, that each person reads 
and is in contact with “news” that confirms the unquestioned prejudices 
one holds. The grand technological window of opportunity – the internet 
– to be open to the whole world – became a window to be in contact with 
only those, who hold the same prejudices. While the Political Enlighten-
ment has become irrelevant, the Scientific Enlightenment ended up at the 
service of irrationalisms, such as blind and unconscious desires, biological 
survival, genetically caused “morality” and the “fallen state of humanity”. 
We shall not blame some system, some unknown and/or imperceptible 
forces, some conspiracies by “ruling elites” and some common denomina-
tor, such as the economy. What then is at issue? 
The distinction between the political and the socialprivate shows that 
human autonomy requires a political community, where the individual’s 
autonomy and humanity can be guaranteed by the free establishment of 
and responsible adherence to laws. Conversely, public and free enactment 
of laws is, equally, essential to a political community. This framework al-
lows for the discussion of all purposes. Depending on temporary require-
ments, one may establish other institutions, such as legislative, adminis-
trative and judicial, yet they too have the clear task of assuring that in the 
final analysis the autonomous being remains the undisputed arbiter of all 
rules. There is a hidden condition of this guarantee: in the public arena, 
all social and economic differences are disregarded, as everyone enters the 
public domain with equal rights and duties. The most important point 
of political society is the primacy of the public over the private, and that 
includes economy. It must be pointed out that what is to be private, in-
cluding property, was founded and is continuously being founded on the 
political decisions that determine the line between the social-private and 
the public. There were social customs that allowed the beating of women 
and children, but the publically adjudicated laws drew a line, which made 
such beatings a legal concern of the public and the private practice had to 
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be abandoned. The same thing holds for economy – in principle. In this 
sense, we can speak of political economy, i.e. that the public adjudicates 
the reach and the limit of economic activity; otherwise, as noted above, the 
market will function in accordance with its essence: war of all against all, 
and no laws are needed.
We must understand that political dialogue as public is not simply 
about “politics”. As was argued above, the political is the public domain of 
autonomous and equal persons. Accordingly, political dialogue pertains to 
concerns that are significant to the public. Such an understanding excludes 
all informal arguments and the psychologization of issues. The term “psy-
chologization” covers emotional appeals as well as rhetorical exhortations 
related to the use of images, rituals and slogans. This modus operandi is not 
designed to treat the individual as autonomous and rational, but as sub-
ject to manipulations and irrational outbursts. In effect, public issues are 
obfuscated. Soliciting such reactions is a mode of modern, but not classi-
cal, rhetoric. In the latter, one finds a detached reasonableness and a clear 
discursive practice founded on rules, while in the former, disconnected and 
psychologically over laden speech that is designed to make a direct impact is 
dominant and, thus, the autonomous political process is subverted.
If publicly appointed figures or those, running for public office, engage 
in this level of rhetorical obfuscations, they disqualify themselves from pub-
lic service. This claim carries no moralistic undertones; it simply follows 
from the principle that the political is primarily public and relates to pro-
posals for open discussions about public matters. No such justification as 
state secrets, known only to the leaders, can be used to either prevent public 
debate or to avoid addressing important public concerns. Presumed by this 
practice is that only the officials are in a position to decide what is good for 
everyone. This is known as paternalism and is modeled on the mistaken 
view of the political state as a family. Sure, there are temptations not to be-
come embroiled in politics and to leave these activities to the government. 
In this case, the citizen has duties, but surrenders its rights. This tendency 
may appear even in a representative democracy, if the representatives begin 
to assume that all public problems can be resolved by the wisdom of the 
leaders. This ideology is obvious in the case of a charismatic representative’s 
appeal to the public. Such an appeal allows an official to pursue undebated 
his or her personal dogma, thus, leading to disastrous results – so obvious 
from the popular “leadership” of recent years.
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And now, let’s consider the sticking point that is in the background 
of all the confrontations: free market. Once again, let us be clear about the 
subject matter: free market as “private enterprise”. We already noted that 
the line between public and private is established by the public; otherwise, 
there would not even be a difference between them and Mr. Carnegie, Mr. 
Rockefeller, Maxima and others, with their hired armies, would own any 
country. Fortunately, the Lithuanian revolution was not leaving Soviet au-
tocracy for private property and free market: the revolution was an entirely 
different “project”: we shall forfeit our wealth, lives and sacred honor not 
for money, some divinity or social status, but for autonomy and equality, 
honor and dignity. In this context, any private interest, coming from soci-
ety, having any public impact, will become a matter of public debate and 
adjudication, whether such interest is a large enterprise, wishing to use 
public water system or roadways or a person’s right of way across his back 
yard – all are subject to the political domain. Free enterprise becomes free, 
precisely when it becomes adjudicated rationally, with full consideration 
not only for the interests of the proposing agency, but also for the inter-
ests of the public and all other segments of private society. The important 
aspect of this adjudication, if it is done in representative democracy, is 
that those public servants, who are going to debate such interests, should 
discount their private interests, their possible gains and judge each case 
on its own merits. This cannot be regarded as government “interference” 
in private business, since the business demands public access and per-
haps even an impact on general social well-being, whether through pol-
lution, discarding public safety, including the safety of employees and an 
inadequate support for public institutions, such as education. We tend to 
overlook the fact that public education, funded by citizens, provides a free 
benefit to enterprises – after all, they do not have to bear the total burden 
of providing skills for their employees; the skills are funded by the public.
Political Technocracy
Now, in political society, the public has the right and the duty to be 
informed. Given the emergence of technology in the domains of produc-
tion, research, control, efficient power, their complex interrelationships, 
their attendant legal issues, there emerges a need for persons, who are ca-
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pable of managing such complex information and processes. Such con-
ceptions and relationships are premised on material, psychological and 
economic interests. Thus, the issue of autonomous decisionmaking by the 
public begins to be changed into an interestladen portrayal of knowledge. 
The latter one results in a legitimation crisis. Given that the underlying 
structure of technocracy has become dominant in the critical as well as 
the general systems schools, this mode of order should be delimited. Espe-
cially important is the role of technology in democratic institutions. After 
declaration of autonomy, Lithuania was flooded by latest Western innova-
tions and promises of almost “miraculous” possibilities, unlimited com-
modities, latest styles in music, dress, manners, in short, as Prof. Arvydas 
Sliogeris said, “Lithuania found itself between a plow and a super com-
puter”. The latter is simply a more sophisticated symbol and continuation 
of the former Soviet technocracy: all problems will be solved by specialists 
and experts.
What is known as modernity, inclusive of the Political as well as the 
Scientific Enlightenments, is premised on the human ability to reshape the 
environment to suit human needs and designs. This alteration requires the 
exclusion of knowledge based on experience, therefore, giving primacy to 
quantitatively constructed models that are imposed on a purely homo-
geneous “matter”. This imposition is not based merely on mathematical 
thinking; it requires human physical and practical intervention to shape 
the raw materials into products. Thus, a view emerges that only experts 
can manage the specific domains, ranging from changes in production to 
behavioral controls. Such experts assume not only a technical model of 
the world, but have the ability and power to change the material processes 
(including humans) in the domains of their expertise in accordance with 
new discoveries. Here, the very principles of operation in all areas are con-
trol, manipulation and power. Any event can be used for setting up the 
conditions to obtain a desired result if these conditions are controlled by 
experts. One should be careful to note that the experts are not interested 
in reality, but in how to manipulate variables to obtain a desired result, 
whether the result is a new product on the market or cloning.
Given this setting, the dangers to freedom in democracy are of two 
kinds. The first was already noted by Plato, where democracy might yield 
tyranny, the second is more difficult to decipher, simply because it does 
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not seem to be a threat and appears to function within democratically 
guaranteed rights. It spreads without offering any visible opposition to 
the citizen. There are various modes of this danger, including centraliza-
tion. We can speak of two modes of centralization: first mode is concerned 
mainly with national questions, such as national laws and international 
relationships. The second type would be dealing with localized concerns 
of regions, provinces, counties. If the first is located in one place, we can 
speak of a centralized government; if the concerns of the second type are 
also centralized, then we can speak of a central administration. Obviously, 
in the modern age no nation can survive without a central government. It 
is an entirely different matter with administrative centralism and its most 
dangerous form: the unification of centralized government with a central-
ized administration. In this case, the government obtains a direct means 
to exercise power without any diffusion through any mediation. Not only 
does it concentrate power, but because of its “remoteness” from local con-
cerns, it continuously weakens the political sense of the citizen all the way 
toward the dissolution of political will. This does not occur through an ex-
ercise of a direct power; rather, the increasing centralized administration 
removes the citizen from public participation and leads to an abdication of 
political will through habit of non-participation. There appears a specific 
logic in this process. The citizen is isolated, individuated, in fact made to 
conceive of himself as completely independent and, in turn, summed into 
a mass, a non-descript quantity to be accessed by generalized slogans. 
Such a “powerless” administrative despotism is called bureaucracy and 
may appear as modern phenomenon in the guise of administrative technoc-
racy, arranged in a hierarchy of expert positions. What is this phenomenon? 
Since the appearance of modern complexities, the state cannot function 
without a staff of office holders. Such a staff is a precursor of bureaucracy. 
But they are not identical; bureaucracy is a form of independent rulership 
with its own invented norms and procedures. In its purest form, bureaucracy 
appeared in colonial rule toward the end of the nineteenth century, e.g., the 
French regime des descrets in Algiers or British governorships in India. In this 
form, administration replaces government, orders and rules replace laws, 
and, in brief, an anonymous mechanism of an administrative office replaces 
open public decisions. In this sense, it is a form of rulership with a complete 
lack of freedom and justice. This bureaucratic domination can be mildened 
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and restricted by a judicial process. The judicial process, in many cases, pro-
vides formal rules or general frameworks, while the concrete content is dealt 
with by a bureaucracy, which implements and, hence, directly supervises of-
ficial policies. Here, the public process, dealing openly with laws and rules, is 
translated into a bureaucratic power with its own anonymity of procedures 
and interpretations of the legal framework. Hence, irrespective of the mod-
ern form of government, there appear degrees of administrative despotism. 
This becomes more so in a technological age. The technocrats charged with 
the implementation of legal procedures in specific domains not only impose 
their interpretation of such procedures, but are in a position to construct the 
concrete means, which will pervade the natural and social environments in a 
visible and material form. The basic form of this domination is the Scientific 
Enlightenment and, thus, comprises the continuation of Soviet paradigm 
that everything must be constructed in accordance with “science” and scien-
tific experts – without public interference. A more serious issue appears with 
the coupling of technocracy with “free market” such that the latter is not only 
productive of the latest “technologies”, but is in a position to demand special 
privileges in the public domain. It promotes “what is good for the public” 
and claims that its products (whether electronics, entertainment, chemis-
try, bio-chemistry, nutrition, attire, home implements and countless oth-
ers) need not be adjudicated by the public. Technical experts will decide the 
safety of such products, while the experts are also researchers funded by the 
market. The result is an autocracy of market/technocracy. Lithuania is cur-
rently in between this sort of autocracy and the Political Enlightenment. As 
in the Soviet Union, so in Lithuania autocracy has no interest in freedom.
Within this context, there appears another danger to freedom in a 
democratic polis, and indeed a danger, which coincides with the very basis 
of democracy: individualism. While of quite recent coinage, the term indi-
vidualism is ambiguous. Positively, it designates the independence, the en-
ergy, originality of the singular, while negatively, and in modern age more 
prevalently, it signifies selfishness, greed, carelessness toward others and 
the surroundings. Obviously, selfishness as a human phenomenon need 
not be negative; it becomes negative, when it is associated with modern in-
dividualism. Selfishness means that the person relates everything to him-
self and seeks to maintain advantages against others. Left purely to itself, 
it does not recognize any other rationality. The selfish person regards his 
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advantages as the most obvious and natural. Individualism is a reflective 
concern with oneself, leading toward isolation and distance from public 
and limited relationships with those having similar concerns in daily life: 
family, friends, business. Selfishness might in some sense be regarded as 
a phenomenon of ethics, while individualism relates to the issues of polis 
and, thus, is of greater concern than the more easily manageable selfish-
ness. Individualism might leave in-tact the social virtues and the concerns 
for one’s circle and its interests, but it slowly begins to neglect the political 
virtues, those of self-worth, requiring participation in the public arena. 
This leads toward the neglect of the common interests and, finally, to pure 
selfishness. This aspect is very prevalent within the new paradigm pervad-
ing contemporary Lithuania. 
While individualism has various trends, which have comprised its 
final shape, for the present we shall explore one such trend and its conse-
quences; subsequently, we shall concern ourselves with other trends and 
their consequences. The trend under consideration stems from equality 
with a focused freedom of each individual, irrespective of social descent, 
to “make his own way”, to shape his own destiny, owing nothing to any-
one, having no masters, and placing himself in a position of being a master 
of himself and his survey. Some become examples of having made their 
own way and, indeed, “on their own”, irrespective of odds and opposi-
tions. This is to say, they have shown that man can make and live his life 
independently of others, withdraw into “his own business” and leave the 
business of others to their own devises. This withdrawal into the domain 
of material interests, into “my business is none of your business, and your 
business is none of mine”, leaves the public arena not only unattended, but 
such an arena begins to be regarded as irrelevant if it does not touch “my 
direct material interests”. The concerned and frugal individuals become 
unconcerned citizens, who become subject to political events, against 
which they have become helpless. As we shall see, such “helplessness” 
leads such individuals to intervene in the public domain in order to force 
it to serve the private needs of these individuals. 
Individualism can assume a shape, which is not adequately describ-
able by this term. An analysis of such a shape will lead us to a closer cog-
nizance of the dangers to freedom in democracy. The release of each indi-
vidual from any social position which once determined rights and duties 
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sets each to seek his own success and fortune. Thus, in the age of equality, 
the individual finds too troublesome to tear himself away from his pri-
vate interests. The public interests are left to the all-pervasive state and 
the representatives. At the same time, the unbridled striving for success, 
specifically in the material sphere, also elicits fears of external threats, in-
securities and disturbances, which tend to reduce the political sphere to 
public “peace and security”. There appears a willingness to give the public 
powers new rights, as long as the powers claim to be able to promote secu-
rity and order. It is well known that despotism has always remained true 
to one rule. It isolated the citizens from one another by reducing them to 
their social-private sphere and claimed that there is no need for citizen 
participation in the affairs of the public. The public sphere is to be run 
by the “leaders and experts”. Those citizens, who would want to organize 
and claim a right for public participation and demand public account-
ability, are accused of being “disturbers of peace” and “disruptors of law 
and order”. The peaceful and good citizens, those, who “mind their own 
business” and stay out of the public domain, are to be warned against such 
disruptors and, indeed, even organized to aid the “authorities” in silencing 
such disruptors. The despotism guarantees security and protection to all 
citizens of good will and law and order. In the age of democracy, despot-
ism assumes an extended form: the public arena, which is centralized not 
only governmentally, but also administratively and technocratically, tends 
to expand its power by guaranteeing that the efforts of these powers will 
lead to success and happiness of the citizens. This promise equally tells the 
citizen that he ought to support the administrative rule without citizen’s 
participation. 
There emerges a foreground with an apparent public support, in 
which, nonetheless, the public has neither a voice nor participation. The 
background power and domination do not manifest itself; anytime that 
anyone would attempt to pierce the foreground appearance he would be 
accused of “disturbance” not only by the administrative powers, but also 
by the respectful citizens, of threatening the social fabric with “anarchy”. 
Such a threat is confusion between the political and the social. It is clear 
that a serious threat of anarchy appears only at specific junctures. First, 
when people are released from a highly and hierarchically structured sys-
tem and have not yet acquired the habits of democratic polis of self-rule, 
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of being law-givers, and second, when some persons are mistaken about 
democratic polis and confuse the self-imposed laws, which regulate free-
dom from the vantage point of autonomous freedom of each person, with 
a rule by power, with unfreedom. The latter forget that the laws of freedom 
stem from the principle of a polis, in which freedom rules and freely limits 
itself by the principle of equality of all citizens. Given this conception of 
democratic polis, anarchy is the least threat. The threat is rather an envis-
agement of a centralized government and the all-pervasive administrative 
bureaucracy, which does not want the participation of the citizen in the 
public arena. Anarchy is used as a ploy to threaten the population with 
disorder if the population enters into the public arena and becomes dis-
ruptive, i.e. a theatre, which is used to demand that the administrative bu-
reaucracy should be permitted to handle the public domain without public 
interference. In principle, anarchy is not at all equitable with autonomous 
freedom, but with an absolute position demanding societies conformity to 
absolute rules. It is basically metaphysics of the will that posits an absolute 
ideology, which may appear in the guises of theology, scientific determin-
ism and elitist claims to knowledge how to construct a utopian society. 
Such a position sees all natural and social events as inadequate and to be 
transformed, violated, in order to establish total control. Anarchistic con-
sciousness is a final outcome of the metaphysics of will in the form of an 
all-encompassing ideology that was the life world of the Soviet Union. .
Obviously, any threat of anarchy cannot be taken seriously in face 
of the current centralized governmental and administrative powers, pos-
sessing the police, the military, technology of monitoring every move and 
conversation of anyone and anywhere and the mass-media means to form 
public opinion. Indeed, because of this power to form public opinion, the 
centralized powers can constantly point to anarchy as a threat to “well 
ordered”” private-social domain, in which a person can seek his aims in 
peace. This threat reduces the citizen to private concerns and asks him to 
leave the public domain in the hands of the powers, which promise pro-
tection. In this sense, the genuine danger to democracy, the weakening 
and the exclusion of public participation in the polis, is covered over. Cor-
relatively, the citizenry, bent on security and order in their private sphere, 
would accept any oppression of those, who demand participation in the 
public arena, specifically in a society, in which economic gain is the sole 
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concern of human striving and purpose. The citizenry itself falls for this 
ploy and turns against the polis, i.e. permits the polis to be degraded into a 
despotic power-use and manipulation of events and public opinion for the 
sake of private-social gains. This is a modern form of the degradation of 
political ethos. One is propelled toward cynicism with respect to all public 
institutions. More fundamental reasons for this degradation will be dis-
cussed subsequently.
There is a degradation of political ethos, when two groups, the one 
more numerous demands order and security at any price in face of fear 
of freedom, and the other, which proclaims conservative morality and, 
hence, has already given up freedom, join forces in democracy. This hap-
pens de facto, even when de jure the formal democratic institutions re-
main. In summary, the dangers to freedom in a polis are a conjunction of 
mutually reinforcing factors. There is the governmental and administra-
tive centralization and, thus, an emergence of anonymous bureaucratic 
power, possessing mass means of control and directing the public opinion 
toward the limits of a private sphere and concerns. There is the trend to-
ward the promise to handle the public domain without the participation 
of the citizenry, enhanced by the hints at all sorts of “enemies”, which are 
threatening the security of private pursuits by anarchy and lawlessness. 
All these means are a way of covering over the despotism of centralized 
power. In the private sphere, everyone is still guaranteed equality, but in 
the public sphere, freedom is gone and inequality rules. In this sense, free-
dom is the most endangered factor and calls for the citizen to look away 
from his private social position and to enter the sphere of public, in which 
he is equal to all and free.
Throughout our discussion, we made a distinction between the 
“social-private” domain of concerns and the polis, the domain of public 
and freedom. What is characteristic of the private-social domain in the 
democratic age of equality is the preoccupation with material well-being. 
Whence this general concern? Why does it appear so prominently in the 
age of equality and political freedom? Subsequent discussions will develop 
various ontological controversies, while at present we shall deal with the 
“human” factor. What would be the object, to which the human would be 
most attracted or attached? Not an object, which is secure and guaranteed, 
but the one, which is desired and even when acquired, is not securely pos-
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sessed. The human is, thus, constantly concerned with an object, which is 
desired and needed and yet exposed to a constant threat of loss. To grasp 
the significance of this state of affairs, we must consider the background, 
from which democratic equality emerged: feudalism. In feudalism, there 
were two major social positions, the aristocrat and the peasant. The aristo-
crat possessed wealth by birth right; hence, material well-being was not an 
object of concern. It was deemed natural. There was no need to strive for 
possession and its security, since there was no fear of loss of one’s natu-
ral birth right. The peasant, on the other hand, was materially poor and, 
because of his origins, could not hope to be rich or to acquire material 
wealth. In this sense, material wealth could not be an object of desire, for 
which one could strive. Desire and striving can emerge sensibly, where 
there is hope of possible attainment and fulfillment. For the aristocrat, 
wealth was never a question of possibility; it was a given actuality. For the 
peasant, wealth was also not a question of possibility, since there was no 
glimmer of hope to fulfill such a possibility. God himself told the peasant 
that he must be poor.
For Lithuanian population under Soviet autocracy, the situation 
was similar. The elite did not need to be concerned about wealth, since 
it owned the entire society, including the “working class”, which did not 
possess anything and had no hope of possessing more than was allotted by 
the autocrats. Hence, no striving to be more or to have more was a pos-
sibility. If one wanted to become part of the autocratic elite priesthood, 
one had to go through a protracted rituals and training to demonstrate 
one’s own obedience and subservience to the prescribed dogma, the “sa-
cred doctrine”, learn the appropriate rhetoric and when and where for its 
recitation and only then be permitted to join the lower ranks of the “im-
mortals”. The change in this context can occur only when both classes are 
exposed to the possibilities of loss and gain, i.e., when the aristocrats are 
exposed to the loss of their possessions, and the lower class is exposed to 
the possibility of acquisition of wealth. Once the privileges are discarded 
by the decree of equality, once possibilities in every domain become open 
for everyone, the limits of what can be reached and attained no longer lie 
in one’s social position, but in one’s own wishes, talents, dedication and 
in becoming one’s own standard creator and bearer. But this is subtended 
by one condition: not being bound by any birth right and privilege, the 
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individual is no longer dependent upon and, in turn, can neither depend 
on nor ask for assistance from anyone; he is on his own to make his own 
way, shape his own destiny. No one will guarantee or secure his social 
position and material survival. Thus, he must live in an incessant striving 
to secure his own livelihood in competition with others and in face of a 
possible loss. There is another factor in Lithuanian revolution as a shift in 
paradigm toward the Political Enlightenment: the sudden emancipation 
and the entrance of all things Western were overwhelming. The novel-
ties, the abundant commodities, the offers to have “anything you want” 
appeared as if for the taking. The citizen’s senses were overpowered by 
the dazzle, the new noises, the glamour, the incredible difference from the 
drab Soviet life – all one had to do is acquire more money, strive for better 
paying position, go into any business to make money – and you will be 
happy. The ritual of privatization became the preoccupation of everyone, 
from the highest communist party officials to the street vendor. This was 
not just selfishness, but the very image of becoming Western.
This new, equal person after Lithuanian revolution has to be primar-
ily interested in his own private survival and well-being; he is dominated 
by a striving, which can never be fulfilled, a striving for security and well-
being, and in face of fear that at any moment he might lose his acquisi-
tions. Under these conditions, the entire social fabric becomes an arena of 
private striving for well-being, of a struggle of everyone against everyone. 
The elected public servants had the same interest: use the public office for 
personal gain, serve other private interests and enjoy sumptuous life. Such 
a personality is fearful of freedom, of disruption of what it has attained 
and is most eager to call for strong government, strong measures and even 
for a strong man to maintain law and order. Even the rich cannot escape 
this striving; having won their wealth through struggle, they have estab-
lished a mode of life, in which the acquisition of more and more is a sec-
ond nature. Indeed, the calculated striving to obtain more and more has 
become interpreted as a religious, moral duty, a god’s way, a sign of divine 
favor. Thus, Max Weber and, of course, in Lithuania, the new God – the 
market – entered prior to any considerations of its limits – political econ-
omy disappeared and pure economy took root. This is to say, the private, 
social arena entered as a primary factor, leading to a society, which, while 
formally democratic, de facto is a social system of powers contesting other 
powers. 
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This general attitude is not only accepted, but comprises an essential 
factor in public opinion. In democracy, there is domination by an open, 
public opinion that is difficult to locate. This domination is the source for 
the establishment of mass media in its various forms. The domination, 
of course, must be determined from the background of equality. With 
respect to public opinion, equality shows some major trends. It guards 
against the yoke of traditional habits, conceptions, family lines and to a 
certain extent nationalistic prejudgments. All calls for justification of one’s 
action are to be found in one’s own reasons and not in family line or some 
traditional moralities. In addition, knowledge of reality is acceptable only 
from one’s own experience and not from authority, and such knowledge 
is viable if it can be translated into praxis for success. Yet, what is most 
important in this context is suggested by a question, concerning Reforma-
tion and Enlightenment: how was it that Reformation closed itself within 
a domain of religious conceptions and, thus, freed reason for different 
tasks, and how is it that despite the possibility of application of Carte-
sian thought, Descartes limited it to the objects of science, and why is it 
that by the eighteenth century this mode of thought became so prevalent, 
leaving schools and entering the general fabric of society? In the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, the social and political conceptions could not 
accommodate the new mode of thought. This mode, which recognizes 
only human reason, could be accommodated only with the emergence of 
equality. This is the democratic mode of thought, and it is bound up with 
free rationality. Any efforts, up to date, to prevent democratic political in-
stitutions, go hand in hand with the degradation of the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment; any revolution for democratic institutions always takes 
recourse to the Enlightenment, since its mode of thought is completely 
democratic. While during the times of Kant, the Enlightenment, stressing 
the independence of the individual’s judgment, spread from a minority, it 
was not the elite-minority conception, appearing in the nineteenth cen-
tury that stressed “education: and was a product of bourgeoisie. The latter 
would be in principle opposed to the Enlightenment, since it posits an 
“educated elite” against the “spiritless masses”, claiming that the demo-
cratic revolution is the greatest threat to “cultural spirituality”.
As all societies, obviously the democratic society must also possess 
something common, i.e., human focus that would hold the society togeth-
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er; whether the focus is the Durkheimian structure or some mythological 
imagery, it is unimportant. What is important is to note what would hold 
together a modern democratic society. First of all, the disappearance of 
class rights by birth and the appearance of equality shifts matters in such 
a way that there is a lesser willingness to “stand out” and to take on lead-
ing positions. In turn, there appears a slow development of awareness that 
among equals the opinion of the majority is the best guide. In this sense, 
the public opinion begins to take over the role of dominating the indi-
vidual. This is not to be confused with the concept of authority. Authority 
excludes challenges to itself, but public opinion includes its own criticism. 
In a democratic polis, each individual is thrown back upon his own un-
derstanding, yet the social matters become the question of public opinion; 
after all, what is necessary for a common life should not be decided by one 
individual, but by a consensus of the majority. And precisely this context 
places the individual in an unavoidable twilight. If the individual com-
pares himself to others, he knows of his equality, but if he compares him-
self to the “public”, he senses his insignificance and powerlessness. Thus, 
the domination of public opinion is of a specific kind, a kind, which would 
be completely foreign in aristocratic, autocratic and even technocratic 
societies. The public opinion convinces not so much through argument, 
but is rather compelling without a distance. Unlike the aristocratic rule, 
where “the lords” are “the others”, in public opinion, the individual is “Mr. 
Public” and is intimately part of the opinion pool. And the latter offers a 
plethora of moralities, advises, social and economic conceptions, politi-
cal truths, etc. Reason is found in the majority and this strengthens the 
domination by public opinion. It should be understood that the principle 
of majority is not an explanatory ground for the domination of public 
opinion over the individual; the true ground is equality, and majority is 
its expression. This is the reason why the domination of public opinion is 
completely bound up with democracy. 
The equality of social members leads to two contrary aims: it opens 
ways of new life and thought, and the latter is enhanced as never before. 
Yet, this freedom of thought in democracy is also threatened by democ-
racy. With equality, everyone’s thought is equal and, hence, no individual 
and no group can proclaim that his/her thinking is somewhat superior. In 
this circuitous way, the individual’s contribution is forced into the open to 
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be judged by the public opinion and, indeed, either made into one among 
many opinions or interpreted along average lines. In this sense, the cen-
sorship for the freedom of thought has not vanished, but changed. With 
respect to freedom of thought, it must reject any tyranny, irrespective of 
its origin. Whether it is exercised in the name of aristocratic birth right 
and blood or egalitarianism, autocracy or some political party of peace 
and security, oppression remains the same to the individual. 
The modern, single party dictatorships, the autocracies, whether com-
munist or fascist, decided public opinion from central positions, party de-
crees and the dictatorial leader. But another domination of public opinion 
is through manipulation and shaping of consciousness. Such manipulation 
begins with the manipulation of information: as is well known, information 
has two senses. First, one receives a report about something in a way that 
one can form one’s opinion about it, and second, one receives information, 
which already contains an opinion and, thus, precludes a free formation of 
an opinion and judgment. In the last sense, we can speak of manipulation. 
But we should differentiate between two types of manipulation. First, the 
direct forming of consciousness through information by controlling the 
information mass media offers by using the latter as means of control by 
interest groups. This can be called an intentional manipulation. The con-
ceptions, which dominate the individual, here, are inseparable from the so-
cial structure and the main interests. This must not be confused with the 
simplistic notion that consciousness is a mirroring of some economic laws. 
This thesis is not only untenable, but dangerous. It abolishes any possibility 
of judging social relationships. It assumes that there is only one mirroring, 
while other conceptions can be deciphered as false consciousness and can 
be explained through “objective” interests. The only correct view belongs to 
the power holders. But it could also be the case that by the very fact of liv-
ing in a society one is intimately structured without any cognizance of this 
structuration. This is not to say that such structurations take place in some 
unconscious way, but are the very structures of thinking. They remain invis-
ible to consciousness, since the latter cannot extricate itself from them; they 
are the principles of consciousness itself. In this case, it would not be quite 
appropriate to speak of manipulation.
In democratic polis, the individual’s judgments and the public opin-
ion go hand in hand. This opens the door for some interest groups to make 
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the thought of the citizens into an object of influence in order to direct it 
toward the interests of the groups. This is a functional manipulation and is 
intended. Yet, it must be understood that such a manipulation is possible 
in principle only in a democratic polis. For example, in a feudalistic world, 
such as medieval or autocracy of Soviet type, there is no manipulation 
of public opinion, since there is one group that rules, and the rulership 
is embedded in social power structure, such that the “authorities” need 
not justify anything to anyone. Moreover, there is no public in a proper 
sense; there are only the others who are told – in case the rulers want to 
tell anything at all – what the rulers want to tell. Any public or individual 
judgment of the correctness or incorrectness of the pronouncements is of 
no consequence, i.e. it is irrelevant whether the “public opinion” was in-
fluenced or not. The ruled know their place by the simple virtue of initially 
imposed force and, subsequently, acquired habit of submission. Manipu-
lation appears through a democratic revolution, where factual relations 
of domination lose their legitimation, i.e., their force. Each is equal, and 
if anyone wants to have any power over the public, he must engage in a 
manipulation of opinion, but in such a way, that the function of manipula-
tion should be hidden. Lacking this, it would not be a manipulation, but 
a transparent effort of intended controls of the population. Being hidden 
and deliberately so, the manipulation of public opinion is difficult to un-
cover. Of course, while manipulation takes place through self-effacement 
in order to be effective, it cannot remain completely hidden. For its effec-
tivity, it requires various means, from selection of times for “information”, 
intonation, conceptual and stylistic means, the positions taken behind the 
information, the constant ideological message of the interests, the veiled 
threats aimed at the various anxieties of the citizens and enticements of 
various resentments. This is one of the paradigmatic changes from former 
autocracy, and the greatest danger is the entrance of private interests of 
the social domain into the public domain. For example, under the guise 
of “free speech”, there appear efforts to sell private interests and, indeed, 
to sell candidates for public service by use of rhetoric. Thus, one may ex-
tol the virtues of “free market” and suggest that the latter should become 
uncoupled from any “political” interference. To paraphrase an American 
rhetorical figure of speech, “The business of Lithuania is business”. This 
rhetorical ploy is never noticed as a way of political society to return to 
a society of clashing powers of interest and complete abolition of human 
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self-worth with its attendant will to equality and autonomy. We should be 
reminded that “free market” is an oxymoron.
It is important to note that any disturbances, concerned with free-
dom, are very healthy for the democratic polis. They disallow the en-
crustation of the aims and purposes of one group, or one generation, to 
dominate the future. There have been recent claims that the government 
is constantly with the people, because it follows the wishes of the “silent 
majority” or the “moral majority” or even “what the people really want”. 
These appeals were already noted by Tacitus, who pointed out that the 
“middle”, the majority, shows no will for the public matters and is con-
cerned solely with its private domain. This reduction of the majority to 
non-participation and then an appelation to its “silent voice” as a politi-
cal measure for public decisions is a ploy of despotism. It claims that any 
challenge to the current state of affairs is counter to the majority, which 
has not spoken. This despotic presumption summates all individuals into 
an amorphous mass of indistinct persons, none having a will, a voice or 
an interest of its own. Given this “insult”, the individual has to speak, and 
in democracy the voice can be had through the press and mass media. 
For democracy, the free press is an inextricable component. The press is 
a means, which the individual can use to become public and to involve 
the public in a debate of singular or common concerns. The free press is 
a democratic instrument of freedom. Without much discussion, the same 
could be said of an independent and impartial judiciary, specifically with 
respect to the protection of the individual against the imposition of either 
social or state domination. As it is well testified by modern history, the in-
dividual’s rights are always endangered; the availability of the judiciary to 
all citizens is coextensive with democratization and a guarantee against an 
assumption of rulership either by a social interest or a bureaucracy. Lack-
ing this protection, there might emerge a clamor by a social group, calling 
for the realization of its aims as “benefits” for the society, e.g., the econo-
mization of society either by the bourgeoisie or the collectivists, both hav-
ing the same format, which would demand the “temporary suspension” of 
the polis and its guarantees of equality and freedom. 
Such temporary suspensions are justified by various ideological ploys, 
such as “scientific necessity” or “historical necessity” of some presumed 
“laws”. The claim is then made that once the “necessities” have been ei-
ther fulfilled or abolished, equality and freedom will be either instituted 
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or restored. Meanwhile, the more efficient achievement of the social aims 
is best left to a socially preeminent elite, e.g., the “industrial captains”, the 
“party leadership”, the “scientific technocracy” and even the “religious 
leadership”. What we would like to maintain is that a surrender of even 
one slight freedom, the abolition of one individual’s rights, however min-
ute, is in principle an infringement on everyone’s rights. The conscious-
ness of rights is damaged, when this consciousness allows the violation of 
the rights of one individual. Perhaps, the greatest damage to democracy 
would stem from the state if the latter were not submitted to limitations, 
which could not be abridged irrespective of which group might attempt to 
assume and enforce its interests and social power over the entire public. 
The dangers of state and at the same time the means for deflecting these 
dangers stem from the very democratic revolution. On the one hand, the 
dangers can emerge very effortlessly through the self-exclusion of the in-
dividual from the public arena – don’t bother me with politics, I have my 
own troubles – leading to increasing domination of this arena by private 
interests either of the “politicians” or their private friends; on the other 
hand, the preservation of freedom is not an effortless non-participation, 
but, in fact, calls for a continuous awareness of events, continuous inter-
rogation of the state, in short, it requires knowledgeable participation. 
In this sense, freedom is not a given, but an effort of knowledge and ac-
tion. And this should not be a surprise; after all, democratic revolution is 
a product of praxis, a praxis, which concerns a will based on knowledge. 
If one simply accepts the side of the will and its projects to reconstruct 
the world – including the human – one may end up in an ideology that 
subjects knowledge to its purposes. In principle, ideology arises, when will 
supercedes knowledge and an attendant correlative ontology and offers a 
reconstruction of the world in accordance with invented rules. This is to 
say, the shift from the given to the willed is a shift from knowledge to the 
metaphysics of the will. This shift is the ground of ideology.
Interests and the Public Domain
The technological outlook extends equally into all domains, thereby, 
leading not only to the requirement that experts manage public affairs, 
but also to the demand that appointed officials be in a position to offer 
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solutions in meeting private wants. No doubt, private wants are a part of 
social life. Yet, once these needs are introduced into the public arena, they 
become a matter for public adjudication and do not justify imposing one 
group’s interests on everyone else. Actually, the introduction of an inter-
est into the public domain is tantamount to submitting this issue to public 
decision. No privilege can be granted to one interest over another without 
public consent. In this sense, even the sacred cow of private enterprise has 
to be adjudicated by the entire citizenry if this activity enters in any man-
ner into the public domain.
At issue here is the principle of equality based on the universalization 
of any rule. If individuals or groups demand that their interests should be 
given primacy over others, then they are inviting all persons to introduce 
their interests as equivalent and worthy of consideration. In this regard, 
the very notion of what is private turns out to be a matter of public debate. 
Barring such adjudication, there is a temptation to introduce one’s private 
interests into the public domain without subjecting these concerns to dis-
cussion. This practice tends not only to split the public arena into private 
spheres of influence, but also to reduce the function of public officials to 
managing diverse and, at times, opposing interests of various individu-
als or groups. This kind of reduction often culminates in the holders of 
public offices to begin to favor various interests. Groups or individuals, 
occupying social positions of power and influence, will tend to make their 
interests into public issues and exclude those of less favorably positioned 
members of society. In this case, the public domain ceases to be a dia-
logical institution for the maintenance of autonomy and turns out to be 
a battle ground among interest groups. In turn, officials are compelled 
to make promises to support diverse and even opposing interests. These 
promises have an appearance of seriousness, since the officials make the 
claim to have technical expertise in managing such interests. This means 
that the public domain is being fragmented into disconnected interests, 
thus, resulting in the privatization of the polity. This is to say, the members 
of such a community tend to enter the public domain only to the extent 
that an issue is relevant to their own and not to the public’s interests. The 
political realm becomes a means to fulfill other purposes. It ceases to be 
an institution of autonomous freedom. And this is what constitutes the 
legitimation crisis: abolition of dialogue between autonomous and equal 
persons and, hence, a loss of human participation.
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A legitimation crisis is in part coextensive with a complex and inter-
connected set of factors that tend to exclude citizens from participating 
in public dialogue. First, giving priority to instrumental reason leads to 
the assumption that technical experts ought to be empowered to solve all 
issues. There appears a contingent of “experts” or technocrats to manage 
citizens. Second, the public’s demands are equally reduced to the level of 
material wellbeing. The public comes to be comprised of interests that are 
privatesocial and not publicpolitical. As a result, the public demands that 
the appointed officials manage the affairs of the public at the level of inter-
ests and not at the level of earlier discussed public institutions. Third, since 
interests vary and are backed by differences in social power, then those, 
who are socially and privately more powerful, dominate the public arena 
and direct the enactment of laws. This results not only in the emergence of 
winning interests, but also the division of the public into classes and pres-
sure groups. Such a division fosters public apathy and cynicism. Fourth, 
these factors imply that a legitimate government is one that supports in-
terests of all kinds of groups. What remains at best are freedom of choice 
among technically produced material commodities based on “needs” (and 
not autonomy) and, finally, abolition of responsibility (as autonomy).
There is no difference between capitalist or communist societies, be-
cause in either case public officials are in charge of managing public affairs 
and are thought to have the right ideology for guaranteeing material and 
psychological wellbeing of the population. The main result is a technocracy 
without a political ethos. This type of government regards itself as capable 
of adjudicating public affairs merely on the basis of material interests and 
technical expertise. This form of management is seen as factual and, thus, 
ethically neutral. This presumed neutrality opens the door for moralizing 
about the practices of the technocratic establishment, not to mention the 
debasing of the public domain by various mythologies. Instead of calling 
for the public accounting of such practices, the citizens “participate” only 
to the extent of making moralizing complaints. Together, such “participa-
tion” abolishes the public arena, where free and equal citizens make deci-
sions and demand their enactment. The public servants also win elections 
by relying on technical experts to design rhetorical images to mesmerize 
the public not by presenting a rational case for debate, but by “messages”, 
such as “Don’t worry, be happy”.
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While one must report the news, one need not stop at this level. A 
free press, if it is free, is also responsible for informing the public what the 
officials are hiding behind the obfuscations, theatrics and equivocations. 
At the same time, what is relevant to the public must be exposed to insure 
that public figures explain their rhetoric or the introduction of myths, mo-
ralities or ideologies into the public arena. Clearly, the institution of free 
press is one of the key institutions of political society and is linked inextri-
cably to the continuous maintenance of such a polity. It will not do to ar-
gue that currently the main mass media is dominated by huge enterprises, 
which are interest laden and present prejudicial views to serve such inter-
ests. In brief, alternative media must have an equal voice to present other 
viewpoints. No doubt, but it is important to note that the very institution 
of the public domain allows alternative media to have a say and maintain 
a plural public. Yet, it must also be clear that while the main stream media 
might be dominated by interests, it cannot be counted as journalistic mass 
media, designed to maintain the public domain of autonomy and equal-
ity, but simply as a social and private institution, engaged in advertising 
private ideologies, moralities and other designer wares. If the alternative 
media are to serve the public domain, it cannot fall into the same trap of 
presenting their own private and social interests, but must counter the 
main stream media by filling the gap, where the main stream has failed. 
Education
There cannot be any doubt that autonomy, responsibility and rights 
are coextensive with knowledge. Ignorant persons cannot make judgments 
in public dialogue without running the risk of being misled by all sorts of 
rhetorical ploys and interest manipulations. Education is a process from 
authority to autonomy – rational and free adjudication of issues based 
on knowledge. One must move through authority by those, who know a 
subject matter and are capable of articulating its intricacies, whether in 
sciences, literatures, social affairs and even public institutions. But one 
must also grow out of being subjected to authority by mastering issues and 
complexities in principle of different fields of knowledge in order to make 
rational and thus autonomous decisions. Without such a process, the per-
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son cannot be responsible for his decisions, since the latter are blind and 
irrational. In this sense, education is another institution that is coextensive 
with the public domain of dialogue and, finally, autonomy and respon-
sibility. This extends into the very domain of universal human rights to 
education as a continuation of all other rights to be autonomous, equal 
and responsible member of human public community. This is specifically 
important in an age, where such public domain and universal rights to 
autonomy and equality are being assaulted by technocracy and material-
istic reductionism of all functions of human life to cause and effect and, 
hence, to irresponsibility. By now, it ought to be obvious that autonomy 
and equality are not pre-given empirical data, but are phenomena that re-
main as long as we enact them. This is the case with education – a process 
from authority to autonomy – where autonomy is developed and finally 
exercised with full responsibility. This means that any refusal to partici-
pate in autonomous engagements is identical with the loss of autonomy.
A political society constitutes its own purpose, without which there 
could not be any talk of free speech, assembly, free market. Democracy 
is never a means for some interest, since in such a case individuals would 
reduce their public actions (use democracy) for their private interests and 
abandon the very meaning of democracy. The political institution is coex-
tensive with the public domain of autonomous persons, who are engaged 
in dialogue about matters that are deemed significant for public life. This 
life is strictly distinguished from social and individual activities that are 
interest laden and, thus, lack the autonomy to be political. Indeed, the po-
litical must be restricted to the public domain, in which members of socie-
ty participates in open dialogue and decisions. Publicly appointed officials 
are bound by the democratic ethos to maintain this arena and, thus, are 
called on to communicate public issues. Any communication that is based 
on obfuscation and designed to advance a particular group is inappropri-
ate for this domain. In various ways, such a communication becomes a 
monologue and rejects the dialogical structure and exchange of informa-
tion that is required to maintain the autonomy of the public. Seemingly, 
those, who claim to have expertise in the design and manipulation of rhe-
torical images, do not have anything to do with the public domain; rather, 
they add to the legitimation crisis that leads, finally, to public cynicism. 
The political free press, as part and parcel of originating and maintaining 
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the political society, serves all by providing information that is of public 
concern for educated and responsible persons. 
It is obviously incorrect to equate morality with laws and rights. Mor-
al laws require the person’s freedom, but they have no compulsory call to 
be followed. Freely established laws as a guarantee of freedom can be en-
forced and consequences delimited in case of the incursions against such 
laws. Thus, those, who are appointed to insure the public domain, are not 
preservers of any morality, but keepers of the law and nothing else. Inclu-
sion of morality would turn political society into warring factions of fanat-
ics, each offering his “ultimate value”. If the judiciary were to assume the 
role of the preserver of morality, then it would have to apply the methods 
of inquisition in order to check the private conscience of every citizen. 
Let us take up the issue of the so-called economic crisis sweeping 
the globe. By admissions from all sides, the crisis was a result of abol-
ishing various legal restrictions on private enterprises. The managers of 
such enterprises paid handsomely to the public servants to support social/
private interests and, thus, neglect the laws that were of public interest. 
This move is coextensive with the notion that we no longer need political 
society; we shall reduce all public matters to private affairs and exclude 
the public from participating in the public domain and the formation of 
laws. The very concept of representative government loses its credibility, 
since the appointed or elected public servants are also interested only in 
their private aggrandizement. When the elected public servants can write 
laws for others, but exclude themselves from such laws, then the very no-
tion of “equality under the law” is meaningless and allows the citizenry 
to claim that no one need follow laws. One of the blatant and well known 
cases is insider trading rules. Privatization of everything means that there 
is nothing left of democracy, and the public domain is a place of total war 
of all against all; no wonder that no one questions strange notions in de-
mocracy, such as “who is currently in power”. In the democratic public 
domain, no one is in power, but the language of power suggests that we 
have abandoned our citizenship, autonomy and responsibility. In brief, it 
is the equal, autonomous citizens, with rights, duties, responsibilities and 
honor, who abandon the maintenance of democracy.
The citizen must also be cognizant of all sorts of mystifications and 
obfuscations that – almost imperceptibly – abolish autonomy and respon-
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sibility. The just mentioned economic crisis was not a responsibility of 
the managers of enterprises, but the doing of “the market” as some sort of 
mysterious “invisible hand” that relieves the actors of their responsibili-
ties. It is assumed that “market knows best” and has the power to improve 
lives everywhere – provided that one “obeys the market”. Examples are 
too numerous to recount of the mention of the wisdom and power of this 
supreme authority: if the Indonesians had listened to and obeyed the re-
quirements of the market, they would be well off; it is their government 
that was fallible and interfered in the market, or morning radio “news” 
proclaiming that the Wall Street investors are nervously waiting to “see 
what the market has decided”. It is peculiar that while admitting human 
errors, everyone knows the grand, divine market that is an unfailing au-
thority of all human affairs. These were private individuals making deci-
sions solely for their private benefit and, hence, are the only ones, who 
should be held responsible. Yet, most of them, if not still in their own 
positions, descended into their mansions on golden parachutes. They are 
the ones, who demanded “deregulations” not because the invisible hand 
called for it, but because they wanted to be pure capitalists: live for profit 
without restrictions as to the means. And the gap widens, while the citi-
zens of democracy, task of which is to fill this gap, have also disappeared. 
The infallible left and the infallible right must come to terms in the 
realization that political society is neither capitalist nor socialist, since nei-
ther would allow public participation in all matters of concern. The right 
wants an absolute rule from above and that means, in principle, a society 
ruled by one power without any right to question such mode of rulership, 
while the left, in principle, wants some sort of mysterious abstraction – the 
government – to do for everyone what everyone cannot do for herself – 
ending in a state, where the political society disappears and a ruling elite 
with the grateful ruled would form a society. One side already has all the 
answers absolutely, whether the answers come from some unquestionable 
pronouncements in ancient stories or from some absolute, although in-
visible, hand, the other side has scientific technocracy that can do every-
thing that society requires, as long as members of public cease to meddle 
in things that are beyond the ken of the majority of the population. While 
the rhetoric is different – one wants to rule “in the name of…” whatever, 
the king of kings, the invisible hand, the other wants to rule “in the name 
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of…” the people, as long as the people do not interfere. In both cases, we 
are moved back to social – power relationships, and away from our public 
domain, our democracy. No social conditions, no systems, no lords, can 
make us free and equal; it is up to us to resume our duties and responsibili-
ties as citizens and, hence, as the government and management of social 
affairs. Democracy is not a system, but is always in the making by us, and if 
we cease to participate in its making either by neglect or by assuming some 
infallible poises we shall abandon what is in principle a human way of life.
Legitimation Crisis
While legitimation was mentioned briefly, its dangers are more exten-
sive, since the assumption of bureaucratic conditions by the governmental 
apparatus tends to usurp all domains of socio-economic processes, and 
such usurpation leads to political problems of legitimation. It is notewor-
thy that some of the most influential writers in the field of socio-economic 
domain, such as Jurgen Habermas, have raised the problem of legitima-
tion of the government in the contemporary Western societies. The crisis 
of legitimation hinges on two preeminent factors: (i) the politization of 
economy as technocracy and (ii) the de-politization of politics or the tech-
nocratization of politics. While these two factors are logically distinct, they 
function in a complex web of interrelationships. Hence, their treatment 
cannot be separated into clear lines. If we were to take the economic re-
lationships between the corporations and their employees, we would find 
that purely speaking the contract between the employer and the employee 
is economical. It is a free choice of the employee to offer his/her abilities 
for an agreed remuneration and conditions of work. The same is valid of 
the employer. The employer is free to employ a person with certain abili-
ties to perform required duties and under certain conditions, such that if 
the abilities are no longer required, or if the employee disagrees with the 
conditions, the contract can be terminated. This process is politically “in-
different”. It does not depend on political powers either for capital or for 
regulations. The capital produced at the economic sphere is distributed in 
accordance with the agreements among employers and the employed and 
in accordance with the exchange values of commodities.
212 CHAPTER VI 
On the political side, the governmental functions are purely for the 
maintenance of agreements obtained among individuals, groups of indi-
viduals or between a group and an individual. The political functions are 
not there to prescribe new relationships among individuals, but to insure 
the relationships, which are accepted or agreed upon between individuals. 
Moreover, the political functions are not for the sake of economic enhance-
ment of individuals or particular groups. If there is taxation, the monies 
are to be spent in the public sphere, such as education, maintenance of 
public domains and services. The monies are not spent for the economic 
support of particular individuals or groups. The monies cannot be em-
ployed to intervene in private economy and its agreements and practices. 
If this is not respected, then politics and economy become mixed and the 
mixture leads to socio-economic tensions and confrontations. Who is to 
get the tax money and for what economic purposes? By political inter-
vention into the economic sphere, political functions become economic 
powers, with which groups and individuals must reckon in terms of eco-
nomic benefits. Instead of being executors of social regulations, the po-
litical functionaries assume a power of distribution of economic benefits, 
which can be wielded to obtain both political and economic advantages, 
either of the political functionary or of his/her ideological friends in the 
private economic sector.
The conflicts in the economic sphere, the problems in the relation-
ship between employer and employee are conflicts of contract, to which 
both the employer and employee commit themselves. The conflicts are to 
be resolved at the economic level. Of course, the agreements must also be 
treated as legal-political and, indeed, the bargaining by worker’s organiza-
tions are to be treated both as economic and legal insofar, as the individual 
is represented by a group and, thus, delegates the group’s elected repre-
sentatives to guarantee the individual’s rights. Yet, if the political sphere 
assumes economic clout, it translates the economic conflicts into political 
conflicts. In this case, individuals and groups begin to look for purely eco-
nomic solutions of conflicts toward the political sphere. Such a situation 
exposes the political functionary to the economic pressures of the private 
sphere and exposes the private functionary to the dangers of seeking solu-
tions for private economic problems in the political sphere. The political 
functionary can be “bought” for economic benefit, because the benefac-
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tors expect economically favorable conditions from the political function-
ary. Moreover, the promise to support a specific economic legislature for 
the interests of some group also implies that the members of a given group 
will vote for the individual making such promises. Here, autonomy be-
gins to slip away toward causes and, thus, ceases to belong in the public 
domain.
Before we can proceed, we must point out that the analysis of legitima-
tion crisis by Marxism is no longer applicable for the current socio-politi-
cal structure of the Western nations. The reason for this inapplicability lies 
in the very continuation of the modern liberal tenets, which, while seeking 
equality, have introduced the functions of the political state into the pri-
vate sphere, into the field of economic relationships and the distribution 
of privately acquired wealth, income and economic relationships among 
the members of society. Economy has lost its autonomy from the state, au-
tonomy so necessary for Marxian analysis of the relationship between pri-
vate and public-political domains. By means of planning agencies, by the 
use of public funds acquired through taxation or over-extension of credit, 
the government tends to create conditions for equalization of economic 
status; not only by public funds, but also by the introduction of laws, such 
as the minimum-wage law, the equalization tendency is carried out and 
introduced into all private domains. This means that the private, econom-
ic contracts between the employer and the employee have become acts of 
politically required agreements. Of course, these are not the only factors; 
there are governmental credits, price guarantees, subsidies, loans, con-
tracts, income distribution, labor contracts and policies, through which 
adjustments are made between competing private interests; the govern-
ment furthermore intervenes in trade relationships at the international 
level by subsiding advertisements of major economic players – the corpo-
rate welfare. It also infuses capital in various “non-productive” domains, 
such as space exploration, armaments, public works, transportation, com-
munication, health, housing, city planning, research and development, 
etc., that can be translated into benefits for “private economy”.
The political intervention in the productive segment may and, indeed, 
has taken various forms: first of all, it intervenes by establishing what can 
be called “reflexive labor”. This consists of governmentally funded pro-
grams of scientific and technological research, which is subsequently em-
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ployed for the private segment of the productive process and, hence, ben-
efits the private accumulation of capital. This means that the government 
purchases private labor with public funds and subsequently is in a position 
to “favor”” some private segment with the products of publicly funded 
labor. Secondly, in various private sectors, the private arrangements be-
tween employer and the employed, the corporation and the union, have 
been replaced by political procedures determining the cost of labor. Since, 
as is well known, the value of commodities are based, according to Marx-
ism, on the labor quantum (measured in terms of socially required time per 
unit), then political functions intervene to dictate the production of “market 
value” and, indeed, the “surplus value”, from which originates profits. This 
is not to say that only Marxism is here untenable, but also that the political, 
the public sphere, assumes inroads into the private sphere and can use this 
intrusion to support one private segment against the others. 
If we were to extend this logic to its conclusion, the outcome would be 
the complete control of private segment by the public and, thus, the aboli-
tion both of the private and the public domains. While this is problem-
atic in itself, more fundamentally, there is a hidden danger of the political 
functionaries employing the public segment, the public wealth and the 
products of publicly funded “reflexive labor” as a punishment or reward 
for the private domain. Such procedure can lead to “silent” coercion of 
the private segment, since the political platforms are structured in terms 
of private inducements in economic and welfare areas. Free elections no 
longer lead to the selection of officials to guard the public domain, but to 
handle the populations’ private affairs. The private domain becomes po-
liticized and the public sphere becomes open to private interests; in turn, 
the private interests are exposed to political manipulation.
The point is that the organizational principle of socio-political life has 
been drastically altered. The distinction between the private and the pub-
lic has been obliterated. The non-political relationships, in the econom-
ic sphere, for example, have become political, where private economic 
achievements are distributed socially vis-a-vis the political or public func-
tions. This is the reason or at least one of the reasons for the confidence-
crisis. The population no longer votes for a public platform, but for private 
platform, which promises to fulfill private needs by way of distributing the 
privately acquired social wealth and benefits. If the platform tends to favor 
215LIFE IN-BETWEEN
one private segment over the other, then the vote is split along the lines 
of who falls within the favored and who falls outside the favored private 
interests. The crisis reaches a culminating point, when the political func-
tionaries cannot carry out the promises to fulfill the needs of the private 
sphere. There are created expectations in this fulfillment by the public, 
and when the fulfillment cannot be attained, the public views that its vote 
is “irrelevant”, that its participation in the public affairs “makes no differ-
ence”. This is indeed ironic, because the public has accepted the notion 
that the public sphere must somehow manage the private sphere. Not only 
manage, but comprise the conditions for the welfare of the private sphere. 
By requesting the fulfillment of private welfare, the public invites the po-
litical domain to intervene into the private domain and, thus, obliterates 
the differentiation between the public and the private spheres. The social 
steering mechanism is no longer a self-regulating private segment, such as 
economy, but the state apparatus, which has assumed functions capable of 
replacing and, indeed, coercing the private functions. 
This is laden with the questions of legitimation and its crises. This is 
obvious, when the governmental planning cannot steer the private seg-
ment to fulfill all private interests and accommodate all the conflicting 
private demands. In this case, some segments of population will be op-
posed to the governmental functions and will see them as illegitimate. The 
governmental intrusion into the private domain and the obliteration of 
the distinction between the private and the public leads to the legitimation 
crisis. In turn, the publics’ demand for governmental solution to private 
problems leads to the same crisis of privatization of the public sphere and, 
hence, to the dissatisfactions when the public sphere cannot solve all pri-
vate, social and economic problems. Another factor in legitimation crisis, 
as would be perceived by the population, is the loss of the confidence in 
the conception of fair exchange. There is an awareness that the distribu-
tion of wealth and welfare depends on governmental policies and the po-
litical negotiations, which mediate among various private interest groups. 
It is known that in the free private sphere the basic motive is profit and, 
hence, setting of goals in terms of maximizing profit. Since these priori-
ties, due to governmental interference, have lost their “natural” force, they 
must be legitimated through political process. Since governmental inter-
ference distributes public wealth and welfare in accordance with interest 
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groups, the productive interests, such as corporations, while receiving 
public funds, are perceived as receiving an illegitimate dole for maximiz-
ing private profit from the public funds. Hence, they maximize profit not 
only on the basis of free market, but also on the basis of governmental 
favors. Since the public perceives these favors as stemming from the public 
domain, it views the governmental action as illegitimate; after all, such an 
action “makes the rich richer”. Hence, voting for a political party and/or 
its platform is seen as useless, since the function of such a platform does 
not allow the private sphere to function in terms of its own risks, but rather 
aids the private sphere to exploit the public sphere. Since the public does 
not wish to legitimate private appropriation of public’s wealth and since 
the political party is nonetheless involved in the distribution of public’s 
wealth to private interest groups, then the population concludes that its 
input in public affairs is meaningless, powerless and ultimately irrelevant.
After all, formal democracy is designed to insure the independence of 
the public sphere from private interests, and yet the governmental func-
tions, by politicizing private interests, change the substance of formal de-
mocracies. In turn, as paradoxical as this may seem, the formal democracy 
is depoliticized, insofar as the voter is concerned. The elected functionaries 
in the public sphere are using their political functions to favor and to sanc-
tion private economic processes and either accumulation of profits by one 
group or use of public funds for the undeserved welfare of another group. 
In turn, paradoxically, while the public demands of the officials to engage 
only in the public-political sphere, it depoliticizes the public sphere by de-
manding that it fulfill the needs of private welfare. In both cases, the public 
sphere is obliterated and the meetings dealing with the public affairs are 
attended only by those, whose immediate private interests are affected. 
The public’s participation in the public’s affairs is no longer public. The 
result is a political “privativism”.
The increased activity of the state produces an expanded need for 
legitimation, for justification of governmental intrusion in the private 
sphere. At the same time, the process of administrative planning produces 
the unintended effect of undermining the traditional procedures of legiti-
mation. What this means is that by planning “public programs”, such as 
educational, family, health, the government “publicizes” the private do-
main by offering technological solutions to questions, which were once 
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settled by traditional ethics and norms functioning in the private sphere. 
Yet, this “politicization” is merely an appearance. The public, having been 
offered the “programs” for health, housing, family planning, education, 
depoliticizes the process and makes it into “private” rights to have “public” 
health, housing, education and, indeed, welfare. The end effect is the dis-
ruption of private norms of social action and their replacement by bureau-
cratic procedures, which depend on political parties and their platforms. 
This, nonetheless, does not lead to public rights in the public sphere, but 
to private rights to services and conditions. It leads to privatization of the 
public domain. In brief, state interventionism into the private domain of 
this kind, into norms of action, disrupts the culturally accepted forms of 
behavior legitimation, translates them into the public domain, while the 
public depoliticizes the public domain by regarding the public functionar-
ies and programs they establish as “private rights”. The only demands that 
the public tends to place on the governmental officials is the fulfillment of 
private welfare. But in this sense, the public legitimation of the public do-
main is in crisis. The public domain should remain outside of the private 
manipulation of interests, and yet the only function that the public offi-
cials fulfill is a private one. Since we are dealing with the domain of norms, 
within which traditional private sphere functioned, the disruption of such 
norms leads to the disruption of values, which cannot be reproduced at 
will. There are no administrative procedures for production of values. 
They emerge and develop through long traditions. Once disrupted by 
bureaucratic-technocratic programs, they tend to vanish. A good example 
would be the publicly provided means for abortion. Everyone has a right 
to abortion. By such a provision, the state enters into a private sphere, 
which was once regulated by values. By providing a free access to abor-
tion, the state sanctions abortion and, thus, disrupts the traditional values; 
and yet, it does not establish a value, since it claims that the programs are 
technical or bureaucratic means for the citizen to achieve private ends. But 
the voter, who must legitimate a political platform, is called upon to legiti-
mate a program, which is disruptive of the citizen’s private values. While 
attempting to legitimate the public sphere, the voter is asked to legitimate 
programs, which are means for private ends inconsistent with traditional 
values. Indeed, the political functionaries may point out that if the voter 
disagrees with abortion, he/she needs not use the public program – after 
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all, that is his/her private business – yet, the voter is asked to endorse a 
program, which is against his/her values. This is to say, the voter is asked 
to legitimate a program, which will be used for private purposes by others, 
who, while initially maintaining the traditional values, may be tempted to 
abolish such values through the availability of such a program. In turn, 
those, who claim that the political domain is disrupting values, is com-
pelled to demand that political platforms should make those values into a 
law, e.g., prohibiting abortion by law.
The danger of disrupting the values and meaningful norms of social 
interaction lies not only in the inability of administrative production of 
values and meanings, but, above all, in the mechanization of human deci-
sion making process, in the reification of choices in a way that the indi-
vidual’s decisions are channeled into prescribed programmatic avenues. 
This is to say that value decisions are abolished in favor of mechanical 
means to achieve mechanical aims: pregnancy – public programs for abor-
tion or laws mechanically prohibiting abortion. Welfare recipience is an-
other variant of the same problem of legitimation. Availability of public 
programs tends to relieve the individual of decision and channels him/her 
choices into the acceptance and use of the programs. This kind of mecha-
nization tends to create a society without values, specifically, when the 
governmental functionaries establish the means for solving not public, but 
private problems. The private decisions of values are preempted by the 
publicly, i.e., politically, established means or conditions to attain ends 
mechanically. This procedure, of course, follows our previous discussion 
of the technological structure of modern thought. Given certain condi-
tions, certain results will follow; the conditions, in the political sense, are 
established by the state, and the private citizens are channeled to reach 
the results prescribed by the conditions. If this “logic” were to be taken to 
its conclusions, then the state would have to establish conditions in every 
area of social life, directing the population to fulfill mechanically the re-
quirements established by the conditions. This purely technological pro-
cess is devoid of value and meaning.
At the face value, such a process has been interpreted to be beneficial 
to the population. It was claimed that it constitutes far greater variety of 
choices for the individual to achieve his/her desires. It was claimed that 
the individual can choose to use the conditions if he/she needs them or 
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wants them and to disregard them if the conditions are irrelevant in his/
her life. Yet, such an argument contradicts the liberal thesis that the indi-
vidual is conditioned by his/her social environment and contradicts the 
conservative thesis that individuals follow their natural greed. It is pre-
sumed that the establishment of conditions is tantamount to the changing 
of the individual in terms of those conditions and, conservatively, that 
such conditions go counter to human nature, which is equally determi-
nate. In this sense, the question of choice is redundant. Moreover, if this 
thesis were to be pushed to the limit, then it could be maintained that: (a) 
the voter cannot make any choices, since the choices are determined by 
the voter’s conditions or nature, (b) the political party in power should 
be in a position to either establish conditions, which would compel the 
voter to vote for the party or to propose that the individual must follow 
some inherent nature; (c) voting, as a legitimating process, would be re-
dundant, since the voter is not choosing the political figures; rather, the 
outcome is predetermined by conditions or by nature. This, of course, is 
another problem in legitimation. While we are under the illusion that we 
are electing officials to manage the public domain, we are: (a) responding 
to socially established conditions or natural compulsions; (b) “electing” 
officials, whose only function is to augment conditions for the private do-
main; (c) “electing” officials, whose aim is to fulfill their private aims and/
or natural inclinations.
The mechanization of the public domain, its programming for the 
“benefits” of private lives, abolishes the public domain. After all, the public 
domain is the sphere of a free forum on how to manage common affairs in 
a rational way. Yet, with the mechanization of the public domain, its sole 
function is to adjudicate the ways that conditions are established for vari-
ous and competing private interests, “who gets what”. The “public” offi-
cials, who are temporarily in the driver’s seat, are in a position to dispense 
favors not on the basis of values or social norms or on rational grounds, 
but on the basis of technological and bureaucratic “expertise”. The public 
sphere becomes a process of trade-off between (i) competing private inter-
ests and (ii) between the political functionaries and their private interests 
and the private interests of various social groups. The problem of legiti-
mation, of course, cannot be resolved where values and meaningful social 
norms are involved. After all, there cannot be trade-off of values, unless 
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values are reduced to material needs. One cannot say that if you surrender 
your principles, dealing with abortion and vote for a platform embodying 
public abortion programs, you will get a program for better housing. Even 
if the legitimation crisis, in the domain of public distribution of economic 
wealth, can be covered over, where the privatization of the public domain 
is not noticed, it is impossible to cover over the legitimation crisis in the 
public domain of values by the technocratic means.
An attempted disregard of values and meaningful social norms by 
the political functionaries do not solve, but rather delay the question of le-
gitimation crisis. If the social individuals are motivated by their culturally 
developed values and meaningful norms of interaction, the motivations, 
provided by the political sphere in terms of technical programs, clash with 
the values. Metaphorically speaking, it is a confrontation of spirit and 
matter. The tragedy is that under liberal interpretation of the social fabric, 
matter must win, since the theory of social conditioning claims that the 
material factors determine and, indeed, change our spiritual motivations. 
But in this case, the state, the political public domain loses all claims to 
value and moral justification and responsibility. Legitimation crisis, in this 
sense, is a moral and a value crisis.
It is possible, thus, to decipher a motivational crisis in the public and 
its willingness to participate in the public domain. If socio-cultural value 
motivations play a role in the legitimation of public and political domain 
and if this domain obliterates values in favor of material programs, then 
the motivation for participating in public affairs may diminish drastically. 
“I am not going to vote for a platform which offers abortion programs 
funded by public funds”. After all, the funds are going to be employed for 
the propagation of a perceived private immorality. It is, thus, comprehen-
sible that a motivation for participating in the legitimation of the platform 
may be absent. This lack of motivation can be generalized to include other 
public factors. If the individual adheres to a traditionally maintained work 
ethic, he/she will find no reason to vote for a platform, the only concern of 
which is to establish public programs, which pay private citizens for their 
non-productivity or unwillingness to engage in useful work.
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Postscript
Throughout this chapter, there appeared a tension between the pub-
lic and the private-social, such that while the distinction between them is 
posited in principle, it begins to blur with the vast input of technocracy, 
intrusion of the public in the private and appearance of the private in the 
public and, thus, a mixture of public/private. Yet, the basic issue that frames 
this tension is the efforts to adjudicate and balance between freedom and 
equality. Pure “market” leads to drastic and even increasing inequalities, but 
equalizing economic positions leads to accusations of discarding freedom. 
After all, the modern Political Enlightenment has an arche that each person 
is equal and free to follow his own purposes, to engage in enterprises, lead an 
unobstructed life, and yet those, who lose their equality due to the advance-
ment of the free talents of others, their “doing better” than others, claim that 
equality is lost and demand an equalization of social domain by publically 
established rules. Lithuania after the revolution has been indeed tensed be-
tween these two, initially identical, aspects of the Political Enlightenment. 
Once technocracy and market forces enter, the balancing of freedom and 
equality becomes intensified, leading on all sides for either public interven-
tion or calls for exclusion of the public/political from private affairs. To see 
this issue in deeper and broader dimensions, it will be necessary to disclose 
Lithuania’s presence in European Union and the latter’s role in the context 
of the logic of globalization. And this is the task of the next volume.
Suggested Reading
Feuer, L.S. Marx’s and Engel’s Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1964).
Habermas, J. Knowledge and Human Interest (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).
Adorno, T. W. and Horkheimer, M. Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Allen 
Lane, 1973).
Leiss, W. The Domination of Nature (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974).
Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962).
Popper, K. The Powerty of Historicism (New York: Free Press, 1955).
Marcuse, H. An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).
 Mickunas A.
Mi53   MODERN WEST: TWO LIFE WORLDS. Monograph. – Vilnius: Myko-
las Romeris University, 2013. 222 p.
  ISBN 978-9955-19-605-1 (print)
  ISBN 978-9955-19-604-4 (online)
  The fall of the Soviet Union and the political, cultural and economic shift of Lithuania 
toward western European world requires complex analyses of the philosophical context in 
which such a shift could take place. The context is modern western civilization, consisting 
of two life worlds, established under the names of Political and Scientific Enlightenments. 
One major task of the text consists of a disclosure of the founding principles of these two life 
worlds to note both, their common ground and their seemingly irreconcilable divergence. In 
the text it is argued that the Soviet grand experiment is founded on a specific interpretation 
of Scientific Enlightenment that led to the invention of a theory called “Dialectical Materia­
lism” and its consequent reduction of all events to “material explanation”.
  The text also contains strict analyses of the Marxian, Soviet paradigm, called “Dialecti­
cal Materialism” and shows the impossibility to maintain such a paradigm without contra­
dictions. If the contradictions are to be avoided, then this paradigm must allow Political En­
lightenment as the ground without which the Soviet experiment is doomed to failure.
  Finally the text shows that Lithuanian proclamation of independence from Soviet 
Union opens the principles of Political Enlightenment and “joins” Western Europe as a site 
where autonomous and equal citizens become the basis of any government. Indeed, the text 
points to an issue which is unresolved: the materialism of the “free market” that demands 
“freedom” but abolishes equality and thus creates a fundamental tension in current Lithua­
nia between the fundamental and inseparable aspects: freedom and equality.
UDK 321.6/.8
Algis Mickunas
MODERN WEST: TWO LIFE WORLDS
Monograph 
Layout Daiva Šepetauskaitė
SL 585, 2013 12 09.
Number of copies published 150. Order 21 076.
Mykolas Romeris University
20 Ateities str., Vilnius
Website:  www.mruni.eu
E-mail: leidyba@mruni.eu
Prepared by JSC “Baltijos kopija”
Kareivių str. 13B, Vilnius, Lithuania
Website: www.kopija.lt
E-mail: info@kopija.lt
Printed by JSC “Vitae Litera”
Kurpių str. 5–3, Kaunas
Website: www.bpg.lt
E-mail: info@bpg.lt
